

2023 Asia-Pacific ESA Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea

May 19–21, 2023
Wooseok Economics Hall, SNU

Hosts



서울대학교 경제학부
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY



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Creative-Pioneering Researchers Program



서울대학교 경제연구소
분배정의 연구센터



MobLab

2023 APESA Conference Programme

May 19–21, 2023
Wooseok Economics Hall, SNU

May 19 (Friday)

08:30–09:00	Registration							
09:00–09:10	Opening Remarks Charles Noussair						Venue: Rm.107	
09:10–10:10	Keynote Presentation 1 Thomas Palfrey Title: Cursed Sequential Equilibrium: A Dynamic Theory of Cursed Behavior with Applications						Venue: Rm.107	
	Venue:	Rm.307	Rm.504	Rm.109	Rm.208	Rm.207	Rm.308	Rm.405
	Type:	Hybrid	Hybrid	In Person	In Person	In Person	In Person	Online Only
10:20–11:50	Session 1	Concurrent 1 CSES Sponsored Session	Concurrent 2 Artificial Intelligence	Concurrent 3 Auction(3A)	Concurrent 4 Gender 1(3A)	Concurrent 5 Information Acquisition		Concurrent 7 Social Norms and Labor Market(3A)
11:50–12:50	Lunch							Venue: Rm.206
12:50–14:20	Session 2	Concurrent 1 KDIS Sponsored Session	Concurrent 2 COVID-19 Pandemic 1	Concurrent 3 Bias	Concurrent 4 Game 1	Concurrent 5 Method	Concurrent 6 Network	
14:30–16:00	Session 3	Concurrent 1 Field 1	Concurrent 2 Coordination and Cooperation	Concurrent 3 Cheap Talk	Concurrent 4 Rationalizing Irrationality	Concurrent 5 Risk	Concurrent 6 Decision and Information	
16:10–17:10	Keynote Presentation 2 Juanjuan Meng Title: Algorithm-driven Personalization and Digital Addiction: A Field Experiment on TikTok (Douyin)						Venue: Rm.107	

May 20 (Saturday)

09:00–10:30	Session 4	Concurrent 1 Field 2	Concurrent 2 ADB Sponsored Session	Concurrent 3 Environmental 1(3A)	Concurrent 4 Game 2	Concurrent 5 Reward and Punishment	Concurrent 6 Decision 1	Concurrent 7 Operations Management (3A)
10:40–11:40	Keynote Presentation 3 Sanjeev Goyal Title: Economics of Networks: Lessons from Large Scale Laboratory Experiments						Venue: Rm.107	
11:40–13:00	Lunch							Venue: SARSHA(#113)
13:00–14:30	Session 5	Concurrent 1 BOK Sponsored Session	Concurrent 2 Lying and Deception		Concurrent 4 Information 1	Concurrent 5 Risk Attitudes	Concurrent 6 Cooperation in Social Dilemma	
14:40–16:10	Session 6	Concurrent 1 Market 1	Concurrent 2 Finance(3A)	Concurrent 3 COVID-19 Pandemic 2 (3A)	Concurrent 4 Identity	Concurrent 5 Public Goods		Concurrent 7 Environmental 2(3A)
16:20–17:20	Keynote Presentation 4 Andreas Blume Title: Language in Sender-Receiver Games: Theory and Experiments						Venue: Rm.107	
18:30–	Gala Dinner							Venue: On House Room (3rd floor) at the ON

May 21 (Sunday)

09:00–10:30	Session 7	Concurrent 1 Market 2(3A)		Concurrent 3 Communication and Persuasion(3A)	Concurrent 4 Information 2	Concurrent 5 Voting(3A)	Concurrent 6 Fairness(2A)	Concurrent 7 Decision 2
10:40–12:10	Session 8	Concurrent 1 Dynamics	Concurrent 2 Contest and Tournament	Concurrent 3 Discrimination	Concurrent 4 Gender 2	Concurrent 5 Trust	Concurrent 6 Drivers of Individual Decisions	Concurrent 7 Beliefs and Attitudes
12:10–13:00	Lunch							Venue: Rm.206
13:00–14:00	Keynote Presentation 5 Lorenz Goette Title: The Behavioral Mechanisms of Goal Setting: Evidence from Field Experiments						Venue: Rm.107	
14:00–14:30	Closing							Venue: Rm.107

Notes to Participants

About the virtual (hybrid and online) sessions:

1. Before participating, please ensure that you have installed and updated Zoom.
2. **There is a unique Zoom ID for all virtual sessions: 202 305 1921.** All sessions, including keynotes and parallel sessions, take place in "breakout rooms" within the Zoom session.
3. To join one of four breakout rooms (Keynote, Concurrent 1, Concurrent 2, and Concurrent 7), please enter the meeting ID to access the main room. From there, move to the appropriate breakout room to participate.
4. The Keynote, Concurrent 1, and Concurrent 2 sessions take place in hybrid settings for both in-person and online participants, while the Concurrent 7 session is held with online participants only. (Room 405 is reserved for Concurrent 7 sessions so that in-person audiences can also attend the online sessions.)
5. While all participants can share their screen, only the host can terminate screen sharing. So,
 - A) please refrain from sharing your screen unless you are presenting, and
 - B) once you have finished your presentation, please stop sharing your screen to allow the next presenter to share theirs.
6. If you have any questions, please send a message to the host in the room you are visiting (although they may not always be attentive to messages).

About the presentations:

1. Each 1.5 hour session consists of four (or fewer) presenters. This allocates each presenter up to 22 minutes, which includes Q&A and preparation time to share the screen.
2. The session chair, who is the last speaker of the session, is responsible for keeping the time of each presenter.
3. Even if a session has fewer than four presenters, please stick to the scheduled presentation times in the program to allow attendees to switch between parallel sessions and attend different presentations smoothly.
4. All presenters should upload their presentation slides to the computer in the session room before the session.

May 19 (Friday)

Session 1 (10:20–11:50)

[Hybrid] Concurrent 1 | Social Enterprises: CSES Sponsored Session

Venue: Rm.307

[The Effect of Hypocritical Corporate Social Responsibility Communication on Worker Misconduct in a Post-Crisis Context: Field Experimental Evidence From an Online Job Market](#)

Nils Kruse, Vienna University of Applied Sciences for Management & Communication

[The Impact of Consumer-rating Mechanisms on Consumer Behavior in Sharing Economy: A Case Study of Bike-sharing](#)

Jingjing Li, School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University

[The Impacts of Financial Incentives on Social Enterprises: the Social Progress Credit Experiment](#)

Syngjoo Choi, Seoul National University

[The Impacts of Media Exposure on Social Enterprises: A Social Network Perspective](#)

Booyeol Kim, Seoul National University

[Hybrid] Concurrent 2 | Artificial Intelligence

Venue: Rm.504

[Can Artificial Intelligence Improve Gender Equality? Evidence from a Natural Experiment](#)

Difang Huang, University of Hong Kong

[The effect of targeted nudge: Experimental evidence from a large-scale field experiment](#)

Zilin Zhan, Beijing Jiaotong University

[The Impact of Artificial Intelligence and Debiasing on Applicant Quality and Gender Diversity](#)

Loukas Balafoutas, University of Exeter

[Using AI and Behavioral Finance to Cope with Limited Attention and Reduce Overdraft Fees](#)

Orly Sade, The Hebrew University Business School

[In Person] Concurrent 3 | Auction(3A)

Venue: Rm.109

[A Comparison of Standard and All-Loss All-Pay Auctions](#)

Aric Shafran, Orfalea College of Business - Cal Poly San Luis Obispo

[All-pay versus First-Price Auction under Non-Neutral Framing: An Experimental Study](#)

Dexter Yu-Hsiang Hsu, National Taiwan University

[Towards the Understanding of Insincere Bidding in Vickrey Auction Experiment](#)

Tiffany Tsz Kwan TSE, Osaka University

[In Person] Concurrent 4 | Gender 1(3A)

Venue: Rm.208

[The impact of single-sex schools on women's willingness to lead](#)

Fu-Hsuan Tsai, National Taiwan University

[Productivity beliefs, competition entry, and gender quotas](#)

Robert Stueber, New York University Abu Dhabi

[Anticipated Discrimination and Wage Negotiation: A Field Experiment](#)

Ramon Cobo-Reyes, Georgetown University Qatar

[In Person] Concurrent 5 | Information Acquisition

Venue: Rm.207

[Social Ties affect Preferences for Competition](#)

Moritz Janas, NYU Abu Dhabi

[Improving Information Acquisition in School Choice: Theory and Experiment](#)

Siqi Pan, University of Melbourne

[When to Visit: Information Acquisition in College Admissions](#)

Youngwoo Koh, Korea University

[Acquisition and Utilization of Information in Social Networks](#)

Ernest Lai, Lehigh University

[Online Only] Concurrent 7 | Social Norms and Labor Market(3A)

Venue: Rm.405

[Swaying Gender Norms Around Women's Work in Indonesia: Evidence from an Online Intervention](#)

Diana Contreras Suarez, University of Melbourne

[Should Mothers Work? How Perceptions of the Social Norm Affect Individual Attitudes Toward Work in the U.S.](#)

Gizem Kosar, Federal Reserve Bank of New York

[Correction of Misperceptions and Spillover Effects on Other Beliefs: Another Look at the Case of Saudi Arabia](#)

Elif Incekara Hafalir, University of Technology Sydney

Session 2 (12:50–14:20)

[Hybrid] Concurrent 1 | Field: KDIS Sponsored Session

Venue: Rm.307

[Risk-return trade-offs in the context of environmental impact: a lab-in-the-field experiment with finance professionals](#)

Sebastien Duchene, Montpellier Business School

[Government Subsidies under Climate Risk: Provision of Rural Public Goods in the Lab and Field](#)

Shuwen Li, Shanghai Jiao Tong University

[Religiosity, risk aversion, and prudence among poor Muslim households: An experimental evidence](#)

Syedah Ahmad, University of Groningen

[Eliciting Preferences regarding the Idea of 'Love Marriage' in Rural India: Results from a List Experiment](#)

Joo Young Jeon, University of Reading

[Hybrid] Concurrent 2 | COVID-19 Pandemic 1

Venue: Rm.504

[Cognitive biases and emotions: A framing experiment](#)

Joanna Rachubik, University of Warsaw

[Strategic Sophistication and Collective Action: Theory and Evidence](#)

Mimi Jeon, Korea University

[Vaccination and Discrimination: Experimental Evidence under the COVID-19 Pandemic](#)

Shusaku Sasaki, Center for Infectious Disease Education and Research, Osaka University

[Selection Effects in the Insurance Market: What Getting Vaccinated Reveals about Insurance Preferences](#)

Orly Sade, The Hebrew University Business School

[In Person] Concurrent 3 | Bias

Venue: Rm.109

[Avoiding Dissonant Information](#)

Ceren Bengu Cibik, University of Warwick

[When Does Overconfidence Harm You? An Experimental Study on Learning with Misspecified Beliefs](#)

Sora Youn, Texas A&M University

[Reconciling Imposter Syndrome and Overconfidence: An Experiment](#)

Tianyi Li, University of Arizona

[Information Overload and Confirmation Bias](#)

Tsz Kin Leung, Hong Kong Baptist University

[In Person] Concurrent 4 | Game 1

Venue: Rm.208

[Positive and Negative Selection in Bargaining](#)

Dongkyu Chang, City University of Hong Kong

[Attribution of failure and success in strategic settings](#)

Lina Lozano, New York University Abu Dhabi

[Debt under uncertainty in the Nash demand game: experimental evidence](#)

Stefano Pagliarani, University of Warsaw

[The Netflix Paradox](#)

Philip Neary, Royal Holloway, University of London

[In Person] Concurrent 5 | Method

Venue: Rm.207

[Nudging Ex-post](#)

Hanlin Lou, University of New South Wales

[Will it be seen? Using Eye Tracking to Re-examine the Future Tense Effect in Intertemporal Choices](#)

Jiang Shiang Hu, National Taiwan University

[The Effect of Foreign Language Exposure: Lab Experiment on Economic Decisions](#)

Sheng-Yen Hsiao, National Taiwan University

[Eye-Tracking Spatial Beauty Contest Games: VBEM Estimation on Simulated and Actual Data](#)

Joseph Tao-yi Wang, National Taiwan University

[In Person] Concurrent 6 | Network

Venue: Rm.308

[Brokerage Rents and Intermediation Networks](#)

Frederic Moisan, Emlyon Business School

[Games on Networks: An Experimental Study](#)

Fulin Guo, University of Cambridge

[Network formation and efficiency in linear-quadratic games: An experimental study](#)

Gergely Horvath, Division of Social Sciences, Duke Kunshan University

[Cooperation and Cognition in Social Networks](#)

Yohanes Eko Riyanto, Nanyang Technological University

Session 3 (14:30–16:00)

[Hybrid] Concurrent 1 | Field 1

Venue: Rm.307

[Improving children's food choices: Experimental evidence from the field](#)

Angela Sanchez Gonzalez, University of Loyola

[The Consistency of Rationality Measurement](#)

You Shan, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University

[Do you like my politics? Love and war in an online dating experiment](#)

Anna Beloborodova

[Weight, Attractiveness, and Gender when Hiring: a Field Experiment in Spain](#)

Francisco Lagos, University of Granada

[Hybrid] Concurrent 2 | Coordination and Cooperation

Venue: Rm.504

[Coordination and Cooperation in Cultures with Vertical Age-Based Social Hierarchies](#)

Euncheol Shin, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology

[Coordination with Differential Time Preferences: Experimental Evidence](#)

Jeongbin Kim, Florida State University

[Response to intervention: An experimental study](#)

Yadi Yang, Nanjing Audit University

[Representation, Peer Pressure and Punishment in a Public Goods Game](#)

Doruk Iris, Sogang University

[In Person] Concurrent 3 | Cheap Talk

Venue: Rm.109

[How much you talk matters: Cheap talk and collusion in a Bertrand oligopoly game](#)

Jun Yeong Lee, Korea Energy Economics Institute

[Communication with Transparent Motives in the Laboratory](#)

Ye Jin, NYU Shanghai

[Monolingualism in the Lab](#)

Yuet Lyu, National Taiwan University

[Vague Language and Context Dependence](#)

Qinggong Wu, HKUST

[In Person] Concurrent 4 | Rationalizing Irrationality

Venue: Rm.208

[Choice and Attention Across Time](#)

Xi Zhi "RC" Lim, Shanghai Jiao Tong University

[Conspicuous Consumption in the Lab](#)

Ahrash Dianat, University of Essex

[Motivated Beliefs, Independence and Cooperation](#)

Wei Huang, CUHK Business School

[To upgrade or not: random menu and choice](#)

Rui Tang, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

[In Person] Concurrent 5 | Risk

Venue: Rm.207

[Disentangling the impact of financial literacy on behavior: Does financial literacy increase patience and risk tolerance?](#)

Ajalavat Viriyavipart, American University of Sharjah

[Earned Entitlement: Effort, luck, performance, and deservingness.](#)

Jose Maria Ortiz, Zayed University

[A Certainty Effect for Preference Reversals Under Risk: Experiment and Theory](#)

Paul Feldman, Texas A&M University

[Higher order risk preferences and economic decisions](#)

Charles Noussair, University of Arizona

[In Person] Concurrent 6 | Decision and Information

Venue: Rm.308

[The Effects of Information Network and Policy Instruments on Non-Point Source Pollution: A Laboratory Experiment](#)

Danielle Roy, University of Guelph

[Wait before crying a wolf? An experiment study on response time manipulation in two-stage game](#)

Bohan Ye, University of Southern Indiana

[An Approach to Testing Reference Points](#)

Ao Wang, National University of Singapore

[Randomization preference and the timing of uncertainty resolution](#)

Evan Calford, Australian National University

May 20 (Saturday)

Session 4 (09:00–10:30)

[Hybrid] Concurrent 1 | Field 2

Venue: Rm.307

[Nudging Civilian Evacuation During War: Evidence from Ukraine](#)

Monika Pompeo, New York University Abu Dhabi

[Voluntary Public Goods Provision in Rural Areas: A Lab-in-the-Field Investigation](#)

Yunpeng Li, School of Economics, Fudan University

[Priming Effect, Culture, and Gender: Evidence from the Academia](#)

Zeev Shtudiner, Ariel University

[Discrimination Under Non Gender-Blind Tests: Evidence from the Taiwan College Admission](#)

Joseph Tao-yi Wang, National Taiwan University

[Hybrid] Concurrent 2 | Behavioral Interventions: ADB Sponsored Session

Venue: Rm.504

[Promoting COVID-19 Vaccination in India](#)

Hyuncheol Bryant Kim, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

[Misinformation Belief, Health Behavior, and Labor Supply during COVID-19 Pandemic in a Developing Country](#)

Siho Park, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

[Peer Effects in Prosocial Behavior: Evidence from Natural and Lab-in-the-Field Experiments in China](#)

Yasuyuki Sawada, University of Tokyo

[In Person] Concurrent 3 | Environmental 1(3A)

Venue: Rm.109

[Public Acceptability of Carbon Pricing and its Determinants in Korea: A Discrete Choice Experiment and its Validation](#)

Jinsoo Bae, Korea Institute of Public Finance

[Promoting Willingness to Pay for "Climate Change and Environmental Charge" in Electricity Tariff: Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment](#)

Sungmin Lim, Seoul National University

[Perceived Control and Attitudes Towards Self-threatening Information](#)

Alice Solda, Ghent University

[In Person] Concurrent 4 | Game 2

Venue: Rm.208

[Strategic Delegation and Collusion: An Experiment](#)

Jeong Yeol Kim, University of Arizona

[Strategic Experimentation with Pirate Barrel: An Experimental Study](#)

OSub Kwon, Nankai University

[Viable Nash Equilibria: An Experiment](#)

Daehong Min, New York University Abu Dhabi

[Quantal Response Equilibrium with a Continuum of Types](#)

Evan Friedman, Paris School of Economics

[In Person] Concurrent 5 | Reward and Punishment

Venue: Rm.207

[The effects of bonus pay when working in a team; evidence from strawberry pickers in the field](#)

Aric Shafran, Orfalea College of Business - Cal Poly San Luis Obispo

[Rewarding Good Deeds by Reallocating Fines for Misbehaviour : An Experiment](#)

Lirong Yang, Nanyang Technological University

[History Dependence of Third-Party Punishment in Social Dilemmas: Defection Rate, Horizon and Experience](#)

Ozlem Tonguc, Binghamton University

[How Do Reward Versus Penalty Framed Incentives Affect Diagnostic Performance?](#)

Timothy Shields, Chapman University

[In Person] Concurrent 6 | Decision 1

Venue: Rm.308

[An Experiment on Diagnostic Expectations](#)

Wonwoo Bae, Seoul National University

[Salience in Juxtaposition Effect](#)

Xueqi Dong, Royal Holloway College, University of London

[Target in control: self-regulation of social influence in consumer choices.](#)

Anna Boros, University of Warsaw

[Non-Allais Paradox and Context Dependent Risk Attitudes](#)

Keh-Kuan Sun, Chapman University

[Online Only] Concurrent 7 | Operations Management(3A)

Venue: Rm.405

[Behavioral Investigation of Fulfilled Expectations in Network Product Adoption](#)

Yinghao Zhang, University of Cincinnati

[Cooperation and Anonymity: Does the Revelation of Group Members' Identities Affect Contributions in an Artefactual Public Good Field Experiment?](#)

Christian Hoenow, RWI - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research

[Behavioral Externalities of Process Automation](#)

Anyan Qi, The University of Texas at Dallas

Session 5 (13:00–14:30)

[Hybrid] Concurrent 1 | Finance: BOK Sponsored Session

Venue: Rm.307

[Does Algorithmic Trading Attenuate Asset Price Bubbles? An Experiment](#)

Stefan Altmann, ETH Zurich

[How Dark Trading Harms Financial Markets? Experimental Evidence](#)

Edward Halim, Nanyang Technological University

[Information Acquisition in Financial Markets with Algorithmic Traders: Experimental Evidence](#)

Mingyang Yan, Nanyang Technological University

[An experiment of a dynamic beauty contest game](#)

Nobuyuki Hanaki, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

[Hybrid] Concurrent 2 | Lying and Deception

Venue: Rm.504

[Lying and Deception in Repeated Communication](#)

Chanjoo Lee, Seoul National University

[Lying for Votes](#)

Subhasish Dugar, The University of Utah

[Overconfidence and Lying: Evidence from Cheating Game](#)

Younjun Kim, Southern Connecticut State University

[Concealing, Anticipatory, and Premeditated Lies](#)

Georgia Michailidou, New York University Abu Dhabi

[In Person] Concurrent 4 | Information 1

Venue: Rm.208

[The Korean MZ Generation's Retirement Savings](#)

Hae Won Byun, Korea Insurance Research Institute

[Still Turning a Blind Eye After Describing Your Ends And Means? An Experimental Study](#)

Fabian Bopp, Paderborn University

[Rank information acquisition at work: theory and experiment](#)

Jin Di Zheng, Nanjing Audit University

[Informed Principal Problems in the Laboratory](#)

Jin Yeub Kim, Yonsei University

[In Person] Concurrent 5 | Risk Attitudes

Venue: Rm.207

[False Sense of Security? A Study of Risk Compensation in the Lab and the Field](#)

Gyula Seres, National University of Singapore

[Risk attitude and belief updating](#)

Evelyn Huang, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

[Perceived correlations in risk attitudes](#)

Jingcheng Fu, National University of Singapore

[Happy Spouse, Happy House: Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes and Marital Satisfaction](#)

Eric Set, NYU Shanghai

[In Person] Concurrent 6 | Cooperation in Social Dilemma

Venue: Rm.308

[Social Preferences and the Variability of Conditional Cooperation](#)

Kyeongtae Lee, Bank of Korea

[Social norms and community enforcement of cooperation](#)

Boris WIECZOREK, CNRS – GAEL

[Stick and Carrot vs. Nash Reversion in the Laboratory Cournot Duopoly](#)

Jeongbin Kim, Florida State University

[Kantian Morality on Cooperation Behaviors in a Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma](#)

Chia-En Huang, National Taiwan University

Session 6 (14:40–16:10)

[Hybrid] Concurrent 1 | Market 1

Venue: Rm.307

[Pricing Data and Their Constituent Variables Traded in Markets with Resale: An Experimental Study](#)

Naoki Watanabe, Keio University

[Morality, Altruism, and Occupation Choice: Theory and Evidence](#)

Mengxing Wei, School of Economics, Nankai University

[Price forecasting interaction of informed and uninformed participants using a laboratory experiment](#)

Tomas Tichy, Technical University of Ostrava

[Information Aggregation in Contingent Claim Markets with Heterogeneous Values](#)

Cary Deck, University of Alabama

[Hybrid] Concurrent 2 | Finance(3A)

Venue: Rm.504

[Investment Behavior in Asset Market Crash: An Experimental Study](#)

Binglin Gong, East China Normal University

[The effect of tournament in investment decisions: An experimental investigation using eye-tracking](#)

Xiaotong Fang, Shanghai International Studies University

[The Effect of Passive Aggressive Investing on Market Quality](#)

Jason Shachat, Durham University

[In Person] Concurrent 3 | COVID-19 Pandemic 2(3A)

Venue: Rm.109

[Work from Home and Careers in the Post-Pandemic Context: Evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment](#)

Agnieszka Kasperska, University of Warsaw

[Effect of information provision on parental intention toward COVID-19 vaccination for children: A nationwide survey experiment](#)

Jung Hyun Park, Seoul National University

[Vaccination decisions in adults and theirs used for children: A study based on preference experiments, COVID-19 vaccination and public survey data](#)

Lijia Wei, Wuhan University

[In Person] Concurrent 4 | Identity

Venue: Rm.208

[When Do Men Shy Away From Competition? An Experiment on Unethical Conduct and Competitive \(dis\)Advantage](#)

Jingnan Chen, University of Exeter

[Ingroup bias with multiple identity dimensions: When attitudes towards government trump attitudes towards religion](#)

Jonathan Yeo, Nanyang Technological University

[Pro-Social Risk-Taking and Intergroup Conflict A Volunteer's Dilemma Experiment](#)

Tse-Min Wang, National Taipei University

[Sex, dark traits, and leadership emergence](#)

Christiane Schwieren, University of Heidelberg

[In Person] Concurrent 5 | Public Goods

Venue: Rm.207

[Threshold Levels, Endowment Structures, and Public Goods Provision](#)

Fengfei Sun, Renmin University of China

[Making it public: The effect of \(private and public\) wage proposals on efficiency and income distribution](#)

Natalia Jimenez Jimenez, Universidad Pablo de Olavide & Middlesex University London

[Coordinating on a Public Solution: A Collective Risk Experiment in the Lab](#)

Wei-Chien Weng, National Taiwan University

[Personal Information and Information as Public Good](#)

Yi-Shan Lee, Chinese University of Hong Kong

[Online Only] Concurrent 7 | Environmental 2(3A)

Venue: Rm.405

[Comparing Auction and Grandfathering in Emission Allowances Allocation: A Large-Scale Lab-in-the-Field Experiment](#)

Dongsheng Chen, Xiamen University

[Tradable Permits versus Congestion Charge on Managing Morning Peak Travel Behavior: A Field Experiment in Beijing](#)

Kexin Geng, Vrije Universiteit

[Would You Give Up Your Car For Money? Offering Monetary Incentives to Forgo Driving - results from a survey experiment](#)

Christian Hoenow, RWI - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research

May 21 (Sunday)

Session 7 (09:00–10:30)

[Hybrid] Concurrent 1 | Market 2(3A)

Venue: Rm.307

[Managerial ownership, moral hazard and excess returns](#)

Lawrence Choo, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics

[Intertemporal Coordination in Volunteer Markets](#)

Matej Lorko, University of Economics in Bratislava

[Are matching subsidies effective when the ask can be avoided?](#)

Erte Xiao, Monash University

[In Person] Concurrent 3 | Communication and Persuasion(3A)

Venue: Rm.109

[Mistrust and Garbling in Communication: Experimental Evidence](#)

Chen Zhao, The University of Hong Kong

[Competition in Persuasion: An Experiment](#)

Wenhao Wu, ShanghaiTech University

[A Simple Experiment on Simple Bayesian Persuasion](#)

King King Li, Shenzhen Audencia Business School, Shenzhen University

[In Person] Concurrent 4 | Information 2

Venue: Rm.208

[Advice Giving—a Performance Booster for Online Workers?](#)

Feng Qin, The Chinese University of Hong Kong

[Does the Size of the Signal Space Matter?](#)

Hyundam Je, Texas A&M University

[The Acquisition and Processing of Performance Feedback: Experimental Evidence](#)

Neslihan Sakarya, University of Essex

[The impact of information on people's attitudes toward organ donation](#)

Hsin-Ya Liao, National Taiwan University

[In Person] Concurrent 5 | Voting(3A)

Venue: Rm.207

[Ambiguity attitudes and voter turnout: Evidence from a field experiment during the 2020 US Presidential Election](#)

Ning Liu, School of Economics and Management, Beihang University

[Does combining general election and electoral referendum increase the voter turnout? A gamified experimental study](#)

Wei James Chen, National Taiwan University

[The effect of tax avoidance in voting decisions: a real-effort task experiment](#)

Angel Solano Garcia, Universidad de Granada

[In Person] Concurrent 6 | Fairness(2A)

Venue: Rm.308

[Do Strict Egalitarians Really Exist?](#)

Hyoji Kwon, Waseda University

[An experiment on the Neolithic agricultural revolution. Causes and impact on inequality](#)

Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, Universidad de Granada

[Online Only] Concurrent 7 | Decision 2

Venue: Rm.405

[The Resolution of Uncertainty in the Value and Probability Domains](#)

Eungik Lee, NYU

[Divergence in Economic Decision Making: The Role of Perceptual Descriptions](#)

Rui Guan, University of Kent

[Narrowly Rational](#)

Shuangyu Yang, National University of Singapore

[Inertial Updating](#)

Gerelt Tserenjigmid, University of California Santa Cruz

Session 8 (10:40–12:10)

[Hybrid] Concurrent 1 | Dynamics

Venue: Rm.307

[A Behavioral Study of Queuing Protocols in Matching](#)

Chen Wei, Washington University in St. Louis

[The Downs-Thomson Paradox with Endogenously Determined Departure Times](#)

Hironori Otsubo, Chuo University

[Tests for time invariance in decisions for money and effort: an experiment](#)

Shotaro Shiba, Waseda University

[Born to wait? A study of allocation rules in booking systems](#)

Tracy Xiao Liu, Tsinghua University

[Hybrid] Concurrent 2 | Contest and Tournament

Venue: Rm.504

[The shape of risk: An experimental study on risk-taking in rank-order tournament](#)

Yang Liu, University of Melbourne

[Shame and Fame in Competition](#)

Yong-Ju Lee, Yeungnam University

[Dynamic Asymmetry in Contests: Theory and Experiment](#)

Nishtha Sharma, University of California Irvine

[Momentum in contests and its underlying behavioral mechanisms](#)

Gregory Kubitz, QUT

[In Person] Concurrent 3 | Discrimination

Venue: Rm.109

[Statistical Discrimination Against Minority Groups](#)

David Hagmann, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

[Faces matter](#)

Lidingrong Huang, NYU Shanghai

[What's the Value of Face? Measuring the WTA to Disclose Important Personal Information](#)

Yu Gao, Peking University

[Attitudes towards refugees and identity](#)

Daniela Grieco, Università degli Studi di Milano

[In Person] Concurrent 4 | Gender 2

Venue: Rm.208

[Gender stereotypes and performance gaps](#)

Jaesun Lee, School of Economics and Management, Tongji University

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Jaimie Lien, The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Abstracts

The Effect of Hypocritical Corporate Social Responsibility Communication on Worker Misconduct in a Post-Crisis Context: Field Experimental Evidence From an Online Job Market

Nils Kruse

Vienna University of Applied Sciences for Management & Communication

<ABSTRACT>

Corporate crises caused by fraudulent behavior are a ubiquitous part of business and -- even with compliance management systems in place -- cannot be fully ruled out by top management. In the aftermath of a crisis, management can decide to engage in remediating corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures. However, whether the CSR measures are perceived as genuine or hypocritical significantly depends on whether the company admits any responsibility in the incident. Applying social and moral identification theory, this research project explores how hypocritical communication, i.e., the misalignment between CSR and a company's crisis response strategies in the aftermath of a corporate scandal, affects worker misbehavior. Based on field experimental data from an online labor market (n = 478), I find evidence that perceived hypocrisy increases undesirable worker behavior, such as shirking and withholding job effort. Given the immense financial cost caused by employee misbehavior managers and company leaders should make managing genuine corporate communication a key priority. My contribution to our understanding of crisis communication, in this case the link between CSR communication and employee misbehavior, thus, can provide a basis for cost savings and risk mitigation.

Author(s): Nils Kruse

Topic: Social Enterprises: CSES Sponsored Session

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The Impact of Consumer-rating Mechanisms on Consumer Behavior in Sharing Economy: A Case Study of Bike-sharing

Jingjing Li

School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University

<ABSTRACT>

The rapidly growing sharing industry has injected new vitality into economic development and has had a positive effect on economic growth. However, the sharing economy, with its online transactions and "usage rather than possession" characteristics, has a higher information asymmetry, making it more difficult to regulate the behaviour of economic participants and making them more vulnerable to discredit problems. Therefore, reducing credit risk in the sharing economy is an important topic, with enterprise consumer-rating mechanisms being one of the crucial ways to address credit risk in the sharing economy. Sharing enterprises have the advantages of a digital economy and have a large amount of behavioural big data, which provides strong support for the establishment and improvement of consumer-rating mechanisms. While we are concerned about the impact of enterprise consumer-rating mechanisms on consumer violation behaviours, we are also concerned about the impact of consumer-rating mechanisms on consumption behaviours. Consumer-rating mechanisms should achieve a 'win-win' situation for both governments and enterprises: to promote consumer reduction damage, but also to ensure consumer consumption and participation, and to maintain sustainable growth of the sharing economy. Therefore, this paper intends to answer the following questions empirically: 1) What are the influences of consumer-rating mechanisms on consumer violation behaviours and consumption behaviours of sharing economy? 2) What are the persistent effects of consumer-rating mechanisms? What are the heterogeneous effects across cities? 3) What are the mechanisms by which consumer-rating mechanisms influence consumer behaviours? In the bike-sharing industry, a typical representative of the sharing economy in China, several bike-sharing enterprises are actively exploring consumer-rating mechanisms. For example, Meituan's "Mo Fan Score", Qingju's "Behaviour Score" and Hello's "Driver License Score". This paper took the Driver License Scores as an example and constructed an Inconsistent Difference-in-difference model with the help of more than 6 million trip data of 49,000 bike-sharing users in 14 cities from 2018 to 2020 to empirically explore the impact of the consumer-rating mechanisms on users' riding intensity, riding frequency, indiscriminate parking and private occupation of bicycles. This paper analyzed the heterogeneity of this impact across cities and over time and discussed the influence mechanism. The study found that consumer-rating mechanisms enhance users' riding intensity and activity, but have a limited impact on user violation behaviours. Consumer-rating mechanisms further promote user consumption in the long term and tend to reduce violations. In first-tier cities, consumer-rating mechanisms are more effective in both promoting riding behaviours and regulating user violation behaviours, and consumer-rating mechanisms can make companies' goals of regulating user behaviour and profit incentives compatible to a certain extent. In addition, the mechanism analysis demonstrated that the Driver License Scores influenced user behaviour through a rating mechanism and reward-punishment mechanism. This paper analyzed the impact of consumer-rating mechanisms on users' consumption behaviour and violation behaviour, and the conclusion provides causal evidence that

consumer-rating mechanisms promote consumption and reduce violations, and provide support for the adoption of consumer-rating mechanisms by governments, enterprises and users to collaboratively manage the shared economy. Secondly, using quasi-natural scenarios and high-frequency behavioural big data, this paper answered the implementation effect of the credit system from the micro-individual level and provided credible evidence for the causal relationship between the credit system and participant behaviour. In addition, this paper focused on the consumer-rating mechanisms of the platform under the sharing economy and digital economy, which enriched the relevant research on frontier topics.

Author(s): Li Jingjing, Chen Shuai, Qin Pin, Geng Kexin, Wang Yacan

Topic: Social Enterprises: CSES Sponsored Session

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The Impacts of Financial Incentives on Social Enterprises: the Social Progress Credit Experiment

Syngjoo Choi

Seoul National University

<ABSTRACT>

There are concerns regarding the sustainability of social enterprises that aim to achieve both financial and social objectives. This is due to the additional cost required to tackle social problems. The Social Progress Credit (SPC) program is an initiative designed to support social enterprises by providing cash incentives proportionate to their social performance. Given that the pursuit of social performance may come at the expense of financial performance, this study investigates the impact of the SPC program on the financial performance of social enterprises. To accomplish this, we initially analyze the effects of the SPC program using a decision-making model for social enterprises. Our findings demonstrate a positive impact on sales while the effect on operating profit remains uncertain. We then employ matched difference-in-differences method using panel data from certified social enterprises in South Korea between 2015 to 2020 to evaluate the effects of the SPC program. The empirical results indicate that the SPC program positively affects sales while not significantly impacting operating profit. Our results suggest that social performance-based incentives can improve social performance without compromising the financial sustainability of social enterprises.

Author(s): Syngjoo Choi, Hyunwoo Hong, Booyeol Kim, Sun Hyun Park

Topic: Social Enterprises: CSES Sponsored Session

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The Impacts of Media Exposure on Social Enterprises: A Social Network Perspective

Booyeol Kim

Seoul National University

<ABSTRACT>

Why do some social enterprises scale up while others do not? Prior research has suggested multiple answers to the question including the social enterprises' financial and human resources. Our study proposes media recognition as an alternative answer. Media exposure increases the visibility and recognition of a social enterprise as a small start-up organization. As a result, it can assist social enterprises to obtain additional network ties to important resource providers, including government agencies and financial institutions. This network facilitation by media exposure can be critical for early-stage social enterprises because they are often isolated from the major resource exchange network. We assigned about 200 social enterprises to the treatment and control groups and provided the treatment group an opportunity to appear on a nation-wide radio interview program. Our results indicate that social enterprises in the treatment group obtain more network ties to the government agencies, financial institutions, and private company support programs, becoming more central in the network. The effect was more pronounced for the social enterprises that were located at the periphery of the resource exchange network. The study shows the importance of a more structural approach to the survival and growth of early-stage small social enterprises.

Author(s): Syngjoo Choi, Booyeol Kim, Sun Hyun Park

Topic: Social Enterprises: CSES Sponsored Session

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Can Artificial Intelligence Improve Gender Equality? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Difang Huang

University of Hong Kong

<ABSTRACT>

Gender stereotypes and discriminatory practices in the education system are important reasons for women's

under-representation in many fields. How to create a gender-neutral learning environment when teachers' gender composition and mindset are slow to change? Artificial intelligence (AI)'s recent development provides a way to achieve this goal. Engineers can make AI trainers appear gender neutral and not take gender-related information as input. We use data from a natural experiment where AI trainers replace some human teachers for a male-dominated strategic board game to test the effectiveness of such AI training. The introduction of AI improves boys' and girls' performance faster and reduces the pre-existing gender gap. Class recordings suggest that AI trainers' gender-neutral emotional status can partly explain the improvement in gender quality. We provide the first evidence demonstrating AI's potential to promote equality for society.

Author(s): Zhengyang Bao, Difang Huang

Topic: Artificial Intelligence

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The effect of targeted nudge: Experimental evidence from a large-scale field experiment

Zilin Zhan

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<ABSTRACT>

Artificial intelligence (AI), as a superior predictive tool, has great potential for targeted interventions and cost savings. However, little study has been undertaken to examine the effectiveness of AI-based behavioral intervention in real-world settings and understand how it translates into policy toolkits. This paper fills this gap by examining the effect of targeted nudge in the context of the dockless bike-share market. One of the biggest problems with the dockless sharing market is disorderly parking in crowded areas. Disorderly parking makes it harder for subsequent users to start rides and creates a public nuisance that city governments are cracking down on. In a large field experiment, we used a prediction algorithm to provide prosocial reminders (i.e., descriptive norms and altruism) before each potentially disorderly ride to discourage parking in crowded areas. Results showed that the targeted reminder messages reduced crowded parking by about 4% to 6%. The targeted reminder messages had a 4 to 10 times greater impact off-peak than during peak hours. Furthermore, the intervention effect was more substantial for high baseline disorderly parking users, but it gradually weakened as the number of interventions increased. Our results demonstrate the potential for AI-based targeted treatment to generate significant benefits in many domains.

Author(s): Yacan Wang, Zilin Zhan, Haoran He

Topic: Artificial Intelligence

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The Impact of Artificial Intelligence and Debiasing on Applicant Quality and Gender Diversity

Loukas Balafoutas

University of Exeter

<ABSTRACT>

The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in hiring is becoming increasingly popular, but little is known about the direct impact of its use on applicant decisions. In a series of novel economic experiments using a representative US sample (N=1,002), we provide some of the first comprehensive causal evidence on how the use of AI and debiasing affect the quality and gender diversity of applicants. We study application decisions for competitive jobs in two experiments where participants are faced with different evaluators: human, AI, debiased human, and debiased AI. Overall, we find that the use of AI does not affect the quality and gender diversity of applicants compared to human evaluators, whereas debiasing (whether human or AI) increases gender diversity without reducing the number of high quality applicants. Our findings suggest that firms with diversity goals wishing to use AI in hiring could do so without hindering such goals, as long as their algorithm is debiased.

Author(s): Edmond Awad, Loukas Balafoutas, Li Chen, Edwin Ip, Joseph Vecci

Topic: Artificial Intelligence

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Using AI and Behavioral Finance to Cope with Limited Attention and Reduce Overdraft Fees

Orly Sade

The Hebrew University Business School

<ABSTRACT>

In a randomized field experiment using a large personal financial management platform operating in the United States and Canada, we investigate mechanisms to reduce overdraft fees. A sample of users identified via an artificial intelligence (AI) algorithm as having a propensity to overdraw their accounts were sent recurring, as

needed, reminder notices to test the efficacy of different framings in reducing the number of overdraft fees. Employing parametric identifications, as well as time-to-event semi-parametric analysis, we learn that sending as needed reminders proved effective in and of itself, and the impact was significantly enhanced by simplifying the message. A negative framing of the simplified version elicited greater engagement and had a stronger impact than a positive framing. Significant effects are seen predominantly among users with medium to high annual incomes. We relate our findings to the literature on limited attention and the ostrich phenomenon. Our work also contributes to the literatures on financial technology, AI, and human-computer interaction.

Author(s): Abigail Hurwitz, Olivia S. Mitchell, Orly Sade

Topic: Artificial Intelligence

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A Comparison of Standard and All-Loss All-Pay Auctions

Aric Shafran

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<ABSTRACT>

We compare bidding behavior in the standard complete information all-pay auction with an all-loss all-pay auction in which subjects bid to avoid a penalty. The Nash equilibria of the two versions of the all-pay auction are identical, yet alternate behavioral models predict differences in bidding behavior as the framing changes. We find no framing effect, with similar bidding patterns observed in standard all-pay auctions and all-loss all-pay auctions. While there is no framing effect, bidding is not consistent with Nash equilibria; instead, we observe overbidding relative to Nash in some treatments and underbidding relative to Nash in others.

Author(s): Kathryn Vasilaky, Aric Shafran

Topic: Auction(3A)

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All-pay versus First-Price Auction under Non-Neutral Framing: An Experimental Study

Dexter Yu-Hsiang Hsu

National Taiwan University

<ABSTRACT>

This paper investigates people's attitudes toward educational policies in Taiwan and the bidding behavior in independent private-value, all-pay and first-price auctions with two units sold under non-neutral framing. In each experimental session, 6 bidders compete for pseudo qualifications of university admission. We examine how subject attitude toward educational policies changes after experiencing both auction formats and compare the efficiency and the individual bidding behavior between two auctions. To compare subjects' bid with the risk neutral Bayesian Nash equilibrium (RNBNE), we pay lottery tickets instead of cash to control for subject risk preferences. Preliminary results show that bidders tend to support need-based financial aid after experiencing both formats, and bidders tend to overbid relative to the RNBNE.

Author(s): Dexter Yu-Hsiang Hsu, Joseph Tao-yi Wang

Topic: Auction(3A)

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Towards the Understanding of Insincere Bidding in Vickrey Auction Experiment

Tiffany Tsz Kwan TSE

Osaka University

<ABSTRACT>

We examine two factors that influence sincere bidding in the multi-unit Vickrey auction experiments including whether participants understand strategy-proofness (SP) and whether they compete against human or computer rivals. We design 2x2 treatments by varying the type of quiz (with/without SP hints) and the nature of rivals (human/ computer). Participants are guided to think about the SP themselves by taking quizzes. Experimental results show that participants with higher score in quiz with SP hint (in other words, higher understanding level of SP) more frequently bid sincerely. However, competing against human or computer rivals does not have an impact on the sincere bid rates. The findings imply that only understanding the Vickrey auction rule is not enough for participants to bid sincerely but realizing SP is necessary.

Author(s): Shigehiro Serizawa, Natsumi Shimada, Tiffany Tsz Kwan Tse

Topic: Auction(3A)

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The impact of single-sex schools on women's willingness to lead

Fu-Hsuan Tsai
National Taiwan University

<ABSTRACT>

The proportion of females in leadership positions is disappointingly low in fields such as science, politics, and academia. However, little research specifically explores woman's willingness to lead. Understanding women's willingness to lead and designing interventions to increase female motivation to seek leadership roles may increase the number of female leaders in positions of influence and have external benefits, such as serving as role models for future generations. In this project, we conducted an incentivized experiment to examine the effect of single-sex schools on women's inclination toward leadership positions. We recruited high school students in Taiwan with comparable characteristics from both single-sex and mixed-sex schools as contrast and assigned them to mixed-gender or single-gender groups. Each subject was given opportunities to indicate their willingness to take on a leadership role in a group scenario, with the accuracy of their responses to challenging questions affecting the group's pay rate. The questions included the male-domain task, the gender-neutral task, and the female-domain task. Additionally, we measured subjects' risk preferences and levels of overconfidence and conducted an Implicit Association Test. We also collected demographic information, including their academic ability, family background, and home location. In doing so, we will contribute to the existing literature about how women's willingness to lead is affected by their environment. This will help understand whether long-term environmental shaping in a single-sex school can enhance women's desire to lead.

Author(s): Josie I Chen, Fu-Hsuan Tsai

Topic: Gender 1(3A)

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Productivity beliefs, competition entry, and gender quotas

Robert Stueber
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<ABSTRACT>

Despite considerable convergence in labor market outcomes, gender inequality persists. This persistence has raised the question how female entry into competitive environments can be promoted and led to the implementation of affirmative action policies. In this study, we use an experiment to investigate productivity beliefs, entry into competition, and affirmative action policies. We analyze what people infer about productivity from the decision to enter a competition. In particular, we investigate whether they believe that more productive individuals select into competition and whether they do so similarly for men and women. We then study how a gender quota affects these beliefs about selection into competition. We find that people falsely believe that selection is stronger for men than for women. The affirmative action policy leads people to believe that the selection is less strong for men but leaves belief about selection for women unaffected.

Author(s): Ernesto Reuben, Robert Stueber

Topic: Gender 1(3A)

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Anticipated Discrimination and Wage Negotiation: A Field Experiment

Ramon Cobo-Reyes
Georgetown University Qatar

<ABSTRACT>

This paper proposes a field experiment to study whether a perception of gender discrimination affects requested wages. People interested in an advertised position can apply using an online portal. After the initial application, participants are randomly allocated to one of two treatments. In the baseline treatment, applicants are asked to fill in a standardized curriculum vitae template, containing information about the applicant's first name, surname, education, and employment. In a gender-blind treatment, applicants complete a curriculum vitae template in which applicants can only report their initials, so that information about gender is not transmitted. In both treatments, applicants are asked to request the hourly wage they wish to receive if hired. We find that female applicants ask for just over half the salary requested by male applicants when the full name is revealed. However, when gender is invisible, there is virtually no difference in these requests; in fact, the average salary requested by female applicants is slightly higher than the wage requested by male applicants.

Author(s): Gary Charness, Ramon Cobo-Reyes, Santiago Garcia-Couto, Simone Meraglia, Angela Sanchez

Topic: Gender 1(3A)

Social Ties affect Preferences for Competition

Moritz Janas
New York University Abu Dhabi

<ABSTRACT>

We conduct a laboratory experiment to examine the causal effect of social ties on the preference for competition. Subjects have to decide whether or not to enter a competition. The potential competitors differ in the following dimensions between the four treatments: Whether they are known to the decision-maker from a chat before the competition stage, whether they will chat with the decision-maker after the competition stage, neither, or both. The data shows that the chat increases social closeness. Social closeness decreases the preference for competition in case the subjects will encounter each other again after the competition but has no effect on the probability of choosing competition if the subjects will not interact again. We thus identify previously unknown externalities of management practices that affect social tie building, such as team-building exercises or remote work options.

Author(s): Enzo Brox, Moritz Janas, Baiba Renerte

Topic: Information Acquisition

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Improving Information Acquisition in School Choice: Theory and Experiment

Siqi Pan
University of Melbourne

<ABSTRACT>

In this paper, we study interventions to improve learning in school choice, theoretically and experimentally. School applicants are assigned to schools using Random Serial Dictatorship. School preferences are determined by a lottery. Applicants derive utility from a known common component ("school quality") and an unknown idiosyncratic component ("school fit"). The idiosyncratic component can be learned at a cost, which is heterogeneous among applicants. As applicants' learning is below the social optimum, we study three policies that improve learning. "Known" policy reveals the lottery outcome before applicants learn their idiosyncratic component. "Coarse" policy only reveals if the rank is "high" or "low." "Affirmative Action" policy prioritizes certain high-cost applicants. We show theoretically that, under mild conditions, Known delivers welfare improvement over Unknown. Coarse delivers unconditional improvement over Unknown and, in some instances, an improvement over Known. Under more stringent conditions, Affirmative Action Pareto improves upon Unknown. We then study these policies experimentally and find that Known dominates Coarse which, in turn, dominates Unknown. Affirmative Action does not improve upon Unknown in environments where the improvement is predicted theoretically.

Author(s): Georgy Artemov, Siqi Pan

Topic: Information Acquisition

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When to Visit: Information Acquisition in College Admissions

Youngwoo Koh
Korea University

<ABSTRACT>

We theoretically and experimentally study centralized college admissions when both colleges and students lack full information about their potential matching partners; Colleges evaluate students based on their exam scores, which are an imperfect measure of students' intrinsic abilities; Students need to learn the exact matching value of each college via costly information acquisition. In a centralized matching via Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm, it is incentive compatible for students to acquire information only in the pre-application stage. However, the uncertainty of the final assignment makes the expected gain from the pre-application learning smaller, resulting in lower social welfare compared to the hypothetical benchmark in which post-admission learning is incentive compatible for students. Our experimental data reveals that the larger the imperfectness of exam scores the more substantial the welfare loss of the pre-application learning. The empirical social welfare obtained in our experimental treatments is consistently lower than the theoretical welfare, and we identify non-equilibrium learning as the main contributor.

Author(s): Youngwoo Koh, Wooyoung Lim

Topic: Information Acquisition

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Acquisition and Utilization of Information in Social Networks

Ernest Lai
Lehigh University

<ABSTRACT>

We experimentally investigate information acquisition and utilization in small social networks. A group of subjects each observe a noisy signal about an unknown state, make costly connections to acquire each other's signals, and utilize available information to choose an action commensurate to the state and average action. Our findings support two predicted monotonicity properties and document a set of behavioral anomalies. As predicted, subjects acquire signals from those who are more popular, and those who are themselves more popular acquire fewer signals. Relative to equilibrium predictions, however, subjects persistently under-acquire information and suboptimally utilize available information by, notably, ignoring otherwise useful, costly acquired signals. Furthermore, the poor utilization of information intensifies as more information is acquired. We explore plausible explanations for these findings as a step toward admitting the observed anomalies into the theoretical domain.

Author(s): Ningning Cheng, Ernest Lai, Yi-Shan Lee, Feng Qin

Topic: Information Acquisition

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Swaying Gender Norms Around Women's Work in Indonesia: Evidence from an Online Intervention

Diana Contreras Suarez
University of Melbourne

<ABSTRACT>

How to influence social norms that drive behavior in relation to women's participation in employment is not well understood. We report results from an online survey and intervention with over 4000 Indonesian men and women. We first describe social norms in relation to married women with children participating in the labor market in Indonesia. Our data show that respondents underestimate women's support for working women and the level of support among men for sharing childcare. Respondents report that the support of mothers and mothers-in-law is most important when deciding whether the wife in the household works. We then experimentally test whether providing information to individuals on i) women's level of support for women with children working outside the home; ii) husband's support for sharing day-to-day childcare with wives; and iii) support for working women amongst older women (mothers' and mothers-in-law's generation) changes men and women's willingness to support women's employment outside the home. Providing the above information increases the probability of men (women) choosing a career mentoring course for their wives (themselves) by about 26% (23%). Information beyond women's level of support for working women is found to have an insignificant impact, although there is suggestive evidence that information on support among older women shapes younger women's attitudes. We find no heterogeneity of treatment impact with respect to the direction and extent of individuals' original misperceptions. Results from a sub-sample who made hypothetical rather than real reward choices showed significant social desirability bias which was not evident when real reward choices were made.

Author(s): Lisa Cameron, Diahadi Setyonaluri, Diana Contreras Suarez

Topic: Social Norms and Labor Market(3A)

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Should Mothers Work? How Perceptions of the Social Norm Affect Individual Attitudes Toward Work in the U.S.

Gizem Kosar
Federal Reserve Bank of New York

<ABSTRACT>

We study how peer beliefs shape individual attitudes toward maternal labor supply using realistic hypothetical scenarios that elicit recommendations on the labor supply choices of a mother with a young child and an information treatment embedded within representative surveys. Across the scenarios, we find that individuals systematically overestimate the extent of gender conservativeness of the people around them. Exposure to information on peer beliefs leads to a shift in recommendations, driven largely by information-based belief updating. The information treatment also increases (intended and actual) donations to a non-profit organization advocating for women in the workplace.

Author(s): Patricia Cortes, Gizem Kosar, Jessica Pan, Basit Zafar

Topic: Social Norms and Labor Market(3A)

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Correction of Misperceptions and Spillover Effects on Other Beliefs: Another Look at the Case of Saudi Arabia

Elif Incekara Hafalir
University of Technology Sydney

<ABSTRACT>

Information interventions are commonly used to correct misperceptions of social norms in order to induce desirable behavior. However, possible spillover effects of misperception corrections over other beliefs are not well understood. To study such spillover effects, we look at the effect of social norms on female labor force participation in Saudi Arabia, which is a good example of a fast-changing society in which misperceptions of social norms are likely to occur. In a survey fielded with both male and female students at one of the largest universities in Saudi Arabia, we asked participants a subset of six questions related to social norms of women working. The first two questions, from Bursztyn et al. (2020), elicit first and second-order beliefs about women working outside of the home and in mixed-gender work environments. These questions are aimed at eliciting beliefs about working women but are not specifically targeted at eliciting beliefs about working women who also have family and childcare responsibilities. The additional three questions we ask are aimed at eliciting perceptions of women working after taking family and childcare responsibilities into account. The last question we asked was about gender priorities when jobs are scarce. We find overwhelming support for female labor force participation (FLFP) from the first two questions. We also find that students of both genders largely underestimate this support, confirming the Bursztyn et al. (2020) findings. On the other hand, we find markedly different patterns for the three questions related to the effects of women working on family life and children. The support for FLFP according to these questions is very low and participants can correctly guess this low support. We ran a treatment in which we give half of the participants the correct information about the society's support for FLFP derived from the first two questions in a design similar to Bursztyn et al (2020). As a difference, we measured the first and second-order beliefs for the other four questions in addition to the measures of labor market participation expectations of students. We find that the information treatment had a negative spillover effect (e.g. in an FLFP decreasing direction) on one of the other beliefs we measured and no effect on others. We discuss possible mechanisms behind the negative spillover effects such as self-serving belief distortion and cognitive dissonance as well as the reasons for the null effect of the treatment on FLFP outcome measures.

Author(s): Sultan Alkhuzam, Elif Incekara-Hafalir, Stephanie W. Wang

Topic: Social Norms and Labor Market(3A)

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Risk-return trade-offs in the context of environmental impact: a lab-in-the-field experiment with finance professionals

Sebastien Duchene
Montpellier Business School

<ABSTRACT>

We assess the impact of environmental externalities on portfolio decisions in a lab-in-the-field experiment on finance professionals and students. Participants are prone to accept lower returns for positive environmental impact but will not bear increased risk. They show asymmetric pro-environmental preferences depending on the sign of the externality. Finance professionals are more pro-environment than students, particularly regarding positive externalities, and less influenced by a ranking signal about environmental performance. Control tasks show that experimental measures of pro-social and environmental preferences have less influence on portfolios than market practices for professionals but are significant predictors for students.

Author(s): Sebastien Duchene, Adrien Nguyen-Huu, Dimitri Dubois. Marc Willinger

Topic: Field: KDIS Sponsored Session

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Government Subsidies under Climate Risk: Provision of Rural Public Goods in the Lab and Field

Shuwen Li
Shanghai Jiao Tong University

<ABSTRACT>

The increasing frequency of extreme weather events has imposed new challenges to small farmers, especially in developing countries. In this paper, we aim to find efficient ways for governments to partner with the local farmers so that modern irrigation channels can be constructed to avoid losses from drought. Using a framed threshold public goods game of loss avoidance, we focus on testing whether government subsidies increase rate of successful irrigation system provision. We collect data in the field using farmers in rural Henan, China, as well as in the lab using college students in the US. Results show that with no subsidy, the rate of provision is below the social optimum. Subsidies substantially increase the likelihood the irrigation project is undertaken, though

groups remain under-insured in relation to the social optimum. A one-to-one matching subsidy appears to be at least as effective as lump-sum grants under same budget, and the success rate is significantly higher with the former scheme than the latter under high risk of loss in the field.

Author(s): Shiyun Zhai, Shuwen Li, Daniel Houser

Topic: Field: KDIS Sponsored Session

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Religiosity, risk aversion, and prudence among poor Muslim households: An experimental evidence

Syedah Ahmad

University of Groningen

<ABSTRACT>

In this study, we examine the risk preferences of poor Muslim households from Pakistan in a lab-in-the-field setting. The main objective of this study is to test for the association of religiosity and risk preferences, mainly examining whether religious people have stronger risk preferences (in terms of risk aversion and prudence). The participants of our study have low literacy levels; therefore, we use risk preference tools that are already tested with young children in existing experimental studies. Our initial findings reveal that less religious people are more prudent and Sunni Muslims are found to be less risk averse. It is widely believed that the risk averse and prudent people engage in precautionary savings. Therefore, we further explore the risk preferences of poor households in comparison to their savings behavior. In particular, we find that religious people are active savers. To exclude the possibility that these results may be driven by differences in participants' characteristics, we include socioeconomic variables. In sum, the results show that whether households are risk averse or prudent, Shia or Sunni, their overall religiosity positively influences their savings behavior.

Author(s): Syedah Ahmad, Robert Lensink, Annika Mueller

Topic: Field: KDIS Sponsored Session

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Eliciting Preferences regarding the Idea of 'Love Marriage' in Rural India: Results from a List Experiment

Joo Young Jeon

University of Reading

<ABSTRACT>

The 'Arranged marriage' (AM) is a type of marriage in which the couple is matched by family members such as the parents. This is in opposition to 'Love marriage' (LM), in which the marital union is chosen by the couple themselves. AM is very prominent in India where 90% of all the marital unions are recognized as AM. In addition, the idea of LM is often associated with stigma and an exception to the norm – especially in the rural, poorer parts in India. In this study we investigate the mindset around the true preference of and declaration about the idea of LM. Standard surveys cannot elicit true preferences regarding LM due to the stigma and the related social desirability bias. Hence, we employ a list experiment (Blair and Imai, 2012) within a primary survey in the rural villages in Bihar, an Indian state with low development parameters and the highest incidence of underage marriage. In specific, we focused primarily on the lower caste (scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, and other backward castes) people in Bihar and randomly divided the subjects into three cohorts. The baseline cohort was directly asked if they think it is acceptable for young people to go in for LM. The control cohort was presented with three non-sensitive statements and asked how many they agree to. Finally, the treatment cohort was presented with the same three non-sensitive statements and one more relating to the opinion on LM. We also collected data on a set of demographic and social variables. The results show that while about 85% of the subjects declare Love marriage to be 'unacceptable' if asked directly, this proportion goes down to about 33% while eliciting true preference in the list experiment – showing a 52% of social desirability bias. Interestingly, this bias tends towards a conservative view instead of a progressive one that is observed in the western world. Such social desirability bias in our data is more acute for the scheduled tribe respondents, and for older subjects, for males. Also, further analyses show that such differences are more acute for the poor, the lowest caste subjects, and it decreases with the level of education. These results show the latent changes in the social norms regarding LM in India and shed light on possible policy changes.

Author(s): Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Arijita Dutta, Joo Young Jeon, Anindita Sen

Topic: Field: KDIS Sponsored Session

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Cognitive biases and emotions: A framing experiment

Joanna Rachubik

University of Warsaw

<ABSTRACT>

In this study, we investigate how performance in a number of puzzles (decisions under risk) depends on the framing. Solving these puzzles draws the respondent toward cognitive biases that affect the correctness of the answer. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three treatments: one-third of the sample saw puzzles framed in terms of COVID-19, one-third about a common cold, and the rest about unemployment. In total, we collected over 8,000 observations across five continents, with the largest samples in the US and Poland. We observed that the treatments involving more serious threats, namely COVID and Unemployment, triggered stronger (negative) emotions than Cold. These emotions were also linked to performance, and their levels correlated negatively with the number of correctly solved puzzles.

Author(s): Joanna Rachubik, Michal Krawczyk, Raman Kachurka

Topic: COVID-19 Pandemic 1

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Strategic Sophistication and Collective Action: Theory and Evidence

Mimi Jeon
Korea University

<ABSTRACT>

We investigate the effects of individuals' strategic sophistication measured by level-k type on collective action in the context of social distancing during the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic. We build a weakest-link public goods game with a private cost of social distancing, in which agents are heterogeneous in level-k types. We find that players with higher level-k types are more likely to engage in social-distancing behaviors. We test this hypothesis with large-scale nationally representative survey data that measured level-k types through incentivized experiments. Our empirical findings provide consistent evidence with our theoretical prediction. This study sheds new light on the role of the level-k theory in understanding real-world collective action problems.

Author(s): Mimi Jeon, Seonghoon Kim, Kanghyock Koh, Euncheol Shin

Topic: COVID-19 Pandemic 1

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Vaccination and Discrimination: Experimental Evidence under the COVID-19 Pandemic

Shusaku Sasaki
Center for Infectious Disease Education and Research, Osaka University

<ABSTRACT>

In this study, we conduct financially incentivized dictator games with the COVID-19 vaccinated and unvaccinated people in Japan (N=1,578), and ascertain their favorable or hostile attitudes toward each other, by using ingroup favoritism. We measure ingroup favoritism as the difference in the allocated amounts between to ingroup members with the same vaccination status and to outgroup members with a different status. Our analyses suggest that the vaccinated people behave more discriminately toward outgroup members, compared to the unvaccinated people. The vaccinated people show strong ingroup favoritism, which are shaped mainly by their outgroup bias of decreasing the money amount allocated to an unvaccinated pair, their outgroup member. In contrast, the unvaccinated people do not exhibit such the ingroup favoritism, on average. Their outgroup bias is found in the rather opposite direction of the hypothesis, and they tend to increase the amount to a vaccinated pair, their outgroup member. We find this tendency in particular from the unvaccinated who selected as their non-vaccination reason "I would like to get vaccinated if I could, but I cannot for health or other reasons." Furthermore, we confirm significant associations between their ingroup favoritism and attitudes regarding the COVID-19 policies, suggesting that the biases would have some degree of social influence in the real world. This study's findings can contribute to discovering how to smoothly build cooperative relationships between vaccinated and unvaccinated people under the current and future pandemics.

Author(s): Shusaku Sasaki, Hirofumi Kurokawa

Topic: COVID-19 Pandemic 1

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Selection Effects in the Insurance Market: What Getting Vaccinated Reveals about Insurance Preferences

Orly Sade
The Hebrew University Business School

<ABSTRACT>

Using an internet-based Prolific survey, we asked 2,549 US residents about their perceptions of COVID-19 along

with their risk attitudes, risky behaviors, and vaccination status. We show that respondents who elected the vaccine were more likely to have life insurance and annuities, as well as to save for precautionary reasons, controlling on risk behavior and preferences. This pattern is consistent with the argument that insurance buyers are systematically different from non-buyers. Moreover, those who took the proactive step of getting vaccinated, thus reducing their pandemic risk, were also more likely to purchase insurance. Controlling on vaccination status, we find no statistically significant association between subjects' risk preferences and risky behaviors, and whether they advised others to buy life insurance or annuitize. Yet the vaccinated did recommend that people boost their saving and annuitize more, again supportive of the hypothesis that people who take health precautions also favor other measures that reduce risk.

Author(s): Daniel Ben-David, Ido Mintz, Orly Sade

Topic: COVID-19 Pandemic 1

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Avoiding Dissonant Information

Ceren Bengu Cibik
University of Warwick

<ABSTRACT>

I examine whether prior exposure to information that contradicts one's beliefs drives information avoidance. More specifically, I focus on the outlook towards abortion and the two main beliefs on abortion rights: "pro-life" (opposes abortion rights) and "prochoice" (advocates abortion rights). In experiments with US respondents, I first vary the prior exposure to information: whether the information participants receive is in line with (consonant information) or contrary to their beliefs (dissonant information). I then measure avoidance of dissonance information using a willingness to pay measure. I find that a strikingly high proportion of participants are willing to avoid dissonant information at a material cost, using up almost half of their experimental budget. Prior exposure to dissonant information is insignificant in driving information avoidance. What matters most are beliefs: Pro-life participants are willing to spend a substantially higher proportion of their experimental budget to avoid dissonant information than pro-choice participants. An attempt to use text analysis to examine the reasoning behind dissonant information avoidance suggests that anticipation of negative emotions is a key mechanism driving information avoidance. This can also explain the difference in willingness to pay among opposing belief groups. These findings have implications for policies aiming to reduce political polarisation through information provision.

Author(s): Ceren Bengu Cibik

Topic: Bias

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When Does Overconfidence Harm You? An Experimental Study on Learning with Misspecified Beliefs

Sora Youn
Texas A&M University

<ABSTRACT>

People behave according to their own, possibly misspecified, beliefs about the world. A prominent example of this phenomenon is overconfidence, whereby agents persistently overestimate their ability. A large portion of the theoretical and empirical research has documented the existence as well as why and how overconfidence can be sustained. However, less is known regarding how misconceptions about oneself affect the evaluation of others and its consequences on team performance. When production requires the input of many people, overconfident agents may misrepresent their low ability with the lack of ability of others. The learning failure about others might cause inferior resource allocation and incur an economic loss. This study exploits recent theoretical models of learning with misspecified beliefs to empirically evaluate conditions under which overconfidence is harmful to team production. Using a laboratory experiment, we show that overconfidence leads to a misallocation of effort when the optimal allocation depends on the knowledge of each team member's ability. In contrast, overconfidence is harmless if the optimal allocation requires identifying only the team's aggregated ability. The findings are consistent with theoretical predictions. Understanding which production environments are fallible to overconfidence and which are immune is of paramount importance in the design of team incentives.

Author(s): Marco Castillo, Sora Youn

Topic: Bias

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Reconciling Imposter Syndrome and Overconfidence: An Experiment

Tianyi Li
University of Arizona

<ABSTRACT>

The feeling that one is less qualified than one's peers, known as imposter syndrome, is very common. We study the relationship between overconfidence and imposter syndrome. We conduct an experiment in which individuals first take a mathematics test and then are sorted into levels based on their performance. They are then matched with a competitor who scored at a similar level on a second mathematics test. Before the sorting into levels, individuals are asked to predict the probability that they perform better than the person that they are paired with. We find that participants condition on the way their opponent has been sorted but do not sufficiently condition on their own sorting. Such a bias can generate imposter syndrome. Individuals display this effect, along with a general pattern of overconfidence, which is consistent with prior research.

Author(s): Tianyi Li, Charles N. Noussair

Topic: Bias

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Information Overload and Confirmation Bias

Tsz Kin Leung

Hong Kong Baptist University

<ABSTRACT>

We show that information overload contributes to confirmation bias. In an experiment, we vary the difficulty of information processing as subjects receive a sequence of signals of an unknown state. In the treatment condition, the preceding signal disappears as the next signal appears. In the control condition, the preceding signal remains visible. We find stronger confirmation bias among subjects in the treatment condition. Our results provide empirical support for models that emphasize the role of limited information processing in confirmation bias (Wilson (2014), Leung (2020), Jehiel and Steiner (2019)).

Author(s): Lorenz Goette, Hua-Jing Han, Benson Tsz Kin Leung

Topic: Bias

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Positive and Negative Selection in Bargaining

Dongkyu Chang

City University of Hong Kong

<ABSTRACT>

In the standard dynamic screening problem between an uninformed seller and a privately informed buyer, theory suggests that the presence (absence) of the buyer's outside option leads to a substantial surplus for the seller (buyer). We examine the validity of this stark contrast. We show that the theoretical differences collapse if some buyer types hold optimism about the seller's future offers. In our experiment, the presence of an outside option does not make a difference in the observed surplus division. We also find evidence that buyers rejected current-round offers, optimistically believing that the next offer would be more favorable.

Author(s): Dongkyu Chang, Duk Gyoo Kim, Wooyoung Lim

Topic: Game 1

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Attribution of failure and success in strategic settings

Lina Lozano

New York University Abu Dhabi

<ABSTRACT>

During our educational and professional lives, we face failures and successes that we need to justify to ourselves and others. In most cases, failure and success are the results of an unknown combination of both internal factors (i.e., own ability and exerted effort) and external factors that are outside one own's control (i.e., others or luck). The evidence suggests that when people attribute the causes of failure and success they often exhibit a "self-attribution bias" -attribute success to their own merit and failure to external sources- to maintain self-esteem. In this project, we study an additional reason for the self-attribution bias, a strategic one. We use an online experiment to test how individuals attribute noisy feedback when the source of the final outcome can be due to their own ability or someone else ability. In addition, following recent evidence on gender differences in attribution biases, we also test whether men and women use different failure and success justifications and study the consequences of it in a hiring context. Understanding the nature and economic consequences of gender differences in attribution of failures/successes is crucial, as it could be one of the causes of the observed gender

gaps in the labor market such as the under-representation of women in top-level positions.

Author(s): Lina Lozano, Marcello Negrini

Topic: Game 1

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Debt under uncertainty in the Nash demand game: experimental evidence

Stefano Pagliarani

University of Warsaw

<ABSTRACT>

In the Nash demand game, players demand money from the public fund, without knowing the demands made by other players. If the sum of demands exceeds the amount of money in the public fund, no one receives any payoffs. We modify the Nash demand game to allow for the creation of debt. In the baseline treatment, players are first asked to allocate their endowments between the private and public funds. Their contributions to the latter are multiplied by a positive constant. Afterwards, participants are asked how much they would like to take back for themselves. If the total demand exceeds money in the public fund, a debt is created that is distributed equally among players. We propose two additional treatments. In the 'uncertainty' treatment, the final balance is multiplied by a positive constant with some probability. This can reduce or increase the final debt. In the 'low private returns' treatment, we study the impact of a reduction in the returns to the private fund on the final balance. We find that in the baseline treatment, the debt is created almost in all periods. Both uncertainty and low returns to the private fund prevent the creation of debt.

Author(s): Stefano Pagliarani, Karolina Safarzynska

Topic: Game 1

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The Netflix Paradox

Philip Neary

University of London, Royal Holloway

<ABSTRACT>

We develop an experiment on the "Netflix game", a version of the model by Gerke et al. (2022) inspired by the online streaming provider Netflix. In this game, individuals are arranged in a social network, and each of them decides either to purchase an account or not to purchase it. If an individual purchases an account, she then nominates k neighbours in the network as co-beneficiaries, where k is the individuals' sharing capacity. As Gerke et al. (2022) show, a reduction in the sharing capacity may result in the appearance of (additional) equilibria in which less individuals purchase an account, which we call the "Netflix paradox". This setup leads to a problem of equilibrium selection, since for the Netflix paradox to materialise, individuals need to coordinate in the (additional) equilibrium with less purchases (which is more efficient for the individuals as a group and detrimental for the company that sells accounts). We address this problem by designing an experiment with two treatments, which share the same network structure and vary in the sharing capacity. Compared to the treatment with the high sharing capacity, the treatment with the low capacity has an additional equilibrium. We study the subjects' ability to coordinate in this extra equilibrium, in which less individuals purchase, and still all of them get access.

Author(s): Claudia Cerrone, Francesco Feri, Miguel A. Melendez-Jimenez, Philip Neary

Topic: Game 1

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Nudging Ex-post

Hanlin Lou

University of New South Wales

<ABSTRACT>

We empirically examine whether information disclosures after making high-cost transactions induce customers to improve their financial decision-making. We examine a randomized control trial by a large commercial bank that involved notifications sent to credit card customers in a treatment group after every high-cost transaction. Customers were informed that the transaction incurs an additional fee and a higher interest rate effective immediately. We find that this ex-post nudge significantly reduces the number of subsequent high-cost transactions and increases the likelihood of making a repayment on the same day. This evidence is consistent with the ex-post information notification increasing customers' awareness of the fee and higher interest rate which subsequently resulted in them rationally adjusting their credit card usage to save money. More generally, this evidence supports a novel method to help people make better decisions by nudging them immediately after a

costly decision was made.

Author(s): Kadir Atalay, Hanlin Lou, Robert Slonim

Topic: Method

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Will it be seen? Using Eye Tracking to Re-examine the Future Tense Effect in Intertemporal Choices

Jiang Shiang Hu

National Taiwan University

<ABSTRACT>

The amount of literature on how language affects economic decisions is increasing. The Linguistic-Savings Hypothesis (LSH) suggests that using future tense references can distance people's perception of future events, thus reducing future-oriented behaviors. Previous studies have only focused on the behavioral outcomes of the hypothesis, without exploring its cognitive processes. In this study, we used an eye-tracker to measure the fixations on the Chinese word "will" and the response time in a binary intertemporal choice experiment, and linked them to the choice data. The treatment group saw a phrase containing the auxiliary word "will" (future tense), while the control group saw a comma in the same location. We found that subjects in the treatment group chose 7% less future rewards and spent 9% more time responding than the subjects in the control group. By fitting the data with the Drift-Diffusion Model (DDM), we found that future tense raises people's decisional thresholds and shifts their preference towards immediate rewards before the evaluation process. In conclusion, our results provide a cognitive explanation of the LSH.

Author(s): Josie I Chen, Wei James Chen, Jiang Shiang Hu

Topic: Method

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The Effect of Foreign Language Exposure: Lab Experiment on Economic Decisions

Sheng-Yen Hsiao

National Taiwan University

<ABSTRACT>

Foreign languages are increasingly important in this internationalized society, especially for immigrants, non-native students, and workers in multinational corporations. However, existing research primarily focuses on decision-making in foreign language contexts from a psychological perspective (foreign language effect). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to examine whether prolonged exposure to a non-native language environment would affect economic decision-making. To achieve this, we give speaking, reading, and listening tests to subjects in foreign/native languages, then elicit their individual preferences, including (1) risk preference, (2) intertemporal decisions, and (3) unhealthy food choices, using their native language. This study aims to clarify the causes of irrational decision-making and to provide language policy implications concerning immigrants.

Author(s): Josie I Chen, Sheng-Yen Hsiao, Elaine M. Liu

Topic: Method

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Eye-Tracking Spatial Beauty Contest Games: VBEM Estimation on Simulated and Actual Data

Joseph Tao-yi Wang

National Taiwan University

<ABSTRACT>

We conduct laboratory experiments on spatial beauty contest games in Taiwan employing university students who read Chinese. We observe subject's final choice, as well as their lookup pattern leading up to the decision captured by remote video-based eye-trackers, and analyze their entire reasoning process. We observe level-k and other types in our subjects just like in the literature, but we find no "top-left" level-k types (which start their reasoning from the top-left corner). We instead identify several smaller classes of omitted types, including "D-types" who play randomly but avoid dominated strategies (D0) or perform one round of deletion of dominated strategies and best response to the remaining strategies (D1). Interestingly, some of the D0 and D1 subjects have lookup patterns resemble level-k reasoning, but start from U0 (or U0') randomizing across one's (or opponent's) undominated strategies. The newly discovered, hard-to-find dominance subjects allow us to explore the reasoning process of deleting dominated strategies through eye-tracking data. In addition to traditional maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of a Markov-switching model for level-k reasoning, we also employ variational Bayesian expectation maximization (VBEM) algorithms tailored to this particular spatial game to estimate the hidden Markov models. We find models estimated by VBEM outperforming those by MLE in both

simulated and actual eye-tracking data, especially if one is allowed to impose a uniform prior on the transition matrix to determine the level-k.

Author(s): Yu-Hsiang Wang, Wei James Chen, Joseph Tao-yi Wang

Topic: Method

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Brokerage Rents and Intermediation Networks

Frederic Moisan

Emlyon Business School

<ABSTRACT>

We study the determinants of intermediation networks through an examination of two pricing rules that differ in the distribution of brokerage benefits over a trading path. The theory makes sharp predictions: when brokerage benefits are solely driven by market power, stable networks involve interconnected cycles, and trading path lengths grow while linking and payoff inequality remain modest as the number of traders grows; when brokerage benefits are equally distributed among brokers on shorted paths, stable networks contain a few hubs with most of the links, and trading path lengths remain unchanged while linking and payoff inequality explode as the number of traders grows. Our paper provides strong experimental support for these theoretical predictions.

Author(s): Syngjoo Choi, Sanjeev Goyal, Frederic Moisan

Topic: Network

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Games on Networks: An Experimental Study

Fulin Guo

University of Cambridge

<ABSTRACT>

The impact of network connections on human behaviour has been widely studied over the past twenty years. In this paper, we focus on strategic games on networks that admit a linear best response (Ballester et al. (2006)). Nash equilibrium provides sharp results: the level of an individual's activity is proportional to their (Bonacich) centrality in the network. This insight forms the foundation for a large body of applied work ranging across finance, development, macroeconomics, international trade, and industrial organization. This result relies upon reasoning that combines strategic considerations and the topology of the network in intricate ways. It is far from clear if human being embedded in real world networks – that are large and complex – can work through this reasoning. The goal of our work is to experimentally test this prediction. We have a 2 X 2 design for the experiment. On the one hand, we consider strategic substitutes and strategic complements, and on the other hand we consider two standard networks (core-periphery and Erdos-Renyi). Both networks have 25 nodes. The experiments are run at CeDEX at Nottingham University. There are eight sessions for each treatment and each session consists of 40 rounds. We find that the theoretical and experimental outcomes align relatively well for strategic substitutes in both networks. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and experiments for strategic complements in both networks. In the core-periphery network, subjects' average action levels are lower than the equilibrium prediction in later periods, leading to lower average payoffs. In contrast, for the Erdos-Renyi network with strategic complements, the subjects on average choose effort levels that are higher than the equilibrium prediction, and, remarkably, they also achieve a higher average payoff than the equilibrium payoff in later rounds.

Author(s): Syngjoo Choi, Sanjeev Goyal, Fulin Guo, Frederic Moisan

Topic: Network

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Network formation and efficiency in linear-quadratic games: An experimental study

Gergely Horvath

Division of Social Sciences, Duke Kunshan University

<ABSTRACT>

We experimentally study effort provision and network formation in the linear-quadratic game characterized by positive externality and complementarity of effort choices among network neighbors. We compare experimental outcomes to the equilibrium and efficient allocations and study the impact of group size and linking costs. We find that individuals overprovide effort relative to the equilibrium level on the network they form. However, their payoffs are lower than the equilibrium payoffs because they create fewer links than it is optimal which limits the beneficial spillovers of effort provision. Reducing the linking costs does not significantly increase the

connectedness of the network and the welfare loss is higher in larger groups. Individual characteristics, such as gender and cognitive-reflection test results, can explain individual differences in link formation.

Author(s): Gergely Horvath

Topic: Network

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Cooperation and Cognition in Social Networks

Yohanes Eko Riyanto

Nanyang Technological University

<ABSTRACT>

Social networks sustain cooperative activity by creating a threat of ostracism. Key to this mechanism is the ability of network members to discern and respond to a potential cascade of relationship breakdowns triggered by a defection. This paper investigates the interplay between cognition and cooperation in social networks. Building on the theoretical framework of Jackson et al. (2012), we define a novel robustness notion to identify a set of low cognitive complexity (LCC) networks that require a limited cognitive ability to understand the consequences of defection. We test the theory in a lab experiment and find that cooperation is higher in equilibrium than in non-equilibrium networks. Within equilibrium networks, cooperation is higher in LCC than in non-LCC. Learning is also essential for the emergence of equilibrium play. JEL: C91, C92, D85, Z13. Keywords: cooperation, network, bounded rationality, experiment, learning.

Author(s): Edoardo Gallo, Joseph Lee, Yohanes E. Riyanto, Erwin Wong

Topic: Network

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Improving children's food choices: Experimental evidence from the field

Angela Sanchez Gonzalez

University of Loyola

<ABSTRACT>

We present a field experiment to study the effects of different information conditions on food choices of 282 children in elementary schools. Previous interventions have typically paid participants for healthy eating, but this often may not be feasible. We introduce a system where food items are graded based on their nutritional value, involving parents or classmates as change agents by providing them with information regarding the food choices of their children. We find parents' involvement in the decision process to be particularly beneficial in boosting healthy food choices, with very strong results that persist months after the intervention.

Author(s): Gary Charness, Ramon Cobo-Reyes, Erik Eyster, Gabriel Katz, Matthias Sutter

Topic: Field 1

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The Consistency of Rationality Measurement

You Shan

School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University

<ABSTRACT>

Revealed preference analysis provides a powerful approach to measure rationality—the extent to which choice data of individuals can be rationalized by some well-behaved utility function. While rationality indices have been widely used in various lab and field settings, the consistency of these indices remains unexplored. Combining budgetary decisions in the lab and food decisions in the field based on scanner data, we measure the rationality of individual consumers in a large grocery store. We show that rationality score of risky or social decisions in the lab is uncorrelated with that of food decisions in the field. By contrast, rationality score is highly correlated between risky and social decisions in the lab, as well as between food decisions in the lab and in the field. We further show that behavioral factors including experience, cognitive and non-cognitive skills may underlie rationality scores across different environments.

Author(s): Mingshi Chen, Tracy Xiao Liu, You Shan, Songfa Zhong, Yanju Zhou

Topic: Field 1

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Do you like my politics? Love and war in an online dating experiment

Anna Beloborodova

<ABSTRACT>

Affective polarization is the animosity among people holding opposing political views. It affects all social relationships, including dating and family formation. In this study, I examine the impact of an individual's political views regarding the war in Ukraine on her mating success on an online dating site in Russia. For this purpose, I conducted a field experiment on a large dating site and collected data on over 3,200 profile evaluations. Preliminary findings indicate the presence of substantial penalties for displaying pro-war or anti-war positions on a dating profile, suggesting considerable levels of affective polarization in the Russian society regarding the war.

Author(s): Anna Beloborodova

Topic: Field 1

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Weight, Attractiveness, and Gender when Hiring: a Field Experiment in Spain

Francisco Lagos

University of Granada

<ABSTRACT>

This study analyses whether there is differential treatment in hiring of overweight individuals in the Spanish labor market. Fictitious applications were constructed in pairs, where the facial photo of a normal weight individual was manipulated to signal the individual as obese. This pair of applications were then split and randomly sent to 3,150 real job openings across twelve different occupations (with about an even split between male and female dominated ones). Male applications with the weight-manipulated photo had a significantly lower callback response for an interview, while there is no differential treatment by weight for women. When splitting the data by male- and female dominated occupations obese men are not discriminated in male dominated occupations, but the obese male applicant has approximately a 50% reduction in the callback rate in female dominated occupations. For women the results at first appear much different: the weight-manipulated female photos have a higher callback rate in female-dominated occupations. This unexpected result is explained by more attractive women being discriminated against in hiring in these occupations. This result is not found in male dominated occupations

Author(s): Catarina Goulao, Juan Antonio Lacomba, Francisco Lagos, Dan-Olof Rooth

Topic: Field 1

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Coordination and Cooperation in Cultures with Vertical Age-Based Social Hierarchies

Euncheol Shin

Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST)

<ABSTRACT>

Hierarchy plays an integral role in organizational structure and practices, and hierarchy norms can vary widely across cultures. Confucian-influenced societies, and especially South Korea's, emphasize social hierarchies and norms based on age, and these likely influence organizational practices, as well as social decision-making in general. Using one-shot Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma games, we find that providing age information significantly increased coordination and cooperation among Korean participants, primarily by influencing preferences for reciprocity and fairness. These results are consistent with sociological evidence of the importance of age-based hierarchies to Korean society and organizations. Naturally, this does not imply that hierarchies are necessarily desirable, since they likely also have many negative effects; however, these results emphasize the relevance of age hierarchies for descriptive modeling of Korean norms and organizational structures. As a counterfactual, we find that providing age information to US participants yielded 0% effects. Baseline cooperation rates were also higher in the US than in Korea, but this difference disappeared entirely in the Prisoner's Dilemma (and was halved in the Stag Hunt) once age information was provided. Since ages and seniority are virtually always common knowledge in Korean social and organizational contexts, only the comparisons between age-revealed conditions are externally valid. This provides a cautionary methodological note to cross-cultural research experiments; simply using the same experimental protocols in each culture does not guarantee practical comparisons that apply to social or organizational contexts, since the protocol may not be equally externally valid for proxying how each culture makes social choices.

Author(s): Euncheol Shin, Matthew Chao

Topic: Coordination and Cooperation

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Coordination with Differential Time Preferences: Experimental Evidence

Jeongbin Kim
Florida State University

<ABSTRACT>

In infinitely repeated games, if players are patient enough, the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs can be supported as equilibrium. Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) show that when two players have different time preferences, the set of equilibrium outcomes can be expanded by using an intertemporal trade strategy - a less patient player gets higher payoffs in early-stage games and a more patient player gets higher payoffs in later stage games. In the lab, we find experimental support for the theoretical prediction.

Author(s): Jeongbin Kim, Wooyoung Lim, Jaeok Park

Topic: Coordination and Cooperation

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Response to intervention: An experimental study

Yadi Yang
Nanjing Audit University

<ABSTRACT>

Individuals often fail to provide sufficient public goods, such as environment-preserving actions or pandemic-preventing behaviors, without coordination or commitment. In a laboratory experiment, we study people's willingness to opt for external intervention—a centralized institution that coerces cooperation—in a threshold public goods game. Specifically, we examine how individuals make trade-offs between the efficiency of public goods provision, the fairness in contribution levels across individuals, and the intrinsic value of decision rights. In a pilot run, we find (1) individual heterogeneity with roughly 2/3 of the subjects willing to sacrifice efficiency for various levels of fairness and (2) what appears to be the intrinsic value of decision rights that differs across individuals and varies with the intensity of intervention. Our results may have implications for improving cooperation as well as identifying the role of governmental intervention in times of crisis.

Author(s): Manwei Liu, Yadi Yang

Topic: Coordination and Cooperation

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Representation, Peer Pressure and Punishment in a Public Goods Game

Doruk Iris
Sogang University

<ABSTRACT>

We introduce hierarchical decision-making in a repeated public goods experiment where representatives decide on contributions and punishment not only on their behalf, but also on behalf of their team members. We confirm the established finding that punishment reverses the slide towards the zero contribution Nash Equilibrium: subjects contribute between 50% and 80% of the endowment at the end of periods when punishment is available, while they only contribute about 30% at the end of periods when punishment is unavailable. But we also uncover a novel interacting effect between hierarchical decision-making and punishment on public good provision. Namely, relative to the standard case of self-representation, the positive trend reversal in contributions is more modest when representatives are in charge for the entire team, especially when non-representatives cannot signal their preferred contribution amounts and chosen contributions plateau to about 50% of endowment.

Author(s): Hyoyoung Kim, Doruk Iris, Jinkwon Lee, Alessandro Tavoni

Topic: Coordination and Cooperation

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How much you talk matters: Cheap talk and collusion in a Bertrand oligopoly game

Jun Yeong Lee
Iowa State University

<ABSTRACT>

This study investigates the impact of cheap talk on price and participant profits in a repeated Bertrand oligopoly experiment. During the first 10 rounds, participants are not allowed to communicate with each other. We then play another 20 rounds where participants can text with one another using an instant message system. Some groups were allowed to text before every round, some to text before every other round, some to text every third round, some to text every fourth round, and some to text only every fifth round. On average, when texting is allowed, groups attempt to collude to raise the price after being allowed to text. To summarize, success in

collusion with cheap talk depends on a combination of how often they can text, the subject of their texts, and whether participants actually text when they can.

Author(s): Jun Yeong Lee, Elizabeth Hoffman

Topic: Cheap Talk

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Communication with Transparent Motives in the Laboratory

Ye Jin

NYU Shanghai

<ABSTRACT>

An informed agent (sender) has transparent motives in a cheap talk game if her payoff is independent of the underlying state as well as the message. How can such a sender persuade an uninformed agent (receiver) to take the sender's preferred action? We experimentally study this form of strategic communication and find that, compared to the uni-dimensional case, information transmission achieves significantly higher effectiveness in a multi-dimensional setting, in terms of increasing the payoffs of both the sender and the receiver. The strategies adopted by the majority of our subjects were consistent with the comparative equilibrium ` la Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010): the sender recommends only the weakly higher-valued item(s) and the receiver follows the message of "recommend some but reject the rest." We further construct a Cognitive Hierarchy model with downward lying cost to explain the over-communication behavior observed in the experiments.

Author(s): Ye Jin, Zhen Zhou

Topic: Cheap Talk

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Monolingualism in the Lab

Yuet Lyu

National Taiwan University

<ABSTRACT>

We experimentally investigate the emergence and persistence of monolingualism in a sender-receiver game with no conflict of interest where the sender sends a message (without prior meaning) regarding a privately observed state to two other receivers who need to choose actions to match the state. Subjects simultaneously play both roles of sender and receiver in a three-member society. Through repeated play, they learn how to "speak" and "listen" to their group members. We also employ the strategy method for senders to elicit the message for each state and incentivize the use of a same language. This design allows us to observe "multilingualism" and "monolingualism" in the lab. To induce convergence to structural languages, we introduce half of the states first for 10 rounds before introducing the rest, which are 90-degree rotations of the initial states for the treatment group. The treatment groups indeed converge to structural languages more often. Receiver matches the true state twice as often when the language is structural, compared to non-structural. 17 out of 22 three-member societies converge to monolingualism in 40 rounds. After the same language emerges, we observe the learning process of "immigrants" who move to another society. Results show that immigrants learn faster in societies with more structural languages.

Author(s): Yuet Lyu, Joseph Tao-yi Wang

Topic: Cheap Talk

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Vague Language and Context Dependence

Qinggong Wu

HKUST

<ABSTRACT>

In this paper, we broaden the existing notion of vagueness to account for linguistic ambiguity that results from the context-dependent use of language. This broadened notion, termed literal vagueness, necessarily arises in Pareto-optimal equilibria in many standard conversational situations. In controlled laboratory experiments, we find that people can use literally vague languages to effectively transmit information.

Author(s): Wooyoung Lim, Qinggong Wu

Topic: Cheap Talk

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Choice and Attention Across Time

Xi Zhi "RC" Lim
Shanghai Jiao Tong University

<ABSTRACT>

I study how past choices affect future choices in the framework of attention. Limited consideration causes a failure of "rationality", where better options are not chosen because the DM has failed to consider them. I innovate and consider sequences of choices, where past choices are necessarily considered in future choice problems. This provides a link between two kinds of rationality violations: those that occur in a cross-section of one-shot decisions and those that occur within a sequence of realized choices. In my setting, the former helps identify attention whereas the latter pins down true preferences. Both types of violations vanish over time and furnish a novel notion of stability. A series of results shows that attention across time can act as a manifestation of attention at a given time, and a full characterization of compatible models is provided.

Author(s): Xi Zhi "RC" Lim

Topic: Rationalizing Irrationality

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Conspicuous Consumption in the Lab

Ahrash Dianat
University of Essex

<ABSTRACT>

Economists have developed a variety of preference models that seek to explain "conspicuous consumption" – i.e., consumption activities that are both observable and serve as signals of social status. However, there is a paucity of evidence on the empirical content of leading preference models. We seek to generate laboratory evidence that can distinguish among leading preference models of conspicuous consumption. To do so, we conduct an experiment where subjects have the opportunity to spend their (earned) endowments on different categories of conspicuous consumption. In particular, our treatments vary the size of the relevant peer group and the feedback that subjects receive about their social status.

Author(s): Ahrash Dianat, Daniel Friedman, Christian Ghiglinò

Topic: Rationalizing Irrationality

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Motivated Beliefs, Independence and Cooperation

Wei Huang
CUHK Business School

<ABSTRACT>

Humans are social animals but sometimes stay alone. The paper theoretically investigates the connection between an intraperson game and an interpersonal interaction. Motivated beliefs supplied from memory management due to present bias in the individual investment problem give rise to a positive spillover on others through social interactions, suggesting that a high frequency of social interactions reduces an individual's tendency to cooperate with others, exacerbating the free-riding problem. We also establish a positive relationship between overconfidence and prosocial behaviors. Evidence from cross-country observational data and cross-sectional data collected from an online experiment is largely consistent with our theoretical implications.

Author(s): Wei Huang, Yu Wang, Xiaojian Zhao

Topic: Rationalizing Irrationality

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To upgrade or not: random menu and choice

Rui Tang
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

<ABSTRACT>

This paper investigates how ex ante randomness over choice menus affects decision maker's ex post choices from a fixed menu. We consider a choice scenario in which the feasibility of a given menu is random and study how the decision maker's choice from the menu varies with the probability of the menu being feasible. We conduct a lab experiment in which each participant is provided with a default item and a random chance to upgrade the item (with cost). We document how participants' willingness to upgrade correlates with the probability

of the upgrading option being feasible. We also collect field data of car consumptions in Beijing and Shanghai and use the data set to study how consumers' willingness to buy cars differs before and after the implementation of the car plates restriction policy which requires consumers to participate in a lottery drawing system to win the purchase quota (with a small probability). Together, our laboratory and field evidence sheds light on how the opportunity for a decision maker to be able to choose shapes her evaluations of the options.

Author(s): Guojun He, Wooyoung Lim, Rui Tang

Topic: Rationalizing Irrationality

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Disentangling the impact of financial literacy on behavior: Does financial literacy increase patience and risk tolerance?

Ajalavat Viriyavipart
American University of Sharjah

<ABSTRACT>

This paper examines how financial literacy influences decision-making by exploring three possible mechanisms: numerical skills, financial awareness, and changes in preferences. Using a lab-in-the-field experimental design with 350 cleaning service workers in the UAE, the study aims to determine the causal effect of financial education on risk and time preferences. Participants were divided into a control group and two treatment groups, one receiving financial literacy training and the other receiving numeracy training. The experiment used incentivized tasks to elicit individual risk and time preferences. The results will shed light on how education can shape preferences in decision-making.

Author(s): Khusrav Gaibulloev, Gerel Oyun, Dina Tasneem, Ajalavat Viriyavipart

Topic: Risk

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Earned Entitlement: Effort, luck, performance, and deservingness.

Jose Maria Ortiz
Zayed University

<ABSTRACT>

In this paper we study the role of merit and luck on earned entitlement through transfers in the standard dictator game, when both dictators and receivers may or may not have undertaken a real effort task. Dictators can earn either a low, or high, endowment based on merit (based on performance) or luck (random allocation). We study how merit and luck of dictators interacts with perceived deservingness of the receivers based on their receivers' effort and performance. We then study how this behaviour relates with factors such as social and political identification.

Author(s): Jose M. Ortiz, Lucas I. Teixeira, Natalia N. L. Falcao, Erika A. Soki, Raquel M. Almeida

Topic: Risk

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A Certainty Effect for Preference Reversals Under Risk: Experiment and Theory

Paul Feldman
Texas A&M University

<ABSTRACT>

Under the expected utility paradigm, two behavioral anomalies stand out. First, individuals tolerate risk when the odds are unfavorable but become more averse to risk as the odds approach certainty. Second, individuals exhibit context-dependent reversals in their attitudes towards risk. Although new theories predict a relationship between these two anomalies, most empirical research examines them in isolation. Understanding how they interact is critical for adjudicating among competing behavioral theories. To address this gap, we conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment with high stakes and expert subjects. We observe a certainty effect for preference reversals and find that reversals persist at higher stakes and among experts. Although our novel findings cannot be explained by leading theories from economics and psychology, they can be explained by a theory that combines insights from both disciplines.

Author(s): Paul Feldman, Paul Ferraro

Topic: Risk

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Higher order risk preferences and economic decisions

Charles Noussair
University of Arizona

<ABSTRACT>

In theory, individuals' higher-order risk attitudes of prudence and temperance influence saving and investment decisions. Prudent individuals save more when their future income becomes more uncertain, and temperate individuals prefer less risky investments in the presence of greater background risks. In a laboratory experiment, we measure individuals' higher-order risk attitudes directly, using two different elicitation methods. Participants then make saving and investment decisions under varying levels of background risk. We find that individual prudence measures correlate with the strength of precautionary saving, while individual temperance measures do not do so with investment. The risk attitudes acquired with the two elicitation methods are strongly correlated with each other. The representative individual is risk-averse, prudent, and temperate.

Author(s): Yilong Xu, Maarten Boksem, Charles N. Noussair, Stefan T. Trautmann, Gijs van de Kuilen, Alan Sanfey

Topic: Risk

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The Effects of Information Network and Policy Instruments on Non-Point Source Pollution: A Laboratory Experiment

Danielle Roy
University of Guelph

<ABSTRACT>

This research uses an interactive, incentivized laboratory experiment to investigate producers' behaviour under varying information networks and policy instruments in a non-point source (NPS) pollution setting. In groups of six, 228 participants acted as producers and made both input level and emissions-reduction technology adoption decisions under an ambient tax scheme. In total each of the 24 sessions lasted 20 rounds, and a subsidy was randomized each round within-subjects. Further, utilizing a between-subjects framework, three information scenarios were implemented in a 3x2 treatment design, orthogonal to a pro-abatement nudge. The treatments varied the level of information available in the network regarding other producers' technology adoption. This design allows us to investigate 1) whether information on other producers' technology adoption influenced an individual's own adoption behaviour, 2) whether the level of information flow within a network affected the aggregate pollution level, and 3) whether subsidization of an emissions-reduction technology led to higher adoption rates and lower NPS pollution levels. Consistent with economic theory, subsidy provision was effective in increasing adoption and lowering pollution regardless of the level of information flow in a network. Observing another producer had adopted the technology was found to increase an individual's own likelihood of adoption. Finally, the scenario with no information on other producers' decisions yielded a socially optimal pollution level when combined with a pro-abatement nudge. This research extends the literature on NPS pollution laboratory experiments and the findings suggest that subsidies and pro-abatement messaging can reduce NPS pollution, and that the effectiveness of the latter may be influenced by the level of information on producer behaviour available in a network.

Author(s): Danielle Roy, Tongzhe Li

Topic: Decision and Information

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Wait before crying a wolf? An experiment study on response time manipulation in two-stage game

Bohan Ye
University of Southern Indiana

<ABSTARCT>

Response time often provides additional information in message exchanges. Most social media sites now allow users to observe an accurate response time. How does this feature affect the user's responding behavior and belief? To answer this question, we designed a two-stage game between a reporter (R) and a follower (F) in three experimental conditions. In all three conditions, the R reports a series of states after receiving a series of private information, and the F will determine the truthfulness of each reported state based on the R's reports and associated response times. The F's payoff is determined by the accuracy of her judgment on each report. In the first condition, the R's payoff solely depends on his report. In the second and third conditions, the R's payoff will be determined by his reported state if being judged as "True" by the F. In the third condition only, the R is made aware that his response times will be reported to the F. We identify the distinct conditions under which R does, and does not, exhibit strategic behavior in report and response time. Additionally, we examine the role of

emotional states in the manipulative use of response time.

Author(s): Xin Jiang, Bohan Ye

Topic: Decision and Information

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An Approach to Testing Reference Points

Ao Wang

National University of Singapore

<ABSTRACT>

We present a general approach to experimentally testing candidate reference points. This approach builds from Prospect Theory's prediction that an increase in payoffs is perfectly offset by an equivalent increase in the reference point. Violation of this prediction can be tested with modifications to existing econometric techniques in experiments of a particular design. The resulting approach to testing theories of the reference point is minimally parametric, robust to broad classes of heterogeneity, yet still implementable in comparatively small sample sizes. We demonstrate the application of this approach in an experiment that tests the role of salience in setting reference points.

Author(s): Alex Rees-Jones, Ao Wang

Topic: Decision and Information

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Randomization preference and the timing of uncertainty resolution

Evan Calford

Australian National University

<ABSTRACT>

Preferences for randomization have received substantial attention in both the decision theoretic and experimental economics literatures over the past decade. Of particular import, given widespread applications, is the study of preferences for randomization within the domain of decision making under ambiguity, or Knightian uncertainty. Within this domain, there has been only limited integration between the theoretic and experimental literatures (Halevy, Ballon and Li; ECMTA 2022). This paper provides an experimental test of two prominent and previously untested theories of preferences for randomization in the face of Knightian uncertainty: Saito (2015, AER) and Ke and Zhang (2020, ECMTA). In addition, we vary the source and relative malevolence of the ambiguity to test a natural hypothesis: Is randomization, as a hedge against ambiguity, more prevalent when the source of ambiguity is malevolent rather than neutral? Our experimental results are surprising. Both the theories of Saito (2015, AER) and Ke and Zhang (2020, ECMTA) predict that randomization should be more prevalent when a larger proportion of the uncertainty is resolved prior to the agent making her decision. Conversely, the reversal of order axiom states that the prevalence of randomization should be independent of the timing of resolution of uncertainty. In contrast to both of these theoretical predictions, we find that the relationship between the prevalence of randomization and resolution of uncertainty is non-monotonic. Subjects are most likely to randomize when there is maximal uncertainty about the timing of the resolution of uncertainty. In addition, we find no effect of source malevolence on preferences for randomization.

Author(s): Evan Calford

Topic: Decision and Information

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Nudging Civilian Evacuation During War: Evidence from Ukraine

Monika Pompeo

New York University Abu Dhabi

<ABSTRACT>

In times of war, evacuating civilians from conflict zones is of critical importance for their survival and well-being. However, many people are hesitant to evacuate. Text-based nudges are a promising, yet unexplored, venue to increase the willingness to evacuate. We conduct a controlled survey experiment in Ukraine, manipulating the framing of automated alert messages. Our findings suggest that providing individuals with an evacuation plan by the authorities is crucial. The specific framing of the message itself does not seem to play a role in the perceived effectiveness of the messages. Heterogeneity analysis shows that women respond more strongly to information about a provided evacuation plan. Furthermore, having a pre-existing personal evacuation plan and being provided with one by the authorities act as substitutes.

Author(s): Seung-Keun Martinez, Monika Pompeo, Volodymyr Vahitov, Nataliia Zaika, Roman Sheremeta, Matthias Weber

Topic: Field 2

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Voluntary Public Goods Provision in Rural Areas: A Lab-in-the-Field Investigation

Yunpeng Li

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<ABSTRACT>

This paper studies the Refund Bonus Mechanism (RBM, Zubrickas (2014)) and the Assurance Payment Mechanism (APM, Li et al. (2014)) which are used for dealing with the free-riding problem in the crowdfunding of public goods in rural areas experimentally. Theoretically, both mechanisms encourage commitments to contribute by offering bonuses for contributors if the group fails to provide the good. RBM rewards contributors proportional to their contributions, and APM pays an assurance payment once a minimum offer level is reached in case of provision failure. We conduct this experiment in China with farmers, college students, and high school students in large groups of size 50. Evidence from experiments shows that APM improves individual contribution in most cases compared to RBM. APM improves coordination by providing assurance payment (AP) as a focal point for individual contributions and increases the frequency at which the individual contribution is not lower than AP for subjects with values above AP. We also find that farmers contribute the most under most treatments and deviate from unique equilibria more than students. These results suggest that subject pools affect the results of public goods provision and subjects, especially farmers, employ cognitive heuristics to make contribution decisions.

Author(s): Yunpeng Li, Zhi Li, Wenchao Xu

Topic: Field 2

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Priming Effect, Culture, and Gender: Evidence from the Academia

Zeev Shtudiner

Ariel University

<ABSTRACT>

This study primarily aims to test how priming manipulation affects students' decisions in academia. Unlike most laboratory experiments testing priming, this experimental design mimics a real-life scenario where students are unconsciously exposed to priming during class. We focus on three different framings of priming: visual, audio, and a combination of both and test their influence on the students' choices. The most substantial result we found is that no matter the framing of priming, once students are exposed to a hidden product, they choose significantly more of it. This result is robust across culture, gender, and type of priming. This study is a pioneer in addressing cultural differences between American and Chinese students with respect to priming, and among the few to address gender differences in priming. Our results imply that gender plays a vital role in the priming effect, depending on the framing: females are more susceptible to visual priming than males, and while priming works across different cultures, culture may play a role in its effect. Regardless, we find that priming manipulation can be used to change short-run behaviors in a learning environment.

Author(s): Shapir Offer, Shapir-Tidhar Michal, Shtudiner Zeev

Topic: Field 2

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Discrimination Under Non Gender-Blind Tests: Evidence from the Taiwan College Admission

Joseph Tao-yi Wang

National Taiwan University

<ABSTRACT>

One of the most prevailing theories about female underrepresentation in academia, particularly in STEM, is the existence of recruiting bias against women, and gender-blind evaluations are often recommended to prevent such discrimination. Meanwhile, after a reform of Taiwan's college admission, more programs implemented interviews, reviews on application materials, and other non gender-blind evaluations. Taking the adoption of non gender-blind tests as a natural experiment, this study examines its impact on female college admission. The empirical result indicates that moving from fully gender-blind tests to fully non gender-blind evaluations raises the female percentage of admitted applicants by 5.54%. Moreover, this pro-women effect surges up to 10.06% in majors not directly linked to subjects taught in high school. This can be due to gender differences in learning styles for new subjects, which vanishes upon receiving sufficient training and gaining an understanding of the new field. This research contributes to the debate over which interventions can be a remedy to enhance women's participation in

fields where they are outnumbered, by shifting away from one-size-fits-all solutions and focusing on uncovering the most effective approach in particular circumstances.

Author(s): Shiang-Hung Hu, Joseph Tao-yi Wang

Topic: Field 2

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Promoting COVID-19 Vaccination in India

Hyuncheol Bryant Kim

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

<ABSTARCT>

COVID-19 vaccine uptake is one of the most important weapon to fight against COVID-19. However, vaccine take-up rates are still not high enough in many countries. Efforts need to be undertaken to identify the most cost-effective way to address it. Using detailed data from a large Randomized Controlled Trial from the state of Uttar Pradesh in India, this study attempts to estimate the effect of different interventions—1) information campaign by the fieldworkers with information (Information Only, T1), 2) information + sure gift (worth \$5) conditional upon vaccination (T2), 3) Information + a lottery (with 5% chance of winning a gift worth \$100) conditional upon vaccination (T3), 4) Information + easy access to vaccination (T4), and 5) information provided via eminent figures in the community (T5). We find evidence that each of the interventions have been quite successful in improving vaccine take-ups (first dose), but T2 and T4 are most successful to promote vaccine take-ups.

Author(s): Asad Islam, Sonalini Khetrpal, Hyuncheol Bryant Kim, Debayan Pakashi, Armand Sim, Madhusudhan Yadav

Topic: Behavioral Interventions: ADB Sponsored Session

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Misinformation Belief, Health Behavior, and Labor Supply during COVID-19 Pandemic in a Developing Country

Siho Park

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

<ABSTARCT>

This study aims to analyze the behavioral consequences of people's beliefs in conspiracy theories and misinformation surrounding COVID-19 vaccines in developing countries. We employ unique panel data to examine vaccination behavior within the transport sector of the Philippines, with a specific focus on tricycles, which are a prevalent mode of transportation in low-income communities in the Philippines. We assess the impact of misinformation on health behavior, labor supply, and the determinants of belief in misinformation, including risk and time preferences. Empirical results reveal that education has a negative correlation with belief in misinformation, while risk preference has a positive correlation. Misinformation beliefs are shown to have a significant impact on health behaviors, particularly vaccination and other preventive health decisions. Furthermore, beliefs in misinformation are observed to impede workplace recovery, especially after the initial strict lockdown phase. Consequently, the study concludes that belief in misinformation is inversely associated with compliance with public health guidelines. Individuals who hold incorrect beliefs regarding COVID-19 vaccines are less likely to engage in preventive measures, such as social distancing and maintaining personal hygiene.

Author(s): Syngjoo Choi, Hyuncheol Bryant Kim, Siho Park, Yasuyuki Sawada, Takashi Yamano

Topic: Behavioral Interventions: ADB Sponsored Session

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Peer Effects in Prosocial Behavior: Evidence from Natural and Lab-in-the-Field Experiments in China

Yasuyuki Sawada

University of Tokyo

<ABSTRACT>

We examine peer effect in classroom exploiting a natural experimental situation in China after the great Sichuan earthquake in 2008. We investigate how having an earthquake-caused disabled classmate with a mental disorder affects fellow students' social and individual behavior captured by a series of standard laboratory experiments. Students are sorted randomly into the classroom within a track and within a school, allowing us to identify peer effect causally. We find that in our context, having earthquake-caused mentally disabled classmates induce students to contribute more in the dictator game and public goods game. However, the effect of peers in the public goods game disappears after controlling for altruism as measured by the dictator game. This result suggests pure effect has enhanced students' altruism, but does not induce a higher level of reciprocal expected

cooperation. In addition, we find no impact of peer effect on risk aversion, discount rate, or academic grades.

Author(s): Albert Park, Yasuyuki Sawada, Menghan Shen, Sangui Wang, Heng Wang

Topic: Behavioral Interventions: ADB Sponsored Session

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Public Acceptability of Carbon Pricing and its Determinants in Korea: A Discrete Choice Experiment and its Validation

Jinsoo Bae

Korea Institute of Public Finance

<ABSTRACT>

A discrete choice experiment survey was conducted to investigate respondents' preferred carbon pricing scheme. The coefficient on carbon prices is estimated to be negative, meaning they generally prefer a low price. The respondents prefer a carbon pricing scheme that waives the cost for small and medium-sized enterprise owners, suggesting progressive schemes are generally preferred. However, they do not prefer a scheme that waives costs for companies that hire many employees. The respondents show higher acceptability of carbon pricing if industrial countries such as the US and European Union introduce a similar carbon price level. In contrast, introduction of carbon price schemes of large emitters such as China and India would not affect the respondents' acceptability. Earmarking the revenue for carbon dividends to all, emission reduction technologies, income and value-added tax cuts, and social cushioning substantially increases carbon price acceptability. Earmarking for cutting corporate tax is also preferred, but the magnitude of the coefficient was only about half of the other revenue recycling schemes. Voting simulations based on the discrete choice model show that attributes of carbon pricing schemes make substantial differences in the rates of acceptance even at the same price level. For example, at 60,000KRW/ton price level, less than 30% of respondents are predicted to accept the least preferred carbon pricing scheme, while 68% are predicted to cast yes votes for the most favored scheme. The simulation results imply that the design of a carbon pricing scheme is crucial to make it politically feasible. However, one may question whether voters in practice would make the same decision as the simulation in a real-world vote choice. An ideal way to answer the question is to analyze historical data on vote choices for carbon pricing, but no vote has ever been held for a carbon price in Korea. Thus, we conducted two additional surveys to check the validity of the choice experiment survey results: one that replicates real-world vote choice, and the other asks WTP using contingent valuation methods. The results of the two additional surveys are compared to the choice experiment results, and the implications are discussed.

Author(s): Jinsoo Bae

Topic: Environmental 1(3A)

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Promoting Willingness to Pay for "Climate Change and Environmental Charge" in Electricity Tariff: Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment

Sungmin Lim

Seoul National University

<ABSTRACT>

Internalizing environmental externalities of electricity generation often fall short of the socially optimal level: residential consumers in Korea, for instance, bear less than a quarter of total environmental external cost in their electric bill. Here, we present a randomized survey experiment on 4,214 nationally representative sample of Korean electricity consumers that showed that willingness-to-pay for Climate Change & Environmental Charges can be promoted. We introduce four information strategies - one economic, one political and two psychological-based messaging. We find that providing information about external cost currently paid by consumers, which is often elusive to most consumers substantially raises consumers' willingness to pay for environmental charges - by 15% compared to the control group. The rest of the information - i) climate policy is partisan-free, ii) environmental policy can be succeeded through international cooperation, iii) cross-country comparison of climate change mitigation efforts - show small and insignificant effects. As consistent with existing findings, the political divide on climate change is attributed to the overall null-effects, while we provide new empirical evidence that such political divide can be induced by consumers' knowledge bias.

Author(s): Sungmin Lim, Syngjoo Choi, Jong Ho Hong, Booyuel Kim, Heerae Lee, Jinwook Shin

Topic: Environmental 1(3A)

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Perceived Control and Attitudes Towards Self-threatening Information

Alice Solda

<ABSTRACT>

The amount of information people face on a daily basis is vast and fast-growing and individuals routinely have to decide what information to attend to. When information is particularly self-threatening, people might be tempted to ignore it and therefore foregoing potentially valuable inputs for decision-making. This might be especially the case if individuals perceive that they have little influence over the outcome the information pertains to. In this paper, we investigate whether an increase in perceived control can mitigate individuals' failure to attend to self-threatening information in the context of information about the negative health impact of air pollution. To address our research question, we designed an experiment in which participants are given the opportunity to acquire information about the number of years of life expectancy the average person in their home region loses due to air pollution. Before eliciting participants' preferences about receiving such information, half of the participants receive information about measures they can take to protect their health against air pollution (treatment group) while the other half does not receive any additional information (control group). This feature of the design allows us to exogenously manipulate participants' perceived control over the effect of air pollution on their health. Participants who observe the information are then asked to report the number of life-years lost in their home region shortly after observing it, as well as two weeks after the experiment. We conducted the experiment simultaneously in the USA and India, collected data from 2280 US participants via MTurk and data from 2036 Indian participants via Dynata. We found that our treatment manipulation successfully increased perceived control over the negative effect of air pollution on one's health in both India and the USA. Surprisingly, we found no effect of our treatment on information avoidance in either sample. However, we found that participants in our treatment were more accurate in remembering the number of life years lost due to air pollution in their home region shortly after receiving the information. However, the effect disappears two weeks later. These results suggest that information campaign aiming at increasing perceived control over aversive events may be a powerful policy tool to combat motivated cognition.

Author(s): Anca Baietti, Angelika Budjan, Tillmann Eymess, Alice Solda

Topic: Environmental 1(3A)

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Strategic Delegation and Collusion: An Experiment

Jeong Yeol Kim

University of Arizona

<ABSTRACT>

The assumption that firms maximize profit has been widely used in economics to explain firm behavior and market outcomes. But the profit maximization assumption may lead to incorrect predictions when firms engage in strategic delegation between owners (e.g., shareholders) and managers (e.g., company executives) whose incentives may differ. This paper examines firms' collusion under the assumption that firms engage in strategic delegation versus profit maximization. The experiment incorporates cartel fines for firms' managers and owners to closely align with the United States antitrust regime. In addition, this study examines the effects of communication between firms on cartel formation under strategic delegation. The experiment yields three main findings: (i) strategic delegation does not increase the total number of cartels when communication is allowed but may increase implicit cartels when communication is not allowed; (ii) cartel formation occurs in two distinct ways, with firms simultaneously choosing a low output for collusion or periodically switching off between high and low outputs to evade cartel fines; and (iii) cartels are more likely to be formed when firms have different incentive schemes for managers instead of the same incentive schemes for managers across all firms.

Author(s): Jeong Yeol Kim

Topic: Game 2

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Strategic Experimentation with Pirate Barrel: An Experimental Study

OSub Kwon

Nankai University

<ABSTRACT>

We experimentally study how people perform risky experimentation to produce information when they can also learn from each other. We test a two-armed bandit model which is similar to but uses a different dynamic learning process from that of Keller et al. (2005). Our model predicts that the information generated by a group of players is no more than that generated by a single player in any perfect Bayes equilibrium even though they interact infinitely repeatedly. To implement this model in the lab, we design a novel dynamic information structure that can trivialize the posterior calculation for any sequence of signal realizations and can be easily communicated to the subjects by relating it to "pirate barrel," a well known toy. We find that 1) when

experimenting alone, the median subject generates almost exactly the same amount as the theoretical prediction, that 2) when experimenting with others, the median subject tends to generate slightly more information than when alone, which is against the theoretical prediction, and that 3) the subjects only react to the posterior belief and do not condition their actions on other players' past actions. Thus, we find no evidence suggesting that infinitely repeated interaction between players can sustain more information production via reciprocation in our environment.

Author(s): OSub Kwon

Topic: Game 2

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Viable Nash Equilibria: An Experiment

Daehong Min

New York University Abu Dhabi

<ABSTRACT>

This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)'s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating. We find that Kalai's measure captures well how the viability of the everyone-participates (eP) equilibrium depends on the success threshold; the measure does not capture other elements of the game which affect the likelihood that the eP equilibrium is played.

Author(s): Duk Gyoo Kim, Daehong Min, John Wooders

Topic: Game 2

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Quantal Response Equilibrium with a Continuum of Types

Evan Friedman

Paris School of Economics

<ABSTRACT>

Quantal response equilibrium (QRE), a statistical generalization of Nash equilibrium, is a standard benchmark in the analysis of experimental data. However, as a QRE is a solution to a system of non-polynomial equations, closed-form solutions do not exist and theoretical applications are limited. We overcome this difficulty in the context of binary-action games with a continuum of types. For this class, we provide results to characterize (non-parametric) QRE without fixed-point calculations. As applications, we consider the volunteer's dilemma, global games, and the compromise game. We revisit experimental data from Palfrey and Carillo (2009) on the compromise game, and analyze the data through the lens of our results.

Author(s): Evan Friedman

Topic: Game 2

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The effects of bonus pay when working in a team; evidence from strawberry pickers in the field

Aric Shafran

Orfalea College of Business - Cal Poly San Luis Obispo

<ABSTRACT>

Crew-based work is a fundamental component of agricultural production, but there is limited experimental evidence on how piece-rate pay structures impact productivity over time and via peers. We implement a five-week long randomized bonus study with strawberry workers on a large farm in Central California to test both the own and peer impacts of varying a worker's (bonus) pay at different times of the day for different durations. Our results show that both own and peer bonuses have a positive and statistically significant effect on productivity when administered for short periods of time early in the day. These effects are less favorable if the bonus is offered later in the day or for the whole day. Productivity declines and workers work fewer hours with large all-day bonuses.

Author(s): Blake Allison, Jason Lepore, Aric Shafran

Topic: Reward and Punishment

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Rewarding Good Deeds by Reallocating Fines for Misbehaviour : An Experiment

Lirong Yang

<ABSTRACT>

We investigated ways to improve cooperation by using monetary penalties for non-cooperative behavior as rewards for cooperative behavior. We used a linear public goods game as a baseline and added a centralized punishment mechanism to encourage cooperation and discourage free riding. The mechanism sets a minimum contribution threshold and punishes non-compliance. We tested two reward allocation methods: an all-pay auction where the highest contributor wins and a lottery where all cooperative players have a chance to get the prize reward, with winning probability proportional to contributions. Our results showed that the all-pay auction outperforms the lottery when the punishment is severe, but both methods yield equal contributions when the punishment is mild. Our mechanism improved performance compared to centralized punishment alone. The level of contributions increased as punishment severity increased, but free-riding still existed even with increased punishment. The results showed no significant difference between the all-pay auction and lottery in a mild punishment environment, but both methods led to similar contributions in a relatively high punishment environment.

Author(s): Yohanes E. Riyanto, Lirong Yang

Topic: Reward and Punishment

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History Dependence of Third-Party Punishment in Social Dilemmas: Defection Rate, Horizon and Experience

Ozlem Tonguc
Binghamton University

<ABSTRACT>

This paper investigates costly third-party punishment in a prisoner's dilemma (PD) when the third-party has information about the players' defection history. We conduct three separate experiments, all featuring multi-round PDs to construct defection histories for PD players, followed by a one-shot PD involving a third-party. In the first experiment where the third-party is told each player's defection rate during the multi-round PD, we observe a positive relationship between past defection rate and punishment. In the second experiment, where the third-parties are additionally informed of number of defections, they are less likely to punish norm violators with similarly high defection rates but with more defections. Finally, the third experiment investigates the interplay of defection history and horizon when third-parties observe firsthand the players' norm violations in the multi-round PD. Our results offer implications for voting behavior, legislative tactics and legal institutions. Keywords : Norms; sanctions; third-party punishment; accountability; image scoring

Author(s): Ozlem Tonguc, Leyla D. Karakas

Topic: Reward and Punishment

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How Do Reward Versus Penalty Framed Incentives Affect Diagnostic Performance?

Timothy Shields
Chapman University

<ABSTRACT>

Prior research examines how rewards versus economically equivalent penalties affect effort. However, accountants perform various diagnostic analyses that involve more than exerting effort. For example, auditors often need to identify whether a material misstatement is the underlying cause of a phenomenon among the possible causes. Testing helps identify the cause, but testing is costly. When participants are incentivized to test accurately (rather than test more) and objectively (unbiased between testing and not testing), we find that framing the incentives as rewards versus equivalent penalties increases testing by lowering the subjective testing criterion and by increasing the assessed risk of material misstatement. However, testing increases primarily when a misstatement is absent, causing more false alarms under a reward frame with no improvement in misstatement detection. Penalties are pervasive in auditing. Our study suggests that rewards are more effective for increasing testing, and that increasing testing blindly can impair audit efficiency.

Author(s): Bright (Yue) Hong, Timothy Shields

Topic: Reward and Punishment

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An Experiment on Diagnostic Expectations

Wonwoo Bae
Seoul National University

<ABSTRACT>

Motivated by Bordalo et al. (2018) who propose an alternative belief updating rule, diagnostic expectations, we propose a novel experimental design to test the existence and persistence of individuals' diagnostic expectations in a dynamic environment. We extend the experimental design of Bordalo et al. (2022) to an individual decision-making task that requires processing visual cues to update information. Individuals with the representativeness heuristic are expected to overreact or underreact to irrelevant information when updating their beliefs. We also test how learning shapes diagnostic expectations as subjects gain experience.

Author(s): Wonwoo Bae, Syngjoo Choi, Jeongbin Kim

Topic: Decision 1

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Saliency in Juxtaposition Effect

Xueqi Dong

Royal Holloway College, University of London

<ABSTRACT>

Saliency theory experimentally outperforms its leading contenders under a novel experimental setting where juxtaposition effect (JE) is observed in absence of event splitting effect (ESE). JE refers to the systematical change in subjects' preferences between a pair of risky options when their outcomes are juxtaposed in a state matrix (Starmer and Sugden (1989)). ESE refers to the tendency that a subjective weight given to an outcome depends on the number of states of the world in which the outcome occurs. Regret theory was considered the standard model that can accommodate the JE; alternatively, ESE was believed to be the strongest cause of the JE (Starmer and Sugden (1993)). We conduct an experiment, in which ESE explanation is excluded by design, to investigate the role of saliency in JE. Our experimental results show in total 31% of choices still exhibit JE when ESE cannot play a role; the effect is not significant as predicted by RT. Results from structural estimation on individual choice data show that, Expected Utility explains 43%, two forms of Saliency Theory explain 16% and 35% respectively, Regret Theory explains 7%, Cumulative Prospect Theory explains 0% of the subjects' choice data.

Author(s): Xueqi Dong

Topic: Decision 1

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Target in control: self-regulation of social influence in consumer choices.

Anna Boros

University of Warsaw

<ABSTRACT>

Social influence theories primarily emphasize the role and properties of the source of influence as determinants of opinion change in consumer behavior. However, consumers are active and causative in their information processing. Consumers' reactions to social influence and opinions are regulated by factors such as trust in the source of information or the value attributed to it. Moreover, the processing of source-based information can vary in terms of intensity. Cognitive and emotional effort may depend on the level of information sought from the source. While broad opinions may be almost effortlessly processed by a target of influence, the underlying facts that constitute them may require additional processing or evaluation. Adequate delegation of processing efforts seems to be the key for effective management of incoming information. Being the target of social influence, thus, may on the one hand make one more vulnerable, but it may also serve as a vehicle for optimizing information processing activities through delegation. In the experiment reported here, we manipulated the level of trust attributed to a source of information (an online shop) and the objective value (price) of a set of products. Through the use of eye-tracking methods, we measured the way participants directed visual attention towards 1) low-level information, requiring more information processing efforts, or alternatively 2) high-level information, requiring less information processing resources allocated by the target of influence. Overall, we show that participants sought more raw (low-level) fact-based information about a product when its value was higher and trust was lower. When trust was higher and value lower, participants sought higher level information already processed by the source, such as opinions and product reviews. These findings suggest that theories of social influence ought to look at the target not only as the "object" of influence, but foremost as an active subject, economically regulating information flow through strategic allocation of information processing resources.

Author(s): Mikolaj Biesaga, Anna Boros, Lan Bui-Wrzosinska, Andrzej Nowak

Topic: Decision 1

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Non-Allais Paradox and Context Dependent Risk Attitudes

Keh-Kuan Sun
Chapman University

<ABSTRACT>

Since Allais (1953) documented violations of the Independence axiom in decision makers, many experimental studies have produced the same type of behavior. As they are not consistent with standard Expected Utility theory, many models that account for such violations have been developed. The most well-known are the Rank-Dependent Utility of Quiggin (1982) and the Cumulative Prospect Theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). In this paper, we propose a theoretical model and a laboratory experiment that generate an alternative type of violations that cannot be consistent with these models and are distinct from the Allais Paradox. We provide and axiomatize a representation in which a decision maker can exhibit different risk attitudes, which we refer to as a Dual Expected Utility representation. In this representation, there will be two different utility functions over the prizes, and the decision maker will use one of them when disappointment probabilities are low and shift to the other once the disappointment probability exceeds a threshold. It contains the standard EU representations as special cases. Unlike the representations that distort weights using a fixed utility function, the DEU allows the concavity/convexity of the utility functions to change. This observation leads to our experiment design, which consists of a series of binary comparison tasks of two lotteries. Specifically, we change the amount of the most disappointing prize while fixing the other prizes in both lotteries. The main implication shares the core idea of Allais as we expect a riskier lottery may be more preferred to a less risky lottery when the probability of a disappointing prize is high and vice versa. However, the design is distinct because we keep the ranks of the prizes constant while varying only the relative size of the disappointment. A potential choice reversal in this series of comparison tasks will be a simple yet direct test against the Expected Utility, the Rank-Dependent Utility, and the Cumulative Prospect Theory. We expect to extend the results further to narrow down possible thresholds for our DEU representation and use the thresholds to predict the presence of Allais behavior in different scenarios of Common Consequence and Common Ratio examples.

Author(s): Edward Honda, Keh-Kuan Sun

Topic: Decision 1

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Behavioral Investigation of Fulfilled Expectations in Network Product Adoption

Yinghao Zhang
University of Cincinnati

<ABSTRACT>

This paper studies how customers form their expectations under network effects. Lab experiments suggest that the behavioral expectation deviates from the standard fulfilled expectation equilibrium, exhibiting a "rotation-to-middle" effect. We attribute this behavioral irregularity to cognitive hierarchy and anchoring-and-adjustment. We calibrate the magnitude of the behavioral tendencies through structural model estimation.

Author(s): Yifan Dou, Ang Gao, Yinghao Zhang, Yuanyuan Zhou

Topic: Operations Management(3A)

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Cooperation and Anonymity: Does the Revelation of Group Members' Identities Affect Contributions in an Artefactual Public Good Field Experiment?

Christian Hoenow
RWI - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research

<ABSTRACT>

This study compares two treatment conditions for contributions to a public good in an artefactual field experiment. The first condition preserves anonymity of group members, whereas identities are revealed in the second condition. Individual contributions to the public good remain anonymous in both cases, so the difference between the two conditions only lies in whether participants get to see who their group members are. The experimental setting in small Namibian village communities entails pre-existing social ties between participants, which are hypothesized to amplify potential effects of revealing identities and further allow investigating the role of group composition, such as the share of friends and family members. Against intuitive expectations, cooperation rates turn out significantly higher in the anonymous setting than in the condition with revealed identities, which can be explained by theories of social identity and depersonalization. Nonetheless, results also show that cooperation increases with the number of one's friends and relatives in the group in the condition with revealed identities.

Author(s): Nils Christian Hoenow
Topic: Operations Management(3A)

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Behavioral Externalities of Process Automation

Anyan Qi
The University of Texas at Dallas

<ABSTRACT>

We study the behavioral effects of process automation on human workers interacting with automated tasks. We introduce a stylized model with two workers who complete their tasks sequentially, working toward a joint project to obtain a fixed payment plus a variable bonus that depends on how early the project is completed. We show that workers will complete their tasks as soon as possible if the early completion bonus is high enough. Following the behavioral operations literature, we hypothesize that workers will suboptimally delay project completion. In addition, we predict that automation will alleviate this problem by reducing the uncertainty in regard to task completion, leading to a higher project completion rate and worker productivity. To test these predictions, we conduct an experiment replicating the theoretical model, varying whether a worker collaborates with a coworker or robot. First, we find that workers largely deviate from the optimal policy, as they take longer than what the theory prescribes to complete their tasks or do not complete the project. Second, we show that process automation increases the project completion rate and reduces the project completion time, confirming the benefits of process automation. Interestingly, workers who collaborate with robots take longer to complete their tasks, contradicting our initial hypothesis that process automation has a positive effect on the productivity of human workers. An additional treatment shows that the reduced uncertainty derived from process automation cannot be leveraged to improve workers' productivity in the same way as reduced uncertainty in a human-human setting and that social preferences are an important driver of this result.

Author(s): Ruth Beer, Anyan Qi, Ignacio Rios
Topic: Operations Management(3A)

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Does Algorithmic Trading Attenuate Asset Price Bubbles? An Experiment

Stefan Altmann
ETH Zurich

<ABSTRACT>

We experimentally examine the impact of algorithmic trading strategies on asset price mispricing and the relative payoff of human vis-a-vis algorithmic traders. We implement a 2x2 treatment design varying the algorithmic strategies into a market-making (liquidity-making) and a sniper (liquidity-taking) algorithm, and the algorithm's speed into an instantaneous and a 5-second speed bump algorithm. Our benchmark treatment is the one with only human traders. We show that the market-making algorithm results in roughly 21% lower mispricing than the benchmark. The sniper algorithm reduces mispricing significantly less than the market-making algorithm. Imposing a 5-second speed bump on the algorithm has no impact on mispricing. Except in the sniper treatment, the algorithm generally does not outperform human traders.

Author(s): Stefan Altmann, Yohanes Eko Riyanto
Topic: Finance: BOK Sponsored Session

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How Dark Trading Harms Financial Markets? Experimental Evidence

Edward Halim
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<ABSTRACT>

We design an experiment to analyze the consequences of dark trading in a financial market. The channel through which dark trading affects market efficiency depends critically on how information regarding fundamentals is distributed among investors. When information is concentrated in the hands of a few investors, possibly due to sparse investor connectedness or low media coverage, dark trading primarily impacts market efficiency by deteriorating the quality of asset prices. When information is diffused, dark trading no longer harms price discovery, but it reduces allocative efficiency. The earnings gap between informed and uninformed traders does not widen with dark trading.

Author(s): Edward Halim, Yohanes Eko Riyanto, Nilanjan Roy, Wang Yan
Topic: Finance: BOK Sponsored Session

Information Acquisition in Financial Markets with Algorithmic Traders: Experimental Evidence

Mingyang Yan
Nanyang Technological University

<ABSTRACT>

This study investigates the impact of algorithmic trading strategies on the information acquisition behavior of human participants and the price dynamics in an experimental asset market. We adopt the "ball-and-urn" setup to allow traders to acquire information on the dividend amount paid out in each period. Our experiment follows a 2x2 treatment design where we vary the algorithmic trading strategy (a market-maker or a sniper algorithm) and the amount of information the algorithm possesses (no information or good information). A human-only treatment serves as benchmark. We evaluate the information acquisition behavior of human traders, the market ability to aggregate diverse information in the hand of traders and algorithms, and the forecast error between the trading price and the asset's fundamental value.

Author(s): Stefan Altmann, Yohanes Eko Riyanto, Mingyang Yan

Topic: Finance: BOK Sponsored Session

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An experiment of a dynamic beauty contest game

Nobuyuki Hanaki
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

<ABSTRACT>

We propose a new framework of the learning-to-forecast experiment that elicits series of long-run forecasts from the participants in an incentive compatible manner, and elicit forecasts feedback into the realization. We have conducted a set of experiment under the proposed experimental framework to study an impact of strategic environment as well as extent to which expectation formations are forward-looking. The preliminary analyses show (1) the price converges to the rational expectations equilibrium under the presence of a strategic substitutability but not under the presence of a strategic complementarity, and (2) only a small fraction of participants demonstrates a forward looking adjustment in their forecasts.

Author(s): Nobuyuki Hanaki, Yuta Takahashi

Topic: Finance: BOK Sponsored Session

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Lying and Deception in Repeated Communication

Chanjoo Lee
Seoul National University

<ABSTRACT>

Lying aversion has been identified as one of the main sources of over-communication in the laboratory. However, recent work by Sobel (2020) points out that lying and deception would have different strategic implications. This raises the question of whether the results that have been understood through the lens of 'lying' are actually deception-related phenomena. We design two environments where lying and deception are completely separated: Pandering and Political Correctness. The key idea is to make the domain of belief two-dimensional by incorporating a reputation-building channel into a repeated communication game. In the Pandering environment, the sender has to tell the truth to conceal her type. In contrast, in the Political Correctness environment, the sender has to lie to reveal her type. Our experimental results document that (i) people incur both lying and deception aversion significantly, (ii) lying aversion is more frequently observed than deception aversion, and (iii) receivers try to punish senders' lying even if it is for the common good. Our result implies that different political communication mechanisms can perform differently depending on their relative dependence on lying and deception, thereby suggesting the importance of understanding the difference between lying and deception aversion in investigating organizational and political phenomena.

Author(s): Syngjoo Choi, Chanjoo Lee, Wooyoung Lim

Topic: Lying and Deception

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Lying for Votes

Subhasish Dugar

<ABSTRACT>

To what extent do pivotal nonpartisan voters believe and act upon potentially deceptive messages from partisan voters who privately observe candidates' ex-ante fitness-for-office attributes? How do nonpartisan voters' responses to messages vary with changing odds of candidates' ex-ante suitability for office? This paper derives contrasting predictions regarding pivotal nonpartisan voters' reactions to possibly untruthful messages across two-candidate voting competitions and tests them in the laboratory. We find that the partisan voters lie substantially more when candidates possess unequal than equal ex-ante odds of performing better in office. The inferior (superior) candidate's base transmits more unfavorable (favorable) lies about their opponent (own) candidate. Facing candidates with different fitness-for-office odds, the nonpartisan voters largely ignore the message and vote for the ex-ante superior candidate. Yet, voting efficiency is lower in the competition with differentiated than undifferentiated candidates. We develop a behavioral framework including lying aversion to explain key features of our data.

Author(s): Subhasish Dugar, Quazi Shahriar

Topic: Lying and Deception

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Overconfidence and Lying: Evidence from Cheating Game

Younjun Kim

Southern Connecticut State University

<ABSTRACT>

We test whether overconfidence is associated with lying in a cheating game where participants flip a coin multiple times and are rewarded in proportion to realized heads they report in private. We find that overconfident participants anticipate more heads to come up, and that their reported heads are closer to what they anticipated. The latter is unique in that participants seem to sacrifice their possible monetary gains to be more consistent with their belief when actual realized heads are more than anticipated.

Author(s): Younjun Kim, Elizabeth Hoffman

Topic: Lying and Deception

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Concealing, Anticipatory, and Premeditated Lies

Georgia Michailidou

New York University Abu Dhabi

<ABSTRACT>

Past and future events can affect present-time decision-making in important ways. More so when these events have self and social image implications. For example, individuals might find that unflattering past events can resurface in present-time and harm their current self and social image. Or, they might realize that present-time unflattering events might be revealed later in time and damage their future self. Depending on how formative individuals view past events to be for the construction of their current self, they might become less or more willing to engage in concealing lying (i.e., lying aiming to cover up a past action). Similarly, contingent on how individuals project their future self to be affected by current events, they might become less or more willing to engage in anticipatory lying (i.e., lying aiming to prevent a present action from being revealed in the future). In an incentivized experiment, participants exhibit the tendency to engage in concealing lying but not anticipatory lying, implying some naivety in anticipating future concerns. In a related experimental variation, subjects do not make more unflattering (but profitable) decisions when, beforehand, they know they can use lying to cover up afterwards or, when they do, they do not lie about it, i.e., they do not significantly engage in premeditated lying.

Author(s): Georgia Michailidou

Topic: Lying and Deception

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The Korean MZ Generation's Retirement Savings

Hae Won Byun

Korea Insurance Research Institute

<ABSTRACT>

While the MZ generation will live longer than their parent generation, economic conditions for asset accumulation are worse than before. Therefore, retirement savings are more important for them than the older generation.

However, a considerable number of the MZ generation has never thought about life after retirement. This study conducted a randomized controlled trial experiment modified from BIT's 2020 experiment to find whether nudges based on behavioral insights can help the young generation save for retirement or plan for it. The nudges are the ones i) framing pensions as investment and using rules of thumb, ii) labeling the saving amounts, and iii) focusing on the future. The experiment showed that the nudge focusing on the future was most effective to make the participants consider retirement savings – the sufficiency of their retirement savings. This result was robust even after controlling for demographic and economic factors.

Author(s): Hae Won Byun, Ravi Dutta-Powell

Topic: Information 1

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Still Turning a Blind Eye After Describing Your Ends And Means? An Experimental Study

Fabian Bopp

Paderborn University

<ABSTRACT>

A lot of harm comes about because people ignore the effect of their behavior on others. One reason why people may ignore these effects willfully is that this enables them to act selfishly without a 'bad conscience'. In essence, such people 'kid themselves': caring about the consequences of others is inconsistent with ignoring these consequences. Upon reflection, people may discover this inconsistency. Nudging people to reflect may thus be an effective tool to prevent harm. We examine this idea experimentally. We find that inviting subjects to describe their aims and means makes them more likely to inform themselves and ultimately act more pro-socially.

Author(s): Fabian Bopp, Wendelin Schnedler

Topic: Information 1

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Rank information acquisition at work: theory and experiment

Jin Di Zheng

Nanjing Audit University

<ABSTRACT>

We study the effects of rank information in a real effort task on employees' effort level with a laboratory experiment. In particular, we are interested in: 1) Ranking information on own effort and group-level productivity, 2) we provide two rank information – own-comparison (with historical record) rank information and other-comparison (with competitors) rank information, 3) we collect their willingness to pay (WTP) for rank information in each scenario. Our preliminary results show that compared with other-comparison treatment, employees are willing to pay more to get information on own performance; and this trend does not diminish quickly with time. However, information acquisition backfires especially in the own-comparison treatment. When employees are given the opportunity to purchase information on own rank information, they exert the least effort compared to all other treatment groups. Employees in the treatment where they are provided with own performance information for free exert the highest level of effort.

Author(s): Jin Di Zheng, Jaesun Lee, Jiang Ming

Topic: Information 1

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Informed Principal Problems in the Laboratory

Jin Yeub Kim

Yonsei University

<ABSTRACT>

This paper considers the problem of mechanism selection by a privately informed principal in common-value environments. Several solution concepts for the selection of a mechanism (or mediator) are proposed and studied by previous studies. A theory of inscrutable mechanism selection suggests the neutral optimum as a reasonable selection that the principal could consider (Myerson, 1983). In a class of problems, the neutral optimum differs from the optimal mechanism identified by y Horner, Morelli, and Squintani (2015) with respect to principal's interim payoffs and the ex ante welfare. We experimentally investigate which mediator, among the two solutions, is selected and implemented in a conflict environment where two subjects negotiate how to share a resource. The principal-subject selects and announces a mechanism; then the agent-subject makes some inferences about the principal's type, based on the announcement, and the mechanism is implemented with each subject using some participation strategy that is rational for him given his information. We compare two environments that differ

in terms of the information structure at the time of selection—interim mediator selection (the subjects know their own private types when selecting a mediator) and ex ante mediator selection (the subjects do not know their types).

Author(s): Jin Yeub Kim, Wooyoung Lim

Topic: Information 1

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False Sense of Security? A Study of Risk Compensation in the Lab and the Field

Gyula Seres

National University of Singapore

<ABSTRACT>

Do safety interventions create a false sense of security? The hypothesis that individuals would be less careful when the environment becomes safer enjoys considerable attention in public discourse. Starting as a case against seat belt laws (Peltzman, 1975), it has been studied in various settings including disease prevention programs, bicycle helmet laws, and face mask mandates. In this paper, we investigate whether people compensate risk optimally. In a laboratory experiment, subjects play a repeated insurance-buying game in which they face a risk of losing most of their endowment, which they can mitigate with one of several costly insurance policies. The probability of a loss is also influenced by an exogenous safety condition that varies between periods. Prior to the laboratory experiment, we expose subjects to two health safety field interventions: (i) in half the sessions, the subjects learn that a HEPA filter is in the room, and (ii) half the subjects were required to wear an N95 or equivalent respirator. We tracked whether the subjects exhibited risk-compensating behavior by standing closer in a queue, being less likely to use sanitizer wipes, and removing their masks more frequently. Our findings are three-fold. First, in the laboratory, we find strong evidence of risk-overcompensation bias - a tendency to reduce (increase) effort more than optimum in response to an improvement (deterioration) in the safety condition. Second, we found limited evidence of risk-compensating behavior in the field. Third, we found that individual risk-compensating tendencies in the laboratory were weak predictors of their precautionary behaviors in the field.

Author(s): Gyula Seres, Lawrence Jin

Topic: Risk Attitudes

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Risk attitude and belief updating

Evelyn Huang

The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

<ABSTRACT>

Despite the importance of risk attitude in decision making, to the best of our knowledge, the role of risk attitude on belief updating has been overlooked. We aim to shed light on this fundamental question. We show, by using economic theory, that stronger risk aversion drives more conservative actions, and decreases the instrumental value of information relative to the importance of belief-based utility. Consequently, we hypothesize that with anticipatory utility, stronger risk aversion yields more belief changes; whereas with updating cost, stronger risk aversion leads to less belief changes. Our experimental results confirm the hypotheses in two settings where subjects update their belief about their IQ (anticipatory utility) and a randomly drawn number (updating cost), respectively. Notably, the results have significant implications on persuasion, advertisement and politics.

Author(s): Evelyn Huang, Benson Tsz Kin Leung

Topic: Risk Attitudes

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Perceived correlations in risk attitudes

Jingcheng Fu

National University of Singapore

<ABSTRACT>

We investigate the perceived links between risk preferences within and across domains defined over probability (low/moderate) and outcome (prospect/hazard). In an experimental setting, we first elicit subjects' risk taking behaviors in different domains, and then measure their beliefs about links of behaviors within the same domain and across different domains. The majority of subjects guess the within-domain links to be positive and significantly higher than truth (i.e., underestimate noise). The guesses for cross-domain links are widely spread, and subjects give insufficient decision weights to the corresponding within-domain links when they evaluate a cross-domain link.

Author(s): Jingcheng Fu, Wencong Li, Songfa Zhong
Topic: Risk Attitudes

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Happy Spouse, Happy House: Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes and Marital Satisfaction

Eric Set
NYU Shanghai

<ABSTRACT>

Married partners make choices by resolving conflicting preferences, ultimately impacting psychological, as well as economic, well-being. We report on a pre-registered online experiment with 72 married heterosexual couples that explores the relationship between individual and joint risk-taking, familiarity with spouse preferences, and marital satisfaction. Preliminary results indicate that 1) similar risk attitudes between husbands and wives predicts higher marital satisfaction; 2) a spouse's beliefs about their partner's choices are strongly anchored by their own; 3) ignorance of partner's preferences does not affect collaborative decision-making outcomes. We also present preliminary analysis of recorded conversations made between spouses during the decision process.

Author(s): Yumeng (Skyler) Chen, Eric Set
Topic: Risk Attitudes

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Social Preferences and the Variability of Conditional Cooperation

Kyeongtae Lee
Bank of Korea

<ABSTRACT>

We experimentally examine how the incentive to defect in a social dilemma affects conditional cooperation. In our first study we conduct online experiments in which subjects play eight Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma games with payoffs systematically varied across games. We find that few second movers are conditionally cooperative (i.e., cooperate if and only if the first mover cooperates) in all eight games. Instead, most second-movers change strategies between games. The rate of conditional cooperation is higher when the own gain from defecting is lower and when the loss imposed on the first mover from defecting is higher. This pattern is consistent with both social preference models and stochastic choice models. To explore which model explains our findings we employ a second study to jointly estimate noise and social preference parameters at the individual level. The majority of our subjects place significantly positive weight on others' payoffs, supporting the underlying role of social preferences in conditional cooperation.

Author(s): Malte Baader, Simon Gaechter, Kyeongtae Lee, Martin Sefton
Topic: Cooperation in Social Dilemma

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Social norms and community enforcement of cooperation

Boris Wiczorek
CNRS - GAEL

<ABSTRACT>

Income and wealth inequalities exist in all societies threatening social cohesion. In this paper, we are interested in two economic concerns regarding inequality. First, the intrinsic concern for social preferences that we have associated with changing norms. Secondly, the socio-consequential concern for negative externalities that we have associated with the destruction of cooperation. Additionally, we are looking at a communication mechanism that restores cooperation and the way it relates to norms. In this experimental study, we examine the effects of inequality and communication on the evolution of social norms for cooperation and how norm compliance is affecting cooperation. We conducted a laboratory experiment with 600 participants, measuring cooperation in an infinitely repeated social prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching following a continuation probability of 95%. In addition, we measured social norms based on the elicitation of normative and descriptive beliefs (Bicchieri, 2006, 2016). We conducted six treatments in 27 sessions in a 2X3 design. Our treatments differ in two dimensions, the first being the composition of the group. Half of the treatments were carried out in homogeneous groups, the other half in heterogeneous groups leading to inequality. In heterogeneous matching, the earnings are unequal when playmates defect. On the contrary, payoffs are equal when they both cooperate, which reduces inequalities as is the case for public goods. The second dimension is the communication mechanism. This mechanism can be ex-ante, ex-post or non-existent. We separate ex-ante and ex-post communication in order to observe the differences induced by the reduction of strategic uncertainty (ex-ante) to the reduction of uncertainty

about the history of the game (ex-post) (Dvorak and Fehrler 2018). The results show that inequality decreases initial cooperation and norms when subjects do not have the opportunity to communicate. However, despite the fact that infinitely repeated games should allow for cooperative equilibria, both equal and unequal treatment reach a low and stable cooperative level after a certain number of rounds (about 35 and 20 percent respectively). Inequality impacts cooperation through two facets of social norms. The first is the depletion of beliefs about social norms, which reduces the likelihood of cooperation. The second is a shift in the weights of the components of social norms in the decision-making process. While only the descriptive component of social norms affects cooperation choices in the case of homogeneous matching, the normative component takes half of its explanatory power in the case of heterogeneous matching. Regarding communication, it counteracts the classic decline of repeated games, by bringing ex-ante and ex-post treatments to the same level of cooperation (about 65 and 50 percent for equal and unequal treatment respectively after 20 rounds). Receiving messages has a positive effect on cooperation and on beliefs that reinforce cooperation. Finally, we used a structural model to build counterfactuals to simulate the impact of norms-nudge on our group by manipulating beliefs. We extended the Basic and Verrina (2021) model by allowing different weights to the components of social norms across matchings, consistent with our previous result. By explaining 75.8% of behaviors across treatments, rounds, types, and expected cooperation from playmates, the model suggests that communication can be summarized as a mechanism that supports beliefs. Our different counterfactuals show the positive impact of norms-nudges, as well as the limits of their application. While norms and nudges increase cooperation in equal treatments, they decrease it in unequal treatments. This is due to a different direction of misperception of social norms. To conclude, the results show that the infinitely repeated social prisoner's dilemma leads to lower compliance to the social norm due to a deterioration of normative and descriptive beliefs. Inequality affects cooperation through a further deterioration of beliefs and a shift in the weights of the components of social norms. Furthermore, communication mechanisms restore cooperation through improved beliefs regardless of the timing of the communication. However, cooperation in equal treatments remains higher than in unequal treatments due to stronger beliefs. Our counterfactuals simulate the effect of Norms-Nudge by revealing the social norm, suggesting that social norms could be an equilibrium selection mechanism.

Author(s): Boris Wiczorek, Sabrina Teyssier

Topic: Cooperation in Social Dilemma

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Stick and Carrot vs. Nash Reversion in the Laboratory Cournot Duopoly

Jeongbin Kim

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<ABSTRACT>

We consider an infinitely repeated Cournot duopoly game in which a more severe punishment path than reversing back to the stage-game Nash equilibrium is sometimes available depending on players' time preferences. Building on the theoretical model of Obara and Park (2018), we aim to show how discount factors and present bias affect the choice of the worst punishment strategy. Different discount factors (weekly vs. monthly) and present bias (front-end delay vs. no delay) are induced by the effective discounting procedure, i.e., subjects make all decisions in the lab and get paid outside the laboratory over time. It is shown that discount factors and present bias affect the levels of cooperation and lead to different punishment paths.

Author(s): Jeongbin Kim, Leeat Yariv, Marina Agranov

Topic: Cooperation in Social Dilemma

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Kantian Morality on Cooperation Behaviors in a Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma

Chia-En Huang

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<ABSTRACT>

We explore the relationship between Kantian morality and cooperation behavior by conducting an online experiment using the sequential prisoner's dilemma. Participants in the control group are paired randomly, while participants in the treatment group are paired with individuals who share similar demographic characteristics, such as gender identity, academic discipline, and homely city. The within-subject design allows us to examine the Kantian morality degree of the same individual in both groups and determine the effect of assortative matching on moral values. We also look into how pairing with similar individuals may impact cooperation, covering aspects like pro-social behavior, beliefs, and moral values. This study provides valuable insights into the underlying mechanisms that drive cooperative behavior.

Author(s): Josie I Chen, Chun-Fang Chiang, Chia-En Huang

Topic: Cooperation in Social Dilemma

Pricing Data and Their Constituent Variables Traded in Markets with Resale: An Experimental Study

Naoki Watanabe
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<ABSTRACT>

Trades of information is currently in a new phase with the rapid development of information and communication technologies. As an object of trade, information is copied or imitated easily, and thus we should consider the possibility of resale. Moreover, the ease of imitation also allows the modification of information to become a new commodity. Various combinations of information can also generate different commodities. This note proposes a simple model of pricing information and evaluates the performance in a laboratory experiment. In order to avoid confusion due to the different meanings in different disciplines, we hereafter avoid using the term "information." In this note, we shall speak of "data" transactions, wherein each instance of data is generated by a combination of several "variables." When individual variables are easily replicated and immediately supplied when the demand arises, it is difficult to put a price on such variables in its transactions. This is because variables are not scarce commodities due to its replicability. If variables were physical commodities, their production would take some length of time and need some amount of costs, and thus it would be impossible to immediately supply those variables in any demanded quantity. It is only by virtue of the limited number of commodities available at a particular point in time that their price can be determined. Accordingly, pricing the individual variables that constitute data represents an important issue. We formalize the trades of data and their constituent variables by using a cooperative game. The variables are priced inductively in two-sided markets in which the sellers of data buy variables, produce data, and sells the data to users. Truly, data can be easily replicated and resold, but if we can estimate the final number of data users, we can use that number as a basis for estimating the demand for each of the variables that constitute the data. The prices of those variables are exogenously set at the initial round, and in each round those prices are updated for the next round immediately at the end of the round, based on the outcomes of trades. If traders behave in accordance with the backward induction, then the prices and threshold never move in any rounds that proceed after the initial round. Our main results are as follows. In our subject experiment, the prices of data and the constituent variables fluctuated over rounds, but the average prices of those variables were not far from the initial values we set theoretically. We did not impose budget constraints on subjects' decision-making, because under the fluctuation of those prices would be restricted under the budget constraints. As compared with the case where gross profits that data generated were shown to the subjects, there was no significant difference in amounts of producer surplus when subjects were informed of the orders of those gross profits but were not informed of the values. The theory of resale-free trades of information has been investigated under the assumption with complete information, while the real trades are made in the situation with incomplete information. We report other results observed in some additional sessions.

Author(s): Toshihiko Nanba, Kazuhito Ogawa, Teruaki Hayashi, Hiroki Sakaji, Naoki Watanabe

Topic: Market 1

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Morality, Altruism, and Occupation Choice: Theory and Evidence

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<ABSTRACT>

We consider a private sector job that offers high-powered incentives and two public sector jobs that produce an identical public good, but only one of them offers opportunities for corruption. Our theoretical predictions relate occupation and effort choices, in these three jobs, to preferences for altruism and morality that are structurally estimated. The predictions are tested in pre-registered experiments. We also estimate proxies for altruism/morality from the dictator/die-rolling games. We demonstrate the mutual portability of parameters between both sets of games. Those choosing the private sector job use a simple heuristic of maximizing legal monetary payoffs, but they are not less altruistic or less moral; they exhibit context-dependent preferences. Conditional on choosing the public sector, less moral subjects are more likely to choose the corrupt public sector job. The effects of altruism on occupational choice are subtle, but altruism positively influences effort choices in the public sector. The majority of subjects choose the corrupt public sector job, but the effort is highest in the private sector. On average, corruption increases the size of the public sector, although the public output received by society is identical in both public sector jobs.

Author(s): Sanjit Dhama, Mengxing Wei, Pavan Mamidi

Topic: Market 1

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Price forecasting interaction of informed and uninformed participants using a laboratory experiment

Tomas Tichy
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<ABSTRACT>

In this contribution we study the behaviour of informed (possibly fundamentalists) and uninformed (possibly chartists) participants using a Learning to Forecast laboratory experiment. The participants separated into two about equal subgroups consider three distinct (un)correlated assets with various price evolution in the past, including distinct volatility. We observe several interesting patterns of behaviour for particular groups, which might allow us to set up some general hypothesis. Specific attention is paid to possible penetration of knowledge from informed to uninformed participants.

Author(s): Tomas Tichy
Topic: Market 1

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Information Aggregation in Contingent Claim Markets with Heterogeneous Values

Cary Deck
University of Alabama

<ABSTRACT>

Rational expectations predicts that asset prices will reflect all available information. In a classic experiment, Plott and Sunder (1988) report that contingent claim markets could yield market outcomes consistent with information aggregation when traders had heterogeneous state-contingent values. However, a more recent experiment by Corgnet, et al (2022) failed to replicate the previous result and instead suggested that a necessary condition for the rational expectation model predictions to robustly outperform the predictions of the prior information model in contingent claim markets is for traders to hold homogenous values. In this paper we show that contingent claim markets can aggregate information when traders have homogenous, but positively correlated values. In fact, support for the rational expectations model is stronger with heterogeneous but positively correlated values than with homogenous values as the former avoids the no trade equilibrium of the latter.

Author(s): Cary Deck, Taein Jun, Laura Razzolini, Tavoy Reid
Topic: Market 1

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Investment Behavior in Asset Market Crash: An Experimental Study

Binglin Gong
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<ABSTRACT>

While many studies have discussed investment behavior in asset market bubbles, little has been done on crash. In this field experiment, we recruit real individual investors to investigate how they behave in a laboratory asset market crash and whether they behave differently after experiencing a crash. We find that after experiencing a laboratory crash and its recovery, investors tended to trade slightly more frequently, became more inclined to momentum trading, and earned higher payoffs in our following experimental markets. Such effects are stronger among underconfident traders. During crash periods, investors tend to buy more, especially after experiencing a crash and its recovery. Different types of crash and recovery can have different effects on trade size and cash holding.

Author(s): Binglin Gong, Qianqian Su
Topic: Finance(3A)

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The effect of tournament in investment decisions: An experimental investigation using eye-tracking

Xiaotong Fang
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<ABSTRACT>

This paper adopted an information cascade game to explore the incentive effects of the tournament in asset trading using eye-tracking. In an individual investment task, subjects who acted as traders were required to buy or sell the stock one after the other. Before making decisions, they received incomplete private information about the redemption value of a stock and the trading decisions of previous subjects. We used a within-subject design of incentive mechanisms (linear incentive vs. tournament incentive). The eye movement equipment is employed to

record the changes in subjects' visual tracking during the process of asset trading when they are watching the historical trades (others' information) and private signals (self-information) shown on the same computer screen. Our experimental results show that the tournament incentive triggers significantly stronger gaze biases towards the information of others and longer response times compared to the linear incentive, resulting in a higher frequency of herd behavior under the tournament incentive than the linear incentive. These findings suggest that the gaze bias towards others' information is a cognitive mechanism for why individuals are more likely to herd under the tournament incentive. We also identify heterogeneity in gender. These findings help explain the existing gap in the field by emphasizing the role of attention in herd behaviors.

Author(s): Mei Gao, Xiaotong Fang, Lucy F. Ackert, Li Qi
Topic: Finance(3A)

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The Effect of Passive Aggressive Investing on Market Quality

Jason Shachat
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<ABSTRACT>

We assess, via experiments, the impact of varying levels of passive investing in asset markets with heterogeneous private information. We find, counter to hypotheses that only a small percentage of traders following active strategies are sufficient for price efficiency, that increasing proportions of market wealth the follow passive investing strategies leads to lower price efficiency and greater presence of persistent arbitrage opportunities. However, we also observe improvements in other performance of market quality indicators such as liquidity, bid-ask spread and turnover.

Author(s): Brice Corgnet, Mark DeSantis, David Porter, Jason Shachat
Topic: Finance(3A)

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Work from Home and Careers in the Post-Pandemic Context: Evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment

Agnieszka Kasperska
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<ABSTRACT>

Work from home (WFH) has become an integral part of the professional lives of many people across the globe. Yet, its impact on career progression is still not entirely understood. This article explores how WFH affects workers' career prospects from the gender and parenthood perspective in the late - / post-Covid-19 context of the United Kingdom (UK). More specifically, we study how WFH impacts workers' opportunities for promotion and salary increase, their access to training opportunities and employers' assessment of workers' commitment level and competencies. We also examine the mechanisms behind these effects, such as the frequency of WFH, employers' experiences with WFH during the pandemic and the stigma against workers who WFH. We use data from the discrete choice experiment fielded between July and September 2022 among 1,000 managers in the UK. Each respondent (manager) was presented with a pair of workers' profiles and asked to select one employee. The profile tables included seven attributes (age, working mode, skills ranking, work experience, sex, family situation, and performance rank) with ranges from 2 to 3 levels each. The treatment condition included a sample split into two groups, one with managers who received information on workers' performance levels and the second with those who did not, this was done to measure the flexibility stigma (i.e. a belief that workers using flexible working arrangements are less productive and less work-oriented). The findings indicate that employees who WFH are less likely to be considered for promotion and salary increase, and more likely to be negatively evaluated than on-site workers. This is particularly true for men who WFH full-time, especially if the employer has no information about their performance level. Hence, employers assume lower productivity levels of men involved in this mode of work on a full-time basis and stigmatise them, likely due to their deviation from the ideal worker norm (i.e. an employee who is fully devoted to work). These negative effects are not found among those who WFH on a less frequent basis (i.e. in the hybrid mode).

Author(s): Anna Matysiak, Agnieszka Kasperska, Ewa Cukrowska-Torzewska
Topic: COVID-19 Pandemic 2(3A)

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Effect of information provision on parental intention toward COVID-19 vaccination for children: A nationwide survey experiment

Jung Hyun Park
Seoul National University

<ABSTRACT>

The reluctance of parents to vaccinate their children against COVID-19 was prevalent particularly when uncertainty over vaccination outcomes prevailed. We conducted a nationwide randomized online survey experiment to assess the effect of information provision on parental intention for COVID-19 vaccination before the government started vaccination for children in South Korea. Parents of elementary school children were provided with either no information (Control), information on vaccine profile (vaccine informed group; VI), or COVID-19 (disease informed group; DI). Among 359,110 participants, parental intention for vaccination of children was significantly higher in both VI and DI groups compared with the Control group. In terms of effect size, information on COVID-19 vaccine increased likelihood to vaccinate by 1,620 per 100,000 parents and reduced vaccine hesitancy by 1,340 per 100,000 parents. Consistently with the positive effect on vaccination intention, both VI and DI interventions increased participants' perceptions on vaccination benefits being higher than its risks and vaccination risks being lower than health risks of COVID-19 infection, and self-reported trust in COVID-19 information. Our results lend strong support to the claim that the provision of targeted, tailored information on COVID-19 vaccine and infection increases parental intention to vaccinate children and reduces vaccine hesitancy.

Author(s): Hyunju Lee, Jung Hyun Park, Shinkyong Kim, Sujin Seo, Minjung Lee, Myoungsoon You, Eun Hwa Choi, Geun-Yong Kwon, Jee Yeon Shin, Min-Ah Lee, Mi Jin Jeong, Young June Choe, Syngjoo Choi

Topic: COVID-19 Pandemic 2(3A)

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Vaccination decisions in adults and theirs used for children: A study based on preference experiments, COVID-19 vaccination and public survey data

Lijia Wei

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<ABSTRACT>

Vaccines are widely considered to be the most effective and economical means of disease prevention, and vaccination is generally affected by risk preference, prosociality, "omission bias" and other behavioral factors. This paper uses the methods of incentivized experiment and survey to measure the behavioral preferences of college students and the public, and tracks their decision-making of COVID-19 vaccination. Among the two adult groups, college students and the public, individuals with high level of pro-social are more active in the first vaccination. In the decisions of booster shots and personal protections after vaccination, individuals with high pro-social level also tend to continuously improve their protection. This paper also studies the vaccination of parents and their children under a unified framework. In terms of parents' decision on vaccination of their children, parents with low risk tolerance and strong "omission bias" are less inclined to vaccinate their children. This shows that adults have different decision-making mechanisms for their own and their children's vaccination decisions.

Author(s): Yiting Guo, Fangwen Lu, Lijia Wei

Topic: COVID-19 Pandemic 2(3A)

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When Do Men Shy Away From Competition? An Experiment on Unethical Conduct and Competitive (dis)Advantage

Jingnan Chen

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<ABSTRACT>

Competition pervades organizational life (Deutsch, 1949, Kilduff et al. 2010). In organizations, employees routinely compete for scarce resources, such as promotions, bonuses, coveted project assignments, and praises. A wide range of anecdotal evidence suggests that competitions push us to pursue competitive advantage and victory with a fervency that goes beyond the bounds of ethical competitive behavior. In this paper, we aim to uncover how competitive (dis)advantage affect one's willingness to compete. In particular, we focus on situations where one can obtain competitive advantage through unethical means or forced into competitive disadvantage due to others' unethical behaviors. Unethical acts in the field, are often hidden from view, which makes the study of this relationship difficult. Moreover, even if a researcher is able to document a relationship between competitive (dis)advantage and competition choices, establishing causality is often impossible due to nonrandom selection into competition. With a novel design, we study competition in an environment where the playing field is not leveled. People can engage in unethical behavior to gain a competitive advantage. We find that men are greatly deterred from entering competition when 1)there is a possibility of a disadvantage and 2)an unlevelled playing field caused by unethical behavior. On other other hand, women only respond to the absolute (rather than the relative) difficulty of the task. Surprisingly, we find no evidence of subjects (low or high ability) taking advantage of unethical means for competitive advantage.

Author(s): Jingnan Chen, Daniel Houser
Topic: Identity

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Ingroup bias with multiple identity dimensions: When attitudes towards government trump attitudes towards religion

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<ABSTRACT>

Group identity is known to exert a powerful socio-psychological influence on behaviour but to date has been largely explored as a uni-dimensional phenomenon. In an experiment, we consider the role of creating broader awareness of multiple dimensions of identity, asking whether it may help alleviate ingroup biases. We first induced different levels of awareness by categorising participants into groups based on either one or two politically charged identity dimensions documented to be of similar strength and largely orthogonal (religious belief and views about government size). Subsequently, we measure ingroup bias on each separate category by using a series of third party allocation tasks. We find that creating broader awareness to another category of identity has a noticeable effect on allocations, but only for the religion category. Furthermore, the directions of effects is not as hypothesised – allocations in the religion category become more ingroup biased with broad awareness. The pattern of effects suggests that government identities trump religion identities. We speculate that this is because the former exhibits strong levels of affective polarisation.

Author(s): Daniel Sgroi, Jonathan Yeo, Zhuo Shi
Topic: Identity

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Pro-Social Risk-Taking and Intergroup Conflict A Volunteer's Dilemma Experiment

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<ABSTRACT>

Prosocial risk-taking involves the willingness to commit resources to initiatives and opportunities with a social benefit, as well as a risk of costly failure. These situations often occur in an environment in which groups compete for resources. In these contexts of intergroup conflict, often individuals make personal sacrifices on a voluntary basis, involving considerable risks of failure. We study the context of prosocial risk-taking and intergroup conflict by extending the volunteer's dilemma along both of these dimensions. We introduce a novel group competition treatment to identify the effect of intergroup competition without providing with an additional collective prize like the majority of past laboratory experiments. We find evidence that intergroup competition significantly increases the volunteering rate of providing a public good, and mitigates the negative impact of risk on intragroup cooperation. Regarding individual heterogeneity, we explore and discuss the impact of risk aversion and gender and its implication for parochial altruism.

Author(s): Tse-Min Wang, Florian Heine, Arjen van Witteloostuijn
Topic: Identity

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Sex, dark traits, and leadership emergence

Christiane Schwier
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<ABSTRACT>

Women continue to be underrepresented in leadership positions. While structural obstacles are held primarily responsible for female underachievement and have been described before, we were more interested in which individual decisions might result in leadership emergence. Therefore, we explored whether women compared to men would differ in economic decision-making (low promotability, social value orientation, delay discounting) depending on their dark personality traits (high versus low) and social contexts (single-sex versus mixed-sex settings). We found that it depended on the task and social context whether sex or dark traits influenced economic decision-making. Women, especially those low in dark traits, volunteered more often for tasks of low promotability than men in the mixed-sex but not single-sex setting. In contrast, it was independent of sex and setting that individuals high in dark traits chose for individualist strategies while those low in dark traits acted in a more prosocial way. In delay discounting, there were no effects of neither sex nor dark traits. Finally, there was a correlation between outcomes in the promotability game and social value orientation only in women low in dark traits in the single-sex setting. Our data are consistent with the view that societal role expectation shapes female economic decision-making related to leadership emergence, this is especially true for women low in dark traits.

Author(s): Haang Jeung-Maarse, Lea Altmeyer, Martin Vollmann, Simon Kirsch, Koen Schruers, Christiane Schwieren

Topic: Identity

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Threshold Levels, Endowment Structures, and Public Goods Provision

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<ABSTRACT>

This study investigated the effects of threshold levels and endowment structures on contribution performance in public goods games. We find that, with the existence of multiple equilibria in the experimental results, both thresholds and group income structure can influence individual decisions and group cooperation. Overall, income homogeneity in a group increases individual contributions and chances of successful provision. Threshold levels significantly interact with income structures of the group. Specifically, a higher threshold level in heterogeneous endowment groups can significantly improve individual contribution levels but insignificantly influence successful rates of provision, showing that the threshold works as a reference point for coordinating cooperation in the group. Threshold effects in homogeneous endowment treatments are insignificantly different, owing to the high cooperation confidence of the partner matching mechanism. Compared with heterogeneous income groups, subjects with the same endowment face fewer belief conflicts and are less influenced by given threshold levels. This study contributes to policy concerns to increase cooperation efficiency and mitigate income inequality in various social contexts.

Author(s): Sun Fengfei, Zhou Yean, Lian Hongquan, Huang Chunchun

Topic: Public Goods

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Making it public: The effect of (private and public) wage proposals on efficiency and income distribution

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<ABSTRACT>

The implications of (public or private) pre-play communication and information revelation in a labour relationship are not well understood. We address this theoretically and experimentally. In the baseline, the employer offers a wage to the worker who may then accept or reject it. We then allow for wage proposals where the workers, moving first, make a non-binding private or public wage proposal. Our theoretical model assumes that wage proposals convey information about a worker's minimum acceptable wage and are misreported with a certain probability. It predicts that, on average, wage proposals lead to higher wage offers and acceptance rates, with the highest wages under private proposals. While both, public and private, proposals increase efficiency over the baseline, private proposals generate higher worker incomes. Broad support for the theoretical predictions is found in laboratory experiments. Our work has important implications for recent policies promoting public information on wage negotiations. We find that while wage proposals promote higher wages, efficiency, and income equality, public information on wage negotiations is likely to benefit firms more than workers.

Author(s): Lara Ezquerra, Joaquin Gomez-Minambres, Natalia Jimenez Jimenez, Praveen Kujal

Topic: Public Goods

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Coordinating on a Public Solution: A Collective Risk Experiment in the Lab

Wei-Chien Weng
National Taiwan University

<ABSTRACT>

In response to climate change and natural disasters, people can either work collaboratively or individually to solve the problem. These decisions may depend on wealth endowment and its origin, the threshold of success, previous play and culture. To answer this research question, we conduct an experiment in Taiwan (and collectively with other 34 countries) where subjects play in groups of four a 10-stage threshold public goods game to prevent losing all their endowments by choosing to invest in a private solution which is more expensive but does not require coordination, and/or a public solution which costs less on average. Endowments are unequal and determined in three different treatments by merit, luck, or either (with 50-50 chance). Specifically, in the merit treatment, subjects with the two highest scores in a preceding real effort task will receive more endowments. Preliminary results show that initially rich subjects contribute to the private solution, while poor subjects contribute

to the public one. Later, rich subjects are willing to join the public solution and mostly succeed. As a result, subjects contribute around 40% of their endowments to the public solution, very close to what they perceive as fair contribution. Treatment differences between merit, luck and either are minor.

Author(s): Joseph Tao-yi Wang, Wei-Chien Weng, Willy Ding-Wei Wang

Topic: Public Goods

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Personal Information and Information as Public Good

Yi-Shan Lee

Chinese University of Hong Kong

<ABSTRACT>

We design an experiment to compare the public-good generating process and social welfare between the information economy and manufacturing economy. The experiment has three conditions in a repeated environment: personal information (PI), information (I), and money (M). In both PI and I conditions, personal data is monetized: it can be kept as private goods or used for generating public goods with monetary values that in-group members will share. The M condition is the classic public goods game using monetary units. Both the endgame effect and conditional contribution are observed in all conditions. However, the contribution level is significantly higher when using one's own personal information than others' and marginally higher than contributing using money. Our findings highlight the generosity when sharing one's personal data even when it is monetized and shed a different light on the principal-agent problem in personal information usage.

Author(s): Josie I Chen, Yi-Shan Lee

Topic: Public Goods

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Comparing Auction and Grandfathering in Emission Allowances Allocation: A Large-Scale Lab-in-the-Field Experiment

Dongsheng Chen

Xiamen University

<ABSTRACT>

Based on a series of large-scale lab-in-the-field experiments recruiting more than 1000 carbon market related industry subjects, we compare uniform price auction (UPA) with free allocation (grandfathering, GF) as alternative permit allocation designs. In our setup, firms first receive their permits for free. Then, under the uniform price auction mechanisms, they need to buy back a share of the permits, followed by a spot (secondary) market for both uniform price auction and grandfathering mechanisms with the continuous double auction. We find that enforced permit transactions in the primary market induce a higher price, facilitating price discovery with lower volatility and more effective trading in the spot market. Uniform price auction reduces non-compliance compared with free allocation. Our results provide insights on the design of paid permit allocation mechanism in China's carbon market.

Author(s): Dongsheng Chen, Zhi Li, Da Zhang, Xiliang Zhang

Topic: Environmental 2(3A)

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Tradable Permits versus Congestion Charge on Managing Morning Peak Travel Behavior: A Field Experiment in Beijing

Kexin Geng

Vrije Universiteit

<ABSTRACT>

The efficiency of tradable permits in managing morning peak travel and its comparison with congestion charges have been discussed theoretically but not practically. This study contributes to providing the first practical evidence of both tradable permits and congestion charges to manage actual scheduling decisions in the morning peak using real car drivers. By conducting a two-month field experiment among 422 car drivers in Beijing, we investigate the effectiveness and drivers' attitudes toward these two policies. We designed a step-size tradable permits scheme and a similar congestion charge scheme based on Beijing real traffic conditions. The OBD box and phone App have been used to record real-time travel information and online trading. Preliminary results show that both treatments significantly reduce rush-hour departures. Compared to congestion charges, tradable permits scheme is more acceptable for car drivers.

Author(s): Kexin Geng, Erik T. Verhoef, Yacan Wang, Yu Wang
Topic: Environmental 2(3A)

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Would You Give Up Your Car For Money? Offering Monetary Incentives to Forgo Driving - results from a survey experiment

Christian Hoenow
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<ABSTRACT>

Private car usage accounts for a substantial share of carbon dioxide emissions globally and constitutes one of the primary sources of local and global air pollution. Hence, policies aimed at reducing the number of cars are becoming increasingly relevant. Contrary to measures that regulate the use of cars through bans or taxes, we aim to explore the potential of positive monetary incentive schemes to give up driving a car. For this purpose, we conduct a large-scale survey experiment among a sample of 1,143 German citizens and assess the willingness to accept such measures. We create different scenarios which vary in the (hypothetical) amount of payments offered and their timing (one-time vs. yearly). We further investigate whether individuals who own or use more than one car react differently to payment schemes that require them to give up just one or all of their cars. Results show acceptance rates for such schemes between 6 and 26%, depending on the specific configuration. At the same time, about half of the participants indicate that they would prefer to keep their car(s) under any circumstances or incentives offered. Based on these findings, we finally estimate the potential carbon dioxide abatement costs of the tested measures at 279 to 2,513 € per ton.

Author(s): Christian Hoenow, Eva Huemmecke
Topic: Environmental 2(3A)

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Managerial ownership, moral hazard and excess returns

Lawrence Choo
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<ABSTRACT>

The efficient market hypothesis states that security prices fully reflect all the information in the market and should therefore match the true value of the security. In contrast, stocks of firms with high CEO ownership are consistently traded below value and yield excess returns to stockholders. This surprising result is consistent with a non-intuitive explanation based on CEO moral hazard. We test this proposed mechanism in a controlled experiment. We find that introducing moral hazard leads to excess returns as predicted by theory. Mandatory disclosure policies have two effects. On the one hand, they facilitate price convergence and increase efficiency. On the other hand, they allow managers to extract funds from shareholders due to myopic trading.

Author(s): Lawrence Choo, Todd Kaplan, Ro'i Zultan
Topic: Market 2(3A)

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Intertemporal Coordination in Volunteer Markets

Matej Lorko
University of Economics in Bratislava

<ABSTRACT>

Research on altruism focuses on static conditions despite many contexts featuring dynamic spillovers that exacerbate the difficulties when coordinating supply and demand in the absence of prices. For example, providing voluntary help in one period often prohibits helping in a fixed number of subsequent periods (e.g., blood donation restrictions). We show that the intertemporal inability to help lowers market surplus compared to the static condition and study whether providing demand or supply information improves market outcomes. We find that in theory demand information causes higher market surplus in static than dynamic conditions, while supply information causes higher market surplus in dynamic than static conditions. Experimental results support almost all theoretical predictions and show that supply information especially improves market efficiency in dynamic conditions. The most critical takeaway is that comparative static inferences in static conditions do not carry over into dynamic conditions (and in this case are opposite).

Author(s): Matej Lorko, Maros Servatka, Robert Slonim, Michal Durinik
Topic: Market 2(3A)

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Are matching subsidies effective when the ask can be avoided?

Erte Xiao
Monash University

<ABSTRACT>

We examine whether matching subsidies remain effective when there is an opportunity to avoid the ask. The effective price mechanism argues that a match encourages giving by reducing giving's effective price and thus should not be affected by the opportunity to avoid the ask. Our experimental results, however, show that a match significantly increases giving only when the ask cannot be avoided. We test and show that the data are consistent with the norm mechanism of giving under matching; a match increases the psychological costs of deviating from the giving norm. Our findings highlight the limits of matching subsidies.

Author(s): Lata Gangadharan, Philip J. Grossman, Lingbo Huang, Erte Xiao

Topic: Market 2(3A)

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Mistrust and Garbling in Communication: Experimental Evidence

Chen Zhao
The University of Hong Kong

<ABSTRACT>

We conduct experiments to investigate the effect of mistrust in standard cheap-talk settings. In our experiments, one sender is matched with multiple receivers with i.i.d. types: one true receiver and multiple false receivers. The sender is informed about the true receiver's type and his payoff depends only on the true receiver's action, but the receivers do not know whether they are true or false. The message sent by the sender is delivered to all receivers, and thus, each receiver believes that there is a probability that the message is completely uninformative. In this way, we have created, without deception, an environment in which the true receiver has false beliefs regarding the informativeness of the message. We show experimentally that this kind of mistrust may generate a higher payoff for the true receiver. We also observe both over- and under-communication in different settings, which cannot be rationalized by the standard explanations available in the literature, but can be captured by home-grown mistrust.

Author(s): Wooyoung Lim, Chen Zhao

Topic: Communication and Persuasion(3A)

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Competition in Persuasion: An Experiment

Wenhao Wu
ShanghaiTech University

<ABSTRACT>

We experimentally investigate whether competition stimulates information revelation, by comparing two Bayesian persuasion models. One model has one sender (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011), and the other has two competing senders who move sequentially (Wu, 2022). The one-sender treatment provides strong support for Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), where the sender uses a noisy signaling device and the receiver complies with his suggestions. In the two-sender treatment, we find that: (1) overall, senders reveal more information than the sender in the first treatment; (2) the first sender uses the fully-revealing device more frequently than the sender in the first treatment; (3) the second sender exhibits a "competitive" behavior pattern; (4) the receiver can use information from both sides for her decision-making. However, contrary to Wu (2022), competition does not lead to full information. To rationalize the behavior, we use the Quantal Response Equilibrium model to explain the features of the empirical results in our experiment.

Author(s): Wenhao Wu

Topic: Communication and Persuasion(3A)

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A Simple Experiment on Simple Bayesian Persuasion

King King Li
Shenzhen Audencia Business School, Shenzhen University

<ABSTRACT>

This experiment tests Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) in a simple setting. We adopt an experimental design in which the Sender chooses a partition of the state space. We find that 1) the Senders' strategies generally satisfy the optimal property that the weaker signal is fully revealing, but 2) their strategies are persistently suboptimal in the sense that the stronger signal is systematically too weak, resulting in a high rate of persuasion failure. However, 3) once we replace the Receivers with a robot who plays a known strategy, most Senders quickly learn to play the optimal strategy. This suggests that the key strategic element of Bayesian Persuasion is easy to understand for the Senders, although determining the posterior probability needed to persuade a human Receiver to take the desired action is a more difficult problem. We discuss some sources of the difficulty and provide evidence for them.

Author(s): Pak Hung Au, OSub Kwon, King King Li

Topic: Communication and Persuasion(3A)

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Advice Giving—a Performance Booster for Online Workers?

Feng Qin

The Chinese University of Hong Kong

<ABSTRACT>

How can we effectively motivate remote workers? We design an experiment to investigate the possibility of using advice-giving as an information nudge to increase online workers' performance. Online workers in this experiment provide no advice, a piece of self-advice, or a piece of advice to others before performing a task. Results indicate that advice-giving increases online workers' performance while presenting a salient gender performance gap. Male workers perform better than female workers after giving a piece of advice to others. We examine potential drives contributing to this gender-specific effect.

Author(s): Yi-Shan Lee, Feng Qin

Topic: Information 2

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Does the Size of the Signal Space Matter?

Hyundam Je

Texas A&M University

<ABSTRACT>

This paper provides the first experimental evidence that information receivers consider the size of the signal space, which represents the number of possible signals. When subjects predict the binary outcomes of compound lotteries, their values of signals for the outcome (Study 1) and values of lotteries they play (Study 2) in varying sizes of the signal space are measured. The results show that the size of the signal space is positively correlated with the value of the signals but not the value of the compound lotteries. The preference for larger signal space suggests the key observation in the information design literature, which is the signal space is equal to the action space, might not always hold. Leading theoretical frameworks cannot explain these experimental findings.

Author(s): Hyundam Je

Topic: Information 2

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The Acquisition and Processing of Performance Feedback: Experimental Evidence

Neslihan Sakarya

University of Essex

<ABSTRACT>

This study explores (1) initial beliefs, (2) the processing of information, (3) the willingness to pay for information, where individuals receive noisy feedback about their own performance (a self-relevant case) as well as the performance of others (a self-irrelevant case) in an experimental task. The experiment constructs a setting where individuals have monetary incentives to hold accurate beliefs but where the information received can also be relevant to self-image. Additionally, we propose a theoretical model of how a Bayesian agent should value instrumental information. In terms of initial beliefs, we find that most participants hold accurate priors, but still, most women choose to downgrade other people's self-assessments. Regarding information processing, there is strong evidence for conservatism (i.e., updating less than theoretical predictions) in both information contexts and across both genders. Another bias, asymmetry (i.e., responding to positive and negative signals disproportionately), is not as common as the former but emerges only when men are processing ego-relevant

feedback. Analyses on the demand for information reveal the existence of overbidding in both information contexts. However, self-relevance exacerbates the strength of the bias.

Author(s): Ergun Kotan, Neslihan Sakarya, Seda Ertac

Topic: Information 2

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The impact of information on people's attitudes toward organ donation

Hsin-Ya Liao

National Taiwan University

<ABSTRACT>

In 2018, nearly 10,000 patients were waiting for organ donations in Taiwan, but there were only 327 donors, meaning that there was a significant shortage of organs. Many studies have used surveys to determine the factors influencing people's attitudes toward organ donation and have found that their understanding of organ donation is relevant. Nonetheless, little research has used experiments to understand the exact impact of knowledge about organ donation on people. Our research uses an online experiment and a between-subject design to test whether people behave differently when given more information about organ donation. We recruit Taiwanese representative samples to participate in the experiment, which includes a quiz and survey. In the quiz, we measure participants' understanding of organ donation and offer different amounts of information through two treatments: in one, each solution to a question is unveiled after the participant submits the answer, while in the other, the participants only know the solutions once the experiment ends. We then use the survey to measure participants' altruism, behavior, and attitudes toward organ donation. This approach will assist us in understanding participants' attitudes and behaviors toward organ donation, providing insights into potential strategies for improving the lack of organs donated.

Author(s): Josie I. Chen, Hsin-Ya Liao

Topic: Information 2

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Ambiguity attitudes and voter turnout: Evidence from a field experiment during the 2020 US Presidential Election

Ning Liu

Beihang University, School of Economics and Management

<ABSTRACT>

The literature presents mixed findings on how the closeness of elections affects voters' turnout. We provide new insights by considering the ambiguity registered voters face regarding the election's outcomes. We test the theoretical predictions of the ambiguity model of voting in a field experiment conducted one week prior to the 2020 US Presidential Election targeting registered voters in four battleground states, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and Ohio. We depict their ambiguity attitudes regarding the election's outcome in their respective states with two indices generalizable to most ambiguity models in the literature and measure the two indices with real incentives. Implementing a simple intervention based on truthful information, we exogenously manipulated registered voters' perceived ambiguity regarding the election outcome. Confirming our theoretical prediction, increasing one's perceived ambiguity leads to a higher voting intention. Our results highlight an unintended effect of information cocoons in elections: exposure to similar predictions of the election outcomes could reduce potential voters' perceived ambiguity regarding the election result and discourage their turnout.

Author(s): Ilke Aydogan, Yu Gao, Ning Liu, Uyanga Turmunkh

Topic: Voting(3A)

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Does combining general election and electoral referendum increase the voter turnout? A gamified experimental study

Wei James Chen

National Taiwan University

<ABSTRACT>

Participation quorum, a common quorum rule to justify representativeness in modern referenda, has been shown to discourage turnout rate. To offset the discouragement, concurrent elections are widely used in some democratic institutions to increase the turnout of a referendum. Although some research has estimated how the concurrent elections could increase turnout rate by natural experiments or quasiexperiments, few efforts have been devoted to randomized controlled trial, not to mention the effect of extraneous factors. In this study, we conduct a gamified laboratory experiment to verify the influence on turnout between two concurrent elections, or

more specifically, between a general election (without quorum) and a referendum (with quorum). Our results confirm that concurrent elections promote turnout in at least one election but lower social welfare. We also observe that participation quorum only decreases the turnout for minority group instead of the majority group.

Author(s): Wei James Chen, Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen, YuPei Chen

Topic: Voting(3A)

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The effect of tax avoidance in voting decisions: a real-effort task experiment

Angel Solano Garcia

Universidad de Granada

<ABSTRACT>

The annual report of the Tax Justice Network (2020) reveals that countries are losing over \$427 billion each year to tax avoidance and tax evasion. In this paper, we analyze theoretically and experimentally the effect of tax avoidance on voting decisions and work productivity when we vary both the cost and the information about tax avoidance. We propose a basic model of redistributive politics in which there are two types of voters (high and low skilled workers) and two exogenous tax schemes to vote for. We design a laboratory experiment to test the results of the model, i.e. the tax rate chosen by majority voting. We consider a control treatment where tax avoidance is not feasible. In the main treatments, only the high skilled workers are allowed to avoid taxes with a fixed cost that varies in two different treatments. We also consider two additional treatments with full or partial information about tax avoidance decisions by high skilled workers. Overall, the preliminary experimental results support our theoretical predictions.

Author(s): Natalia Jimenez-Jimenez, Elena Molis, Angel Solano-Garcia

Topic: Voting(3A)

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Do Strict Egalitarians Really Exist?

Hyoji Kwon

Waseda University

<ABSTRACT>

The purpose of our study is to verify the argument of Cappelen et al. (2007) that insists on the pluralism of fairness ideals. Their experiments are based on the dictator game with production, and they suggest that three fairness ideals exist: strict egalitarianism, libertarianism, and liberal egalitarianism. However, because of the characteristics of the dictator game, the egoistic behavior of taking all of the endowments is a reasonable decision and cannot be ignored. In this paper, we show by estimation of modified models that strict egalitarians do not exist but that egoists do. We assume that people who follow different fairness ideals also place different weights on fairness, and we separate the weight parameter by the three fairness ideals. Especially in the case of strict egalitarianism, the estimated value of the weight parameter indicates that strict egalitarians behave like egoists who take all of the total product. This result implies that people rarely follow the strict egalitarian ideal under this kind of dictator game with a production phase and, instead, a high proportion of egoists take the total product without considering any fairness ideals.

Author(s): Hyoji Kwon, Yukihiro Funaki

Topic: Fairness(2A)

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An experiment on the Neolithic agricultural revolution. Causes and impact on inequality

Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

Universidad de Granada

<ABSTARCT>

We propose two games that resemble the conditions of human societies before and after the Neolithic agricultural revolution to test the hypothesis that the modes of production affected the level of inequality. We replicate the findings that foraging societies organized themselves around social division of labour and were more egalitarian than farming societies. We also find evidence that the transition from foraging to farming societies was heterogeneous, with groups that quickly adopted the agricultural practice and others that never experienced it. Our experimental data further suggest the transition could be determined by cultural and institutional preconditions: more egalitarian foraging groups adopted earlier agricultural techniques, but inequality raises in farming societies as agriculture settles.

Author(s): Antonio Morales, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara
Topic: Fairness(2A)

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The Resolution of Uncertainty in the Value and Probability Domains

Eungik Lee
NYU

<ABSTRACT>

We compare preferences for resolution of uncertainty when the uncertainty is resolved about a probability rather than a value. In various existing frameworks—e.g., Kreps and Porteus (1978)—, preferences over gradual versus one-shot resolution do not depend on whether values or probabilities define the main object of uncertainty. Yet, in our experiment, a large majority of subjects preferred to resolve uncertain values gradually but uncertain probabilities all at once—both with uncertainty defined over gains and losses. We investigate the possible determinants of this discrepancy and propose a theoretical explanation for it using what we call "process utility". Finally we test this theory on a set of new experiments which confirm our theoretical expectations.

Author(s): Engik Lee, Kathleen Ngangoue, Andrew Schotter
Topic: Decision 2

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Divergence in Economic Decision Making: The Role of Perceptual Descriptions

Rui Guan
University of Kent

<ABSTRACT>

Human choice behavior is grounded on the perception of decision problems. Yet there is little research on the economic consequences of different perceptual descriptions. We implement a randomized controlled experiment to examine how auditory versus visual descriptions of options influence economic decision-making. We find that providing auditory descriptions, as compared to visual descriptions, leads to severe impairment in economic rationality and longer response time. In addition, with the switch from visual to auditory descriptions, subjects make choices with a lower level of risk aversion; this is especially significant for females. Our results raise a concern about welfare loss in choice contexts where auditory descriptions play a major role.

Author(s): Rui Guan, Fadong Chen
Topic: Decision 2

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Narrowly Rational

Shuangyu Yang
National University of Singapore

<ABSTRACT>

We examine whether choice behavior can be rationalized across settings. In an experiment, we compare portfolio allocations between two equiprobable Arrow securities in one setting, and between one safe asset and one risky asset that delivers either a positive payoff or nothing in another setting. We find that subjects are narrowly rational, that is, their choice data are internally consistent within each setting but inconsistent across settings. We observe that a diversification heuristic, the tendency to choose allocation on the midpoint of the given budget line, may underpin the observed inconsistency. We explore the underlying mechanisms in two additional experiments and show that the inconsistency across settings can be reduced by framing the two settings similarly but not by further decreasing the likelihood of the securities to a low level. Our study contributes to the literature on revealed preference analysis and heuristic-based decision making.

Author(s): Bin Miao, Shuangyu Yang, Songfa Zhong
Topic: Decision 2

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Inertial Updating

Gerelt Tserenjigmid
University of California Santa Cruz

<ABSTRACT>

We introduce and characterize inertial updating of beliefs. Under inertial updating, a decision maker (DM) selects a posterior belief that minimizes the subjective distance between her prior and the set of posteriors that are consistent with the observed event. Importantly, by varying the subjective notion of distance, inertial updating provides a unifying framework that nests three separate belief updating rules: (i) Bayesian updating, (ii) non-Bayesian updating rules such as the alpha-beta rule (Grether, 1980), and (iii) updating rules for zero-probability events such as the conditional probability system (CPS) of Myerson (1986). We show that our model is behaviorally equivalent to the Hypothesis Testing model (HT) of Ortoleva (2012), which also clarifies the connection between HT and CPS.

Author(s): Adam Dominiak, Matthew Kovach, Gerelt Tserenjigmid

Topic: Decision 2

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A Behavioral Study of Queuing Protocols in Matching

Chen Wei

Washington University in St. Louis

<ABSTRACT>

Many matching processes such as child adoption, public housing allocation, and organ transplants, are dynamic, and matches are often arranged by queuing protocols. Participants arrive over time, they are ranked according to their arrival times using a protocol such as a first-in-first-out (FIFO) or a last-in-first-out (LIFO) one, and are sequentially offered a potential match. While FIFO is the most common matching protocol, LIFO is sometimes viewed as an alternative and it arises naturally in some applications. For example, in child adoption, younger children are often preferred to older ones by potential adoptive parents (see Baccara, Collard-Wexler, Felli, and Yariv, 2014). Therefore, if adoption agencies offer all children the same market exposure, birth-mothers of later-born children are likely to be given the first choice over adoptive parents, resulting in a setting strategically equivalent to a LIFO protocol. Similar preferences also exist for perishable items or with social stigma for unemployed job candidates or unclaimed properties. An increasingly large market design literature has compared alternative protocols weighting the trade-off between match quality and wait time (see for example Hassin, 1985, Bloch and Cantala, 2017, Baccara et al., 2021, and Baccara and Yariv, 2023, for a survey). However, existing studies are mostly theoretical and assume that participants are perfectly rational. In reality, there are reasons to believe this is a strong assumption. For example, under LIFO, where an agent's ranking decreases over time, agents may have an incentive to behave in an overly conservative way. We experimentally study these tendencies and their welfare consequences. We first consider a discrete-time, infinite-horizon, overlapping generation model in which agents are dynamically matched to items. One agent and one item arrive at the market at each period. While the item must leave at the end of the arrival period, the agent can stay in the market for up to two periods. Therefore, at any time, there are either one or two agents and one item in the market. Based on their arrival times, agents are ranked according to either a FIFO or a LIFO protocol. Agents in their first and second period on the market are referred to as "young" and "old," respectively. Upon arrival, each item is assigned a type randomly drawn from a common distribution on the interval $[0,1]$. Upon being matched to an item, an agent obtains a payoff equal to the item's type. An agent who leaves the market unmatched obtains zero utility. In addition, any item is compatible with any agent with some probability, and we assume that compatibility is independent across items and agents. An agent and an item can only match if they are compatible. Once an item arrives at the market and its type is realized, the first-ranked agent chooses whether to match with the item or not, conditional on compatibility. The match will take place only if the item's type is high enough and the agent and the items are compatible. If the match does not take place, the second-ranked agent (if present) decides whether to match with the item or not, conditional on compatibility. At the end of the period, one item and up to two agents leave the market, either because they matched or because they reached the end of their life span. We introduce a behavioral parameter that represents the level of agents' conservatism, we determine the behavioral equilibrium under both FIFO and LIFO. In both environments, the equilibrium is fully determined by the minimum item's type that young agents find acceptable. We conduct a lab experiment to test our theoretical predictions. The experiment uses a simplified two-player game with a Nash equilibrium that is strategically equivalent to the behavioral equilibrium of the infinite-horizon, overlapping generation matching setup. The experiment results are consistent with theoretical predictions related to comparisons across protocols: subjects are more willing to match with a lower-type item under LIFO (i.e. they set a lower acceptance threshold) compared to FIFO. Additionally, match quality is lower under LIFO than under FIFO. However, while the subjects' behavior under FIFO matches that of a fully rational equilibrium, their threshold choices under LIFO are higher than those associated to a fully rational equilibrium. Currently, we are planning additional experiments to explore the reasons behind the subjects' overly selective threshold choices under LIFO.

Author(s): Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee, Brian Rogers, Chen Wei

Topic: Dynamics

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The Downs-Thomson Paradox with Endogenously Determined Departure Times

Hironori Otsubo
Chuo University

<ABSTRACT>

We introduce a novel scenario that embeds the Downs-Thomson (D-T) paradox in the context of departure time in the morning commute. Commuters who depart from a common origin and travel to a common destination are asked to choose between traveling on either a congestible (car, road) or non-congestible (train, railway) mode of transportation. The ones choosing to travel by road are also asked privately to choose their departure time. In doing so, they face a trade-off between the cost of congestion at a bottleneck on the road and the service costs at their destination. We compute the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for the probability of choosing either car or train, the probability distribution of time of departure by the commuters who travel by car, and the effects of improving either the railway or the road on the cost of travel. We then report experimental evidence that partly supports the D-T paradox.

Author(s): Hironori Otsubo, Eyran Gisches, Amnon Rapoport

Topic: Dynamics

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Tests for time invariance in decisions for money and effort: an experiment

Shotaro Shiba
Waseda university

<ABSTRACT>

Time invariance of time preference is a property that impatience does not change over time and is an essential assumption in traditional experiments (one-day experiments) on individual's time inconsistency (Halevy, 2015). Due to the suspicion of this assumption, several studies have been conducted to investigate time inconsistency using alternative experimental designs (follow-up experiments) recently. However, these experiments also have some structural disadvantages and could not be a good prescription for conventional experiments. Therefore, in this study, we consider when the traditional experiments can be justified by testing time invariance in various decision situations. Specifically, we measure impatience of same person twice in different days with respect to different outcomes (money and effort) and delay sizes and compare them respectively. The results of an online experiment with students show a weak support for time invariance in all situations. Time invariance is not rejected both in money and effort conditions though some heterogeneity exist. We also find a positive correlation between impatience measured in different timings both in money ($\rho > 0.5$) and effort ($\rho > 0.25$) which is extremely high when outcome is money and delay is more than a month ($\rho = 0.8 \sim 0.9$). Moreover, violations of time invariance are not strongly correlated with a change of demographics during the experiment, even though we include many variables relating inter-temporal decisions like monthly paydays and expected future incomes. Our results suggest that though a few participants may really have time variant preference, a bias in the traditional experiments on time inconsistency may not be so serious, especially when using monetary outcomes and large delays.

Author(s): Shotaro Shiba, Kazumi Shimizu

Topic: Dynamics

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Born to wait? A study of allocation rules in booking systems

Tracy Xiao Liu
Tsinghua University

<ABSTRACT>

When designing allocation rules for scarce goods or services, market designers often face the issue of balancing between efficiency and fairness. Critically, efficiency losses may exhibit various formats and calls for a systematical quantification. We document that a previously understudied source of efficiency loss stemming from queuing can be substantial in many real-world booking systems using first-come-first-served allocation rules. We provide a novel experimental framework that allows us to quantify and compare different sources of efficiency losses across different allocation rules. The theory predicts and lab experiments confirm that the efficiency loss due to opportunity costs of time spent on queuing overwhelms any other efficiency concerns in a booking system based on queuing. However, such loss is almost completely eliminated in a booking system based on lotteries. We also develop and test a novel dual-track system that allows participants to freely choose their preferred allocation rule. We observe a majority prefers the allocation rule based on lotteries over the rule based on queuing.

Author(s): Lingbo Huang, Tracy Xiao Liu, Jun Zhang

The shape of risk: An experimental study on risk-taking in rank-order tournament

Yang Liu
University of Melbourne

<ABSTRACT>

We study how the structure of prizes and the number of contestants affect participants' risk behaviour in tournaments. We design an experiment where participants can choose any mean-preserving probability distribution for an output that will determine their rank in the tournament. We find that participants react to the structure of the prize distribution in the direction of game theoretic predictions: the variance and skewness of the distribution they choose to increase with the inequality of the distribution of the prize structure and with the number of participants: (1) Participants will only choose a symmetric distribution when the prize schedule is linear, they will choose a positively skewed distribution when the prize schedule is convex. (2) Increasing the convexity of the prize schedule or adding more contestants (and the same amount of the lowest prize) into the tournament will induce participants to choose a more dispersed distribution.

Author(s): Changxia Ke, Gregory Kubitz, Yang Liu, Lionel Page

Topic: Contest and Tournament

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Shame and Fame in Competition

Yong-Ju Lee
Yeungnam University

<ABSTRACT>

Ex ante asymmetry between competitors may generate additional motives for them to work harder in competition. We identify psychological motives such as shame and fame and investigate how asymmetry in competition induces shame and fame, which in turn affect individuals' equilibrium effort. Using the framework of two-player asymmetric contests, we show that interaction between the "shame-fame encouragement effect" and the standard discouragement effect of asymmetry generates a non-trivial comparative static { individual effort being single-peaked in the degree of asymmetry. Our data from laboratory real-effort games that are designed to induce reasonably high shame sensitivity provide strong supporting evidence.

Author(s): Yong-Ju Lee, Wooyoung Lim

Topic: Contest and Tournament

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Dynamic Asymmetry in Contests: Theory and Experiment

Nishtha Sharma
University of California Irvine

<ABSTRACT>

I study a repeated contest between players of asymmetric strength: strong and weak. With equal effort, the strong player is more likely to win the contest than the weak player due to asymmetric resources, ability, confidence, and experience. I assume that if the weak player wins in the first period despite the lower strength, then they become stronger in the second period than they initially were (due to reasons such as resources from the winning prize, confidence boost, and experience at winning). Compared with one-shot and fixed-strength repeated contests, I show that both players exert a higher effort in the first round when strength can change. The strong player increases effort to prevent a fall in their relative strength, and the weak player increases effort to cause an increase in their relative strength, a phenomenon I define as the encouragement effect. The model predicts that the increase in the strong player's effort due to the encouragement effect is higher than that of the weaker player. I verify my theoretical predictions in the laboratory by randomly assigning subjects to high and low strengths and making them play a bidding game to influence their probability of winning. As predicted, both players bid higher when strength can change, but the increase is higher for the strong player. Therefore, the strong player has an even higher chance of winning in the first period when the weak player's strength can increase. Due to the higher encouragement effect for the stronger player, the inequality between strong and weak often fails to reduce even when it can.

Author(s): Nishtha Sharma

Topic: Contest and Tournament

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Momentum in contests and its underlying behavioral mechanisms

Gregory Kubitz
QUT

<ABSTRACT>

We investigate the existence and nature of momentum in performance in contests and whether momentum arises for reasons in part unrelated to rational strategies in contests. To address this question, we look at a setting where strategic considerations should not generate momentum: a sequence of two rounds of independent contests. We show that if we relax the assumption of payoff maximizing agents, positive momentum (success tends to be followed by more success) or negative momentum (success tends to be followed by less success) can arise through several behavioral mechanisms that have, until now, not been widely considered in the literature. We examine these predictions in an experiment. Using random variations in the participants' winning chances in a first contest to identify the causal effect of success on later performance, we find that a positive momentum exists. Using several experimental conditions which modulate the effect of the different possible mechanisms, we find that the pattern of momentum is most compatible with players' having adaptive preferences, whereby they lose interest in the second contest after failing to win the first one. These results suggest that standard models of contests do not fully capture the behavioral dynamics existing in competitive settings.

Author(s): Gregory Kubitz, Lionel Page, Hao Wan

Topic: Contest and Tournament

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Statistical Discrimination Against Minority Groups

David Hagmann
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

<ABSTRACT>

Statistical discrimination relies on people interpreting information about group differences. Across three pre-registered experiments (n = 7,002), we show that information about the demographics of top performers induces incorrect beliefs that lead to discrimination against minority groups. Participants are less likely to hire women when they receive information about top performers in a male-dominated candidate pool, even when there are no gender differences in performance, and are less likely to hire better-performing non-White candidates when the racial demographics of the candidate pool reflect the US population. A third experiment with neutral group labels shows this is not a motivated error.

Author(s): David Hagmann, Gwendolin Sajons, Catherine Tinsley

Topic: Discrimination

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Faces matter

Lidingrong Huang
NYU Shanghai

<ABSTRACT>

Using a field experiment on around 45,000 buyers, we explore how attaching faces to product reviews can promote purchases. Since each review on our e-commerce platform is accompanied on the top by a profile photo icon, we modify what this icon displays, whether it is the face picture of the review writer (i.e. the Face treatment) or the system-default photo of a chicken (i.e. the Chicken default). Upon entering the online product page, the customers are either shown the face-treated reviews or the chicken-default reviews while holding the review contents unchanged. Their purchase decisions are then logged. On average, around 7% more subjects in the face-treated group decide to subsequently purchase the product. The findings suggest that revealing faces would indeed encourage consumption decision-making and we propose at least two possible mechanisms, information trustworthiness and attention. The experiment is complemented by an extension that tests whether the personalisation aspect of using a customised profile photo would already influence spending. Our research sheds light on how human faces facilitate purchases in the field.

Author(s): Lidingrong Huang, Peiran Jiao, Ye Jin

Topic: Discrimination

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What's the Value of Face? Measuring the WTA to Disclose Important Personal Information

Yu Gao
Peking University

<ABSTRACT>

Facial recognition technologies that facilitate ID verification and security services are widely employed worldwide. Yet, evidence of people's valuation of their facial information is still lacking. We investigate Chinese people's willingness to accept (WTA) to disclose facial photos and travel history by providing "take-it-or-leave-it" offers in an online experiment. We find that the estimated value of a facial photo is CNY 34.14 (or 5 USD), which is 1.2 times the minimum hourly wage, in contrast to that of travel history of CNY 15.98 (or 2.22 USD). Furthermore, females or people without a bachelor's degree are less willing to disclose their facial or travel history information than others. Estimating households' WTA to disclose important personal information has implications for the theoretical modeling of people's privacy preferences and personal information protection legislation.

Author(s): Yu Gao, Juanjuan Meng, Yu Wang

Topic: Discrimination

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Attitudes towards refugees and identity

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<ABSTRACT>

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has generated the fastest-growing refugee crisis since World War II. More than two million people left Ukraine in the first two weeks of the war, with the European Union estimating that there may eventually be seven million refugees. Many of these refugees sought asylum in countries at the border, like Poland and other central- and eastern-European countries, while some moved to other European countries like Italy. The humanitarian response has been heartening, notwithstanding some countries' past resistance to providing similar support to asylum-seekers from other regions of the world. As Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiril Petkov said recently about people from Ukraine: "These are not the refugees we are used to. ... These people are Europeans. ... These people are intelligent, they are educated people. ... This is not the refugee wave we have been used to, people we were not sure about their identity, people with unclear pasts, who could have been even terrorists." The literature exploring the reasons behind the attitudes towards migrants shows that, along with economic motives, identity concerns play a significant role in affecting how much natives welcome migrants and refugees. People perceive society through the lens of a group they belong to, and this self-categorization generates the distinction between ingroups and outgroups. Ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice are common traits in behavior. This paper explores Italian natives' attitude towards refugees, some sharing a common European identity and some not sharing it, being from outside Europe. In particular, we collect donations in favor of two distinct groups of refugees hosted in Italy. One group comprises Ukrainian refugees, who should be perceived close in terms of (European) identity. The other group comprises African refugees, who are likely to be perceived as distant from Europeans in terms of culture and religion. The survey collects the total amount of the donation and the choice of the form of the transfer, whether in-kind or cash. From an economic point of view, cash transfers are superior to in-kind ones because the freedom of choice maximizes recipients' utility. Conversely, givers prefer in-kind transfers because they care about the recipients' consumption of specific goods and do not appreciate the consumption of other goods. We thus interpret cash transfer as a form of distrust towards recipients.

Author(s): Cristina Cattaneo, Daniela Grieco, Nicola Lacetera, Mario Macis

Topic: Discrimination

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Gender stereotypes and performance gaps

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<ABSTRACT>

This study investigates how participants exposed to competition react to gender stereotypes in performance. We propose two novel gender-oriented tasks: clicking as a male-oriented task and face recall as a female-oriented task with two treatment conditions, which can strengthen shared gender stereotypes and foster gender competition. The gender performance gap in these two tasks clearly exists in the baseline and prevails across treatments. We observe winners' improvement in the dominant task and losers' deterioration in the dominated task, which becomes more significant with the treatments. Our results suggest that task stereotypes affect performance of dominated groups, discouraging losers and repressing their productivity in the labor market.

Author(s): Jaesun Lee, Ming Jiang, Se Eun Jung

Gender differences in Task performance and expectations

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University of Granada

<ABSTRACT>

Ductor, Goyal and Prummer (Review of Economics and Statistics, 2021) document gender differences in productivity in economics across 30 years. They argue that these differences can be explained by differences in the co-Author(s)hip networks of men and women. Our goal is to test whether differences in the co-Author(s)hip network of men and women can be explained by men and women having different expectations regarding the performance of others. In this paper, we examine gender differences in task performance and expectations in four different tasks (emotion-recognition, verbal ability, mathematical ability, and mental rotation). According to previous literature, these tasks differ in the (ex-ante) expectation that women will perform better than men. We find support for the hypothesis that women perform better than men when eliciting the beliefs of participants in the task and external observers. The use of monetary incentives to elicit expectations does not matter for the accuracy of the reported beliefs (i.e., we do not find support for a social desirability bias or demand-effect). These findings highlight that differences in networks could be explained by homophily or discrimination, rather than expecting different performance from men and women.

Author(s): Antonio Cabrales, Lorenzo Ductor, Ericka Rascon-Ramirez, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

Topic: Gender 2

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Impact of Gender Composition on Team Performance

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<ABSTRACT>

We investigate the impact of gender composition on team performance. We study a game with participants make decisions individually and in groups of five. There are two ways the game is framed. We analyze the relationship between gender diversity in groups and measures of group performance. Our results shed light on the mixed results on the role of female participation and team performance.

Author(s): Wei Zhan, Ann Owen

Topic: Gender 2

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Rank versus Inequality—Does Gender Composition Matter?

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<ABSTRACT>

This study investigates the influence of gender composition on allocation decisions involving a rank–inequality tradeoff. In a laboratory experiment, participants chose to either alleviate inequality by relinquishing their current relative rank or exacerbate inequality by maintaining their current rank. Two essential features of the experiment are: 1) participants' relative rank is the outcome of their real-effort performance and luck; 2) participants' genders are naturally revealed by gender-specific nicknames. We found that female participants are more reluctant to relinquish their current relative rank when the persons ranked below and above them are of the opposite gender. This tendency was less pronounced in the male participants.

Author(s): Duk Gyoo Kim, Max Riegel

Topic: Gender 2

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Perfect conformity to arbitrary rituals engenders trust

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<ABSTRACT>

The signaling effect of ritual conformity on engendering trust in groups is proposed in the social sciences.

However, this effect is elusive as rituals can induce group identity that biases social preferences, as cooperative individuals self-select into groups that demand conformism, or as rituals inculcate prosocial values and norms. To validate the signaling effect of rituals, we experimentally manipulate the observability of conformity to value-neutral synthetic lab rituals in groups. Rituals are performed without financial incentives or knowledge of the subsequent incentivized games that measure trust and social preferences within and between groups. We find that only perfect and observable conformity in groups engenders increased trust. Non-conformity erodes trust, even for perfectly conforming individuals. Observing perfect conformity also increases ingroup sharing if reciprocity by co-players yields mutual benefit even when it is costless to unilaterally benefit others, but not when it yields neither mutual benefit nor welfare gains. Thus, we confirm that the perfect conformity to observable rituals signals a joint commitment to mutual beneficence and in turn engenders trust.

Author(s): Jonathan H. W. Tan, Dinithi N. Jayasekara

Topic: Trust

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Chitchat Matters: How Chatbots Influence Trust in Algorithmic Advice

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<ABSTRACT>

The use of chatbots has become increasingly popular. The chatbots can not only provide instrumental information, such as advice, but also can give a human touch through casual conversation, such as chitchat. This research investigates how the chatbot's chitchat ability affects human-AI trust building. In Study 1, subjects interact with a chatbot in an incentivized cost-loss game. The chatbot advises the individual decision-maker about whether to take the risk or pay a cost to avoid it. Before playing the game, the subject can chat freely with the chatbot. The Author(s) experimentally manipulate the chatbot's chitchat ability and find it systematically affects the subject's tendency to follow the advice. Further analysis reveals that although the chitchat affects participants' emotions and the perceived social distance, the effect of the chitchat is primarily driven by the changes in the perceived intelligence and trustworthiness of the chatbot. Two pre-registered follow-up studies replicate the main effects and shed light on the design of effective human-algorithm interactions and algorithmic transparency policies. Managers should exercise caution when deploying chatbots because many chatbots in the market have a low ability to chitchat and the algorithm is not transparent to the consumers.

Author(s): Yunfeng Lu, Yohanes Eko Riyanto, Georgios Christopoulos, Xing Zhang

Topic: Trust

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Receiving credit: On delegation and responsibility

Yadi Yang

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<ABSTRACT>

Evidence has shown that blame for a "bad" decision can be shifted by delegating the decision to someone else. We conduct experiments to examine whether the reverse is also true: Does one receive credit for taking a "good" decision as compared to delegating the decision to someone else? Our results indicate that the answer is affirmative. A person receives higher rewards when she makes a fair decision herself than when a delegate does. This indicates that responsibility attribution is a double-edged sword that applies to both bad and good outcomes.

Author(s): Cedric Argenton, Jan Potters, Yadi Yang

Topic: Trust

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Institutional quality causes social trust: Experimental evidence on trusting under the shadow of doubt

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<ABSTRACT>

Generalised trust is essential for collective action, which is at the heart of many societal problems. Institutional quality has been proposed as a determinant of generalised trust, though while the correlation between the two is strong and robust, the evidence on the causal link is scant. We show that this relationship is causal. We first experimentally expose individuals to institutions of different quality, operationalised as their ability to prevent corrupt behaviour. We then measure generalised trust using a trust game. The results show that institutional

quality drives generalised trust and that this effect is generated by the mere doubt that corrupt behaviours might succeed, even without knowledge of occurrence or success of such behaviours. Cross-country comparisons with novel data support our results. Our contributions are the first causal experimental evidence on the link between institutional quality and trust and a novel experimental design for modelling institutional quality in laboratory settings.

Author(s): Andrea FM Martinangeli, Marina Povitkina, Sverker Jagers, Bo Rothstein

Topic: Trust

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Is reputation a monitoring device or an information device?

Lijia Tan

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<ABSTRACT>

This paper studies how reputation schemes build trust and promote cooperative behaviors in an open innovation interaction. An initiator develops a risky project internally or together with a partner. Cooperation is socially beneficial but entails post-cooperation exploitation from the partner; therefore, the initiator turns down the cooperation in the equilibrium. We find the partner's reputation records, both partially and fully, boost cooperation. Our theoretical investigations show that a reputation scheme serves as (1) an informational device for the initiator to infer the partner's hidden type (in the reputation consumption stage); and (2) a monitoring device to deter the partner's undesirable hidden actions (in the reputation production stage). Using a mixed experimental design with two stages and three reputation intensities, we separate the reputation's production and consumption stages and distinguish its informational and monitoring role. We find the reputation scheme is more effective in breeding cooperation as a monitoring device.

Author(s): Yan Xu, Shuanping Dai, Lijia Tan

Topic: Drivers of Individual Decisions

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Cost Levels Anchoring in Discrete Choice Experiments

Stanislaw Kaniewski

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<ABSTRACT>

Valuation of public goods is commonly done using Stated Preference (SP) methods, such as the Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE). In DCE respondents are asked to choose between presented alternatives, which may represent possible policies that differ with respect to attribute levels, including the cost. This approach allows for using observed choices to model respondents' utility functions and eventually their Willingness To Pay (WTP) for new policies and their attributes. However, the hypothetical nature of choices made by respondents makes them prone to various behavioural phenomena (Johnston et al., 2017). One of them, observed in a variety of contexts and settings is anchoring (Ariely et al., 2003) -- a cognitive bias whereby an individual's decisions are influenced by a particular reference point. If anchoring to the cost levels used in experimental design occurs then the resulting value estimates may be biased. For example, using lower or higher cost levels of the presented alternatives could change the resulting WTP estimates. In this study, we test whether the cost vector used in experimental design is anchoring respondents' WTP and investigate its potential drivers. We use experimental treatments to test, if such an anchoring occurs and investigate whether it is driven by the mean or the range of the cost vector used in a DCE study. In a 2-by-2 experimental treatment we vary (1) mean levels of the cost vector and (2) range of the cost vectors, around these means. This allows us to independently evaluate the effects of these design dimensions. The empirical application concerns valuation of Galileo -- the European geolocation system, which is developed as an alternative to the American Global Positioning System (GPS). The data comes from an CAPI-based survey of the population of Poland which run in waves from November 2018 to August 2019. The representative sample of 1,862 respondents were selected based on social-demographic quota and only active users of GPS were invited. Each participant faced 12 treatments (in a random order) with 2 or 3 alternatives, with the first one being 'opt-out'. In each treatment, a respondent would see 3 variables: cost, sharing anonymous and sharing personal location data (obligatory, optional or no sharing at all). We model the data with the state-of-the-art mixed logit model while controlling for the treatment-specific scale. We find that changing the mean cost levels appears to influence the estimated WTP associated with the 'opt-out' constant and do not significantly influence other attributes. The effect for the opt-out constant, however, significantly changes the WTP associated with a hypothetical policy. The effect is the strongest for the low range of cost levels and is mitigated by using the highest range of bids. On the other hand, we find that the range of bids (for the same mean level of costs) does not significantly influence WTP. In addition, we observe the impacts of the cost vector on the share of 'opt-out' choices answers and using systematic strategies, supporting findings from (Glenk et al., 2019). These results are in line with theoretical expectations, including higher probability of reaching 'choke price'

in high mean or high range treatments (Mørkbak et al., 2010). Higher range of bids decrease number of opt outs and number of people using systematic strategies. However, they do not disappear, and as we usually have lower boundary for cost (0), the upper boundary can be arbitrarily high and still be accepted by yeah-sayers (Kragt, 2013). This finding lends support to the fat-tails problem (Parsons & Myers, 2016): extremely high bids which will be unconditionally accepted can be abused to introduce arbitrarily high bias in WTP estimates. The paper concludes with providing guidance for future studies, such as using larger rather than smaller range of cost levels. The anchoring, however, likely remains a concern for SP-based valuation studies.

Author(s): Mikolaj Czajkowski, Marek Giergiczny, Maciej Sobolewski, Stanislaw Kaniewski

Topic: Drivers of Individual Decisions

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Impact of online environment on individual and group performance: an experiment

Mofei Jia

Xi'an Jiaotong Liverpool University

<ABSTRACT>

Working from home is a new trend in some industries in the short future, which means more individual and group tasks are conducted online. Therefore, we investigate whether online environment has impacts on individual performance and group cooperation. We conducted an individual task, i.e., a guessing game, and a group task, i.e., a public goods game, in lab and online experiments, respectively. To manipulate online environment and mimic working scenario, participants were connected in a local virtual environment and supported by a live virtual meeting in the online experiment. We find that, when people are cooperating, the online and offline results are comparable. However, when people are competing with each other, especially when the game involves strategic interactive thinking, significant difference is detected: online people are more rational and the results converge faster to Nash Equilibrium. It seems that when people are working online, they are in a "cooler" state and may make more rational decisions.

Author(s): Mofei Jia

Topic: Drivers of Individual Decisions

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Central Bank Digital Currency and Privacy: A Randomized Survey Experiment

Young Sik Kim

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<ABSTRACT>

Privacy protection is among the key features to consider in the design of central bank digital currency (CBDC). Using a nationally representative sample of over 3,500 participants, we conduct a randomized online survey experiment with treatments to examine how the willingness to use CBDC as a means of payment varies with the degree of privacy protection and information provision on privacy benefits of using CBDC, respectively. We find that both treatments significantly increase participants' willingness to use CBDC by up to 60% when purchasing privacy-sensitive products. Our findings provide useful insights on the design and the public's adoption of CBDC.

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Topic: Drivers of Individual Decisions

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Swagger and Bragging

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<ABSTRACT>

An individual's public declarations to others about what they have done, or plan to do, are a potentially powerful source of individual motivation. We examine the influences of two types of boasting, swagger (ex-ante declaration of future goals) and bragging (ex-post declaration of accomplishments), in a series of laboratory experiments. Our experimental design allows observation of the effects of both private declarations and public ones with social media-style peer approval. We observe that different types of opportunities to boast significantly affect performance outcomes, but not always in a positive direction. In particular, private swagger can be significantly detrimental to an individual's future performance. Public swagger with endogenously chosen declaration levels is most effective in increasing overall performance, and in terms of individuals successfully fulfilling their declarations. In terms of bragging, we find that declarations about one's past performance tend to increase future performance; however, over-confident individuals' performance is relatively harmed, while under-confident individuals have the

greatest performance increases. The positive effect of under-confidence is enhanced with increasing exposure to social approval. When not given a chance to observe actual performances, peers tend to reward median range self-assessments with "likes", but reward both low and high self-assessments relatively more when performance is verifiable. Overall, our study demonstrates a significant effect of boasting on outcomes, while the explanatory factors behind social approval mechanisms can be complex.

Author(s): Shaoan Huang, Jaimie Lien, Jie Zheng

Topic: Beliefs and Attitudes

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Analytic thinking and attitude toward COVID-19

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<ABSTRACT>

Research on opinion disagreement and belief polarization generally depends on the heterogeneity of priors, while where the different priors come from is not well answered. We run a large-scale online survey experiment at different time points when Chinese people were facing different COVID policies. We find robust evidence that analytic thinking ability significantly explains the attitude differences toward COVID-19 and disagreement over COVID policies. A randomly introduced accuracy nudging intervention on the harm of COVID-19 could not change this pattern and the results are robust in another sample of highly educated respondents. The study suggests that analytic thinking are important source of polarization.

Author(s): Shuguang Jiang, Siyu Wang, Qian Wei

Topic: Beliefs and Attitudes

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Self-serving Regret: Experimental Evidence from a Reciprocity Game

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<ABSTRACT>

Self-interested behavior has been well identified in dictator games: people allocate little or nothing to serve their interests better. Although it has long been recognized that beliefs about others are critical in interpersonal interactions, the mechanism by which self-serving beliefs result in self-serving behavior remains unclear. To explore the relationship among the conflict of interest, belief formation, and the resulting behavior, this study designed a three-stage reciprocity game with belief elicitation and regret option and conducted a laboratory experiment using university students as the subject pool. By asking recipients to predict the allocators' decisions and incentivizing the prediction, we discover that people rationalize their own self-serving bias by believing that others are similarly self-interested and then returning the 'favor' in the name of fairness. Additionally, this study examined post-decision regret by the reciprocators, and the asymmetry between upward and downward adjustments indicates a self-serving pattern: Reciprocators who under-estimated the allocated amount are less likely to make an upward adjustment compared to the likelihood of downward adjustment made by those who over-estimated the allocated amount. This study contributes to the literature on self-serving bias by better understanding the presence of self-serving beliefs and self-serving behavior.

Author(s): Zeng Lian, Xin Shen, Jie Zheng

Topic: Beliefs and Attitudes

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Pandemic Beliefs and Precautions: Evidence from China and the United States

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<ABSTRACT>

We conduct a recent survey on beliefs regarding COVID, experiences and precautions taken among citizens of the United States and China. In China, we focus on Shanghai, which had been through a substantial period of lockdown policy. We examine how lockdown experiences and living conditions interact with residents' outlook on the future. Respondents in the United States exhibited relatively more pessimism on average regarding the end of the pandemic, while taking on average, lower precautions. Residents in Shanghai expressed relatively more negative psychological and economic pandemic effects. A substantial fraction of respondents in each country expressed belief that the pandemic was due to a foreign country rather than arising domestically or entirely naturally – however, respondents in each country differed in terms of their impression of the foreign country's

intentions. We examine how economic conditions and attention to media sources are related to respondents' beliefs about COVID.

Author(s): Jaimie Lien, Jie Zheng

Topic: Beliefs and Attitudes

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